WorldPeace - "WorldPeace verses The State Bar of Texas" - World Peace

NO. 2002-42081

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER                 §          IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DISCIPLINE                                                 §
                                                                        §
V.                                                                    §          HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
                                                                        §
JOHN WORLDPEACE                                §          269TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DEFENDANT’S SEVENTH AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMS

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT

COMES NOW, John WorldPeace, Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, and files this his DEFENDANT’S SIXTH AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMS and would show the Court the following:

I. PARTIES

1.01 Petitioner, Commission for Lawyer Discipline, is a governmental body under the State Bar of Texas.

1.02 Respondent, WorldPeace is an individual residing and doing business in Houston, Harris County, Texas.

1.03 Third Party Defendant, John Lang is an individual residing and doing business in Houston, Harris, County, Texas.

1.04 Third Party Defendant, Philip Apodaca is an individual residing in Houston, Harris County, Texas.

1.05 Counter Defendants, J. G. Molleston, Dawn Miller and Leigh Arneman, attorneys at law, are individuals and residents of Houston, Harris County, Texas.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PARTIES ……………………………….......................................................................... 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………….........................

GENERAL DENIAL………………………………………………...............................

WORLDPEACE’S COUNTER CLAIMS AND FURTHER DEFENSES………….

A. COUNTERCLAIM - RULE 13 SANCTIONS AGAINST THE COMMISSION..

B. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE: THE STATE BAR VIOLATION OF

WORLDPEACE’S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS…………………………………

C(1) DEFENSE: ATTORNEY FEES - STATE BAR………………………………...

C(2) COUNTERCLAIM: ATTORNEY FEES - WORLDPEACE………………………

D. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL - DUE PROCESS..

E. DEFENSE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL RANGE OF PUNISHMENT……………….

F. CONTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL - THE GRIEVANCE PROCESS IS OPPRESSIVE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS…………………….

IX. DEFENSE: REGARDING LANG, LYNCH, NASH, WILLIAMS AND APODACA

THE “SUIT WITHIN A SUIT” REQUIREMENT……………………………….......…

X. REGARDING RULE 801 AND 804 TDRPC………………………………............…

XI RES JUDICATA………………………………............................................................

XII DEFENSE: SEVERANCE - UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS……………

G. COUNTERCLAIM: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS…

IV. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - COLLINS COMPLAINT……………………………..…

XIII. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION - FRASER-NASH………………………………....…

XXI THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - PENNY JO REILLY………………………………..…

VII THIRD PARTY CLAIM - PHILLIP APODACA…………………………….………

XXVII FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - DARLENE WILLIAMS………………………

XXXIII FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION - JOHN V. LYNCH……………………..…………

XLII SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION - JOHN F. LANG………………………………..……

IV THIRD PARTY CLAIM - JOHN LANG……………………………….......................

PRAYER………………………………………………………………........................………

II. GENERAL DENIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

2.01 Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 92, Defendant John WorldPeace asserts a general denial to each and every claim and cause of action set forth in Plaintiff Commission for Lawyer Discipline and demands that Plaintiff Commission for Lawyer Discipline prove their allegations by the greater weight and preponderance of the credible evidence before a jury, as is required by the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas.

2.02 In addition, WorldPeace also alleges that 1) the Commission for Lawyer Discipline (CLD) does not have the legal capacity to sue WorldPeace, 2) that the Commission for Lawyer Discipline is not entitled to recover in the capacity in which it sues, 3) that there is another suit pending in this state between the same parties involving the same claim, 4) there has been an accord and satisfaction, 5) duress, 6) estoppel, and 7) illegality.

2.03 In the Lynch complainant, WorldPeace alleges there was no contract between WorldPeace and Lynch and therefore WorldPeace owed no duty to Lynch.

2.04 WorldPeace pleads the affirmative defense res judicata in the Collins complainant which was tried in the 281^st District Court after the 281^st District Court denied WorldPeace Motion to Consolidate. The Commission opposed WorldPeace’s motion.

2.05 WorldPeace also pleads the defense of a “suit within a suit”. All suits against an attorney by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline are per the common law, malpractice suits. The civil law requires that in order to prove malpractice against a lawyer, which the courts have defined as a suit for negligence, the Commission must prove that the complainant would have won the underlying lawsuit.

The Commission has specifically alleged in most of the complaints in this lawsuit that WorldPeace violated Rule 1.01 (b)(1) TDRPC which includes “neglect” which is a derivative of negligence. Therefore, the Commission must prove in the Apodaca, Williams, Lynch, Nash and Lang cases that they would have won their underlying suits.

In addition, WorldPeace asserts that Apodaca did in fact try the underlying suit without success and therefore WorldPeace is not liable to Apodaca for negligence.

In the Williams and Lang cases, it appears that the statute of limitations has run in the underlying cases and they did not file suit after they filed a grievance against WorldPeace and before the statute of limitations ran. Therefore, they have waived their right to file suit and any suit by the Commission against WorldPeace for not filing suit is frivolous, has been waived and is barred to the Commission.

2.06 In regards to the Rule 8.01 TDRPC and Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP violations alleged by the Commission against WorldPeace. WorldPeace would point out comment 6 under Rule 8.04(c) and comment 10 under Rule 1.02(c).

When the Collin’s grievance was filed, WorldPeace informed the State Bar that he was going to shut down the grievance process.

WorldPeace asserts that he has a right to challenge the TDRPC by not complying with the TDRPC particularly in regards to information requested from WorldPeace in the grievance process. In demanding information from WorldPeace when the State Bar is not required to give WorldPeace information, WorldPeace is disadvantaged in any future lawsuit against him. Comment 2 under Rule 8.01 protects the attorney’s unstated invocation of the Fifth Amendment.

2.07 The grievance process allows a one sided development of the case in that the lawyer is not allowed to see or question the grievance committee, the complainant or see the evidence against him. Consequently, frivolous grievances proceed to trial.

2.08 In addition WorldPeace would show his Fifth Amendment Rights under the United States Constitution and Act 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution protect him from self incrimination in any grievance matter. In all initial requests for a response, the State Bar states that the attorney’s response may be turned over to law enforcement which indirectly indicates criminal prosecution is being considered by the State Bar.

Lastly, at the beginning of each grievance hearing the attorney is read his Fifth Amendment Rights. This is an indication that the demand for information prior to the grievance hearing is also protected by the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, the admonishment by the grievance hearing that the Fifth Amendment is applicable, is an admission that the Respondent attorney is not required to file a response. And if the Respondent is not required to file a statement prior to the grievance hearing, then the Respondent cannot be charged with violating any TDRPC that relate to the failure of the Respondent attorney to communicate with the State Bar about a grievance.

III. WORLDPEACE’S COUNTERCLAIMS AND FURTHER DEFENSES

A. COUNTERCLAIM – RULE 13 SANCTIONS AGAINST THE COMMISSION’S ATTORNEYS

WorldPeace counter sues Dawn Miller, Leigh Arnemann and J. G. Molleston for TRCP Rule 13 Sanctions and sanctions under Chapter 9 and 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code for filing and perpetuating a frivolous and groundless cause of action.

WorldPeace would show the court that each complaint should be considered separately such that sanctions should be awarded on each frivolous and groundless grievance as opposed to the entire lawsuit.

B. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE: THE STATE BAR’S VIOLATION OF WORLDPEACE’S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS

On February 11, 2003, the State Bar via the Commission for Lawyer Discipline sent to WorldPeace a supplement to WorldPeace’s request for discovery. The supplement consisted of four articles from the Houston Chronicle that were written about WorldPeace when he ran for governor of Texas in 2001 and 2002. A fifth newspaper article was about WorldPeace suing the minister and others of his church; an undeniable religious matter unrelated to this lawsuit.

There articles have nothing to do with any of the six complainants which form the basis of the Commission’s lawsuit. Four articles seem to hold a common theme about race which was a high profile issue in the 2002 Texas Governor’s race. There are no allegation in this lawsuit by the Commission that even remotely relate to these articles.

The implication is that the Commission filed suit against WorldPeace for his political activism.

In addition, to the above articles, the Commission also included WorldPeace’s web page regarding his present run for Mayor of Houston. Within the WorldPeace for Mayor Page, there is a reference to WorldPeace’s religious beliefs and there is a link from that page to the WorldPeace Peace Page where WorldPeace has extensive writings about religion and the interrelationship between religion and politics and the law.

There can be little doubt that the Commission has no other reason to bring WorldPeace’s web pages into evidence in this case for any reason except to attempt to try WorldPeace’s religious and political beliefs to the jury.

It is a violation of Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution to discriminate based on religious beliefs.

WorldPeace would show the court that when an opponent in any lawsuit begins to personally attack the opposing lawyer or party, it is because there is no basis for the underlying case.

WorldPeace has filed for Rule 13 sanctions but now has undeniable evidence that the State Bar maliciously filed suit on WorldPeace by way of five frivolous complaints and one complaint that had already been tried.

Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.08. Prohibited Discriminatory Activities (a) A lawyer shall not willfully, in connection with an adjudicatory proceeding, except as provided in paragraph (b), manifest, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on race, color, national origin, religion, disability, age, sex, or sexual orientation towards any person involved in that proceeding in any capacity.

WorldPeace sues the State Bar for religious discrimination.

C(1). DEFENSE ATTORNEY FEES – STATE BAR

The dollar value of the State Bar attorney’s is what he or she gets paid by the State Bar. That is the undeniable going rate. That is what the State Bar can purchase an attorney for on the open market. To allow a State Bar attorney to allege that he or she should be paid what a private attorney charges is nonsense.

When applying the reasonable fees standards, the salary of the Commission’s attorney is the undeniable reasonable salary of the State Bar attorney. It is the value of the State Bar attorney’s time for that kind of work.

Further, since the State Bar attorneys are salaried, the State Bar would have to prove that “but for” the WorldPeace complaints it would not have hired its attorneys in order to be awarded attorneys fees. This is the way it works in the real world. When someone needs an attorney, they hire one at the going rate.

However, in the case of the State Bar, their budget authorizes the hiring of staff attorneys and those attorneys are not working on a contract basis. They are full time employees.

Therefore, the State Bar has not incurred any additional attorney fees for its prosecution of the complaints against WorldPeace which would justify attorney fee sanctions. The State Bar must prove that “but for” the complaints against WorldPeace they would not have salaried an attorney to file suit against WorldPeace.

The State Bar cannot do this. The only case law that the State Bar has offered is off point because it discusses private attorneys working pro bono for the State Bar and then being awarded attorney fees. None of the State Bar attorneys in this lawsuit are private pro bono attorneys.

C(2). COUNTERCLAIM ATTORNEY FEES – WORLDPEACE

Since the State Bar per the TRDP and TDRPC claim they can receive attorney fees when none have been incurred, WorldPeace alleges he can as an attorney be awarded attorney fees for the time he had to spend defending himself in this lawsuit.

It does not matter that WorldPeace is pro se.

The principal seems to be that time spent by the Commission’s attorney is compensible even through no fees were incurred and it is unjust to allow those fees to the Bar and then deny attorneys fees to the Respondent’s attorney.

D. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL - DUE PROCESS

WorldPeace would allege that the State Bar in the complaints of Collins, Apodaca and Lynch recommended a sanction of public reprimand for WorldPeace. (Ex __) WorldPeace would show the court that his rights of due process were violated under both the United States and Texas Constitution because the filing of a lawsuit against WorldPeace places into the permanent public record a public reprimand.

In other words, the State Bar has the power to impose a sanction of private or public reprimand on WorldPeace without WorldPeace being given any real alternative. WorldPeace would show the court that even the most frivolous of grievances can put pressure on an attorney to accept a private or public reprimand even when it is not deserved because the alternative is a trial de novo in the District Court which amounts to a public reprimand.

WorldPeace would also show the court that the alternative to a trial de novo is a Evidentiary Hearing where the attorney has less rights than he does in a civil trial. No one can doubt that an Evidentiary Hearing is little more than the reinforcement of the State Bar grievance process.

WorldPeace would show the court that the only real option for an attorney to get a fair hearing in a grievance is a trial de novo in the civil court where he can level the playing field between himself and the State Bar.

E. DEFENSE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL RANGE OF PUNISHMENT

WorldPeace would show the court that the range of punishment which allows disbarment for the most minor acts of Professional Misconduct, such that failing to return one phone call, can result in disbarment and is therefore arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.

WorldPeace would show the court that virtually all lawsuits have a range of punishment for damages in civil cases to a definite strata of punishments in the criminal cases such that the punishment fits the crime.

The grievance process is a quasi criminal procedure. The grievance process gives a Fifth Amendment warning at the grievance hearings: they are related to grand jury proceedings.

Therefore, there should be a range of punishment applied to various violations.

F. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL - THE GRIEVANCE PROCESS IS OPPRESSIVE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

WorldPeace would show that the grievance process is unconstitutional due to its oppressive, arbitrary and capriciousness as exemplified by: 1) Attorney respondents in the grievance process are subject to being sanctioned for revealing any confidences in the process but if the complainant non-attorney reveals those confidences there is no sanctions applicable to the complainant, 2) There is a conflict in laws such that confidences that are prohibited from being revealed can be revealed in a pleading in a lawsuit without repercussions: 3) The senior investigator can designate intolerant grievance panels to hear grievances against attorneys the investigator wants sanctioned; 4) the offer of a private or public reprimand by the grievance committee can be forced upon an attorney because the filing of a civil suit against the attorney acts as a public reprimand thus making a settlement offer of a private or public reprimand an empty offer; 5) the commission can enforce double sanctions through Rule 8.04 (a)(1) which boosts any violation of the TDRPC; 6) the attorney is intimidated and coerced into presenting to the grievance panel evidence that will violate his rights against self incrimination - all demands for information from the State Bar stating that the information can be forwarded to law enforcement and all grievance hearings open with an admonition to the attorney about his rights against self incrimination; 7) the grievance process can be abused to influence legitimate attorney client fee disputes ; 8) the Commission can seek attorney fees even when it incurs none; 9) attorney fees can be calculated on the rates charged by private attorneys when the State Bar’s in house attorneys make about 20% of the private rate - the best evidence of reasonable attorney fees is what the State Bar attorneys are paid; 10) attorney fees can be charged for attorneys who are employed by the State Bar and no proof is required to be offered by the State Bar that “but for” the acts of the Respondent, the State Bar would not have employed an attorney; 11) there is no range of punishment that limits the sanctions available to the court in a disciplinary action so not returning one phone call can result in disbarment; there is no standard for which the various judges who hear these matters can use as a guideline. (12) the attorneys for the State Bar are immune from prosecution for their tortious and even criminal acts committed during the course of attempting to sanction an attorney; (13) the most abusive attorneys, like Jim Adler of Houston, can avoid prosecution by becoming members of the grievance panels; (14) the grievance process is so skewed against the respondent attorney that his best strategy is to not cooperate with the State Bar and let the grievance go into a civil lawsuit where the respondent has a level playing field under the law and the TRCP. 15) The process allows for arbitrary application of the TDRPC to attorneys. 16) A pro se Respondent attorney is not allowed attorney fees. 17) The State Bar is allowed to combine grievances into one lawsuit by alleging common violations of the TDRPC even though those violations do not apply to every grievance.

The solution to all these issues is to disband the grievance process and open the TDRPC to the client in a civil lawsuit. Any other system allows for abuses by the grievance bureaucracy.

IX. DEFENSE: Regarding Lang, Lynch, Nash, Williams and Apodaca the “suit within a suit” requirement

WorldPeace would show the court that the suit that the Commission has filed against WorldPeace is in essence a malpractice suit. As such, the Commission is required to prove a “suit within a suit”. The Commission is required to prove that Lang, Lynch, Nash, Williams, Apodaca would have won their suits had WorldPeace not been negligent.

Further, WorldPeace would show the court that all but Lynch’s claims come under the four year statute of limitation and that Lang, Williams and Apodaca were still able to file suit after filing a grievance against WorldPeace. WorldPeace would show the court that none of the complainants have made an effort to file suit.

WorldPeace would show the court that the lawsuit that the Commission has filed against WorldPeace is frivolous and groundless. WorldPeace would show the court that the Commission is taking on causes of action that the complainants are not willing to prosecute themselves.

WorldPeace would show the court that there the standard of neglect in a State Bar suit against an attorney should not have a lesser standard of care than the common law requires of an attorney in a legal malpractice case. Either the attorney was negligent or he was not. And that negligence must have caused harm. There are many neglectful acts of an attorney that do not cause harm. The complaintant must prove that he or she was harmed if there the attorney is to be found negligent.

The TDRPC is too broad such that an attorney could neglect to call a client without any harm to the client and yet for this neglect the attorney could be disbarred because there is no range of punishment for this kind of infraction.

X. REGARDING RULE 801 AND 804 TDRPC

WorldPeace would show the court that in several of the complaints the Commission has alleged Rule 804 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Number Eight of Rule 804(a) indicates that WorldPeace failed to timely furnish to the Chief Disciplinary Council Office or District Grievance Committee a response or other information as required by the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. Unless he or she in good faith firmly asserts a privilege or other legal ground for failure to do so.

WorldPeace would show the court that per comment number six of that rule it states that a lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief openly asserted that no valuable obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.02c concerning a good faith challenge of validity, scope, meaning or application of law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.

Further, WorldPeace would show that per Rule 801 comment number two, it sates that this rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provision of Article 1 Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. A person relying on such provision in response to a specific question a more general demand for information, however, should do so openly and not use the right of non disclosure and non asserted justification for failure to comply with this rule.

WorldPeace would show the court that the language of the comment uses the word should as opposed to shall. WorldPeace is therefore not required to openly assert the Fifth Amendment per the rules.

Further, WorldPeace would show the court that in each Bar Grievance it states that the State Bar is going to turn over the information that it acquires to law enforcement officials. The Miranda decision begins with “you have the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you, etc.” WorldPeace had a right to remain silent and that is exactly what he did at the grievance portion of the disciplinary process.

XI. RES JUDICATA

WorldPeace would show the court that the Collins complaint was tried in the 281^st District Court, Harris County, Texas (No. 2000-31108; WorldPeace v. Collins, 281^st District Court, Harris County, Texas) which was filed by WorldPeace on June 20, 2000.

The Commission filed suit on WorldPeace in this cause regarding the Collins complaint on August 20, 2002.

WorldPeace filed a motion to have the Commission’s cause of action regarding Collins in this case consolidated with WorldPeace’s cause of action against Collins in the 281^st District Court.

The Commission objected to WorldPeace’s motion and the 281^st District Court abused its discretion by refusing to consolidate the cases under TRCP Rule 39.

Final judgment was entered on February 28, 2003.

The problem in this case is that the Commission has not applied the same argument that cases cannot be combined with regard to WorldPeace’s Third Party Claims against Lang and Apodaca. Either, cases can be combined or the cannot.

There is no overriding TRDP Rule that prevents the combining of suits under Rule 39 TRCP and therefore the State Bar’s action should have been consolidated with the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit that had been filed a full year prior to the Commission’s lawsuit.

Per the local rules, WorldPeace was required to file for the consolidation in the 281^st District Court which he did. This court had no jurisdiction per the local rules to consolidate the lawsuit.

Since the lawsuits were not consolidated per Rule 39, TRCP, the Commission is barred by res judicata from retrying the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit.

In addition, the Commission is barred from filing a cause of action for Restitution in this lawsuit because Collins failed to file for restitution in the underlying case.

XII. DEFENSE: SEVERANCE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS

WorldPeace would show the court that range of damages in this lawsuit is not just death penalty sanctions but the loss of one’s vocation.

WorldPeace would show the court that he cannot get a fair trial with six grievances consolidated is one lawsuit. WorldPeace would show the court this prejudices the jury against WorldPeace due to the number of grievances. This is true even if all grievances are frivolous and groundless which they are.

Further, WorldPeace would show the court that in a combined trial there must be an agreement by 10 of the 12 jurors on each compliant as opposed to an agreement on the overall verdict.

An agreement on the overall verdict could require some bargaining between the jury on voting for or against particular complaints in order to reach an overall verdict.

This results in factors being considered which one outside the facts of a particular complaint but go to the negotiation by the jury of a verdict which they can all sign their name to.

This unnecessarily burdens some jurors to indirectly vote against the attorney on a complaintant that they would normally not vote against. It also suggests to the jury that they are to consider whether the attorney should be sanctioned based on the number of grievances as opposed to the merit of each individual grievance.

There should be separate jury findings on each grievance and no jury finding on the combined grievances.

G. COUNTERCLAIM: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

WorldPeace would show the court that the entire grievance process as applied to WorldPeace in this lawsuit has been abusive, malicious, and aggressive. Further, WorldPeace would show the court that the specific grievances have no basis in fact or law and therefore were frivolous and groundless.

WorldPeace would show the court that the State Bar has a history of illegally filing a lawsuit against WorldPeace.

Therefore, WorldPeace sues the State Bar for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and sues for damages equal to the value of his legal fees in this lawsuit.

IV.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

COLLINS COMPLAINT

On or about January 27, 1999, Johnell Collins (hereinafter referred to as “Complainant” borrowed some $22,000.00 from Bank One to purchase a 1979 Ford Semi-Tractor and a 1993 Lufkin Trailer (hereinafter referred to as “the truck”) to be used by Complainant’s companion, Alvin Arbuckle (hereinafter referred to as “Arbuckle”). In March 1999, Collins threw Arbuckle out of her house after they had been living together for three months. Collins did not immediately register the semi tractor with the State of Texas in her name. After moving out, Arbuckle registered the truck in his own name. Thereafter, a dispute regarding ownership arose between Complainant and Arbuckle.

Collins hirded ___ Bard, attorney at law, to represent her in obtaining title to the truck. Collins went to Arbuckle’s where the truck was being stored and took possession of it.

Suit was filed in County Court at Law No. 3 by Bard, for Collins against Arbuckle. When the judge heard the matter, the judge stated that the problem sounded like a family matter to her and that the lawsuit really belonged in the family court.

After this statement by the court, Collins, made an appointment with WorldPeace. WorldPeace wrote a contract with Collins. Normally WorldPeace charges a $100 non-refundable retainer for a first interview which usually includes a intitial demand letter to the opposing party.

However, in this case, WorldPeace was not starting from scratch, but he had to overcome the fact that Collins had already received a negative ruling from Judge Bradshaw Hull in CCCL # 3. Had Collins not received a negative ruling, then there would have been no need for her to been looking for another attorney.

WorldPeace told Collins that he had sued Judge Bradshaw-Hull’s husband and therefore she would have to recuse herself if WorldPeace substituted in on the lawsuit. None-the-less WorldPeace had to overcome the negative handling of the lawsuit which would go to the new judge.

Therefore, WorldPeace charged Collins a $2,400 non-refundable retainer just to get the case back to zero as if nothing had been done by the prior attorney. Collins agreed to the $2,400 plus an additional percentage of any gross recovery.

WorldPeace substituted into the lawsuit and had the lawsuit moved to County Courty at Law No. 2.

The problem with the truck was that it was a business assets which was used to make money. The intrinsic value of the truck was $22,000 but the true value of the truck was $1,700 per week in income. Therefore, the annual value of the truck was about $90,000.

On or about April 28, 1999, Complainant retained the services of Respondent to represent her in an ongoing lawsuit to regain ownership of the truck. (Ex “A”) A contract was signed in which Complainant would pay a non refundable retainer of $2,500.00 (due to the fact that Collins’ prior attorney had already lost the lawsuit) plus thirty-three and one-third percent (33-1/3%) of any gross recovery after attorney’s initial contact with Arbuckle’s attorney, thirty-three and one-third percent (33 1/3%) of any gross recovery after suit is filed and forty percent (40%) of any gross recovery of any settlement 56 days prior to the first trial date.

Gross recover was defined as any award or settlement including attorney fees.

Complainant paid the non-refundable retainer and understood the contract to be that she would pay all expenses and receive a percentage of any cash recovery.

WorldPeace understood the contract to mean that he would get the applicable percentages of any award or settlement, cash or otherwise.

Respondent did not tell Complainant that he expected to be paid a percentage on the value of the truck [TDRPC 1.03(a)].

This matter is a simple contract dispute and nothing more. It would be very unfortunate if every time there was a contract dispute, between an attorney and client the client would file a grievance with the State Bar.

The Retainer Agreement between Collins and WorldPeace was self explanatory and clear WorldPeace would receive a percentage of any gross recovery (any award or settlement).

When both parties have different understanding of the contract terms, there is no meeting of the minds and therefore no contract.

WorldPeace used the words “a percentage of ‘any gross recovery’” in his Retainer Agreement. He did not use the word cash. He did not use the word amount. He used gross recovery to mean any gross recovery.

The law changed after the Retainer Agreement was signed between WorldPeace and Collins with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Levine v. Bayne, Swell & Krause; 405 S.W. 3d 92 (Tex. 2001). Levine said an attorney must be specific in his contract regarding non cash recoveries. WorldPeace used the words “any gross recovery” and defined that as any award or settlement. The Levine talked about a phrase in a contract that said, “any amount received by settlement or recovery”. There is a difference between the words gross recovery and the words “any amount recovered”. Amount indicates money. WorldPeace alleges that his contract did not come under the Levine ruling and will appeal the 281^st District Court’s ruling on this matter.

There can be no bar violation by WorldPeace simply because after his best abilities to draft a contract that seemed to him to be self explanatory and after the subsequent Levine ruling Collins challenged the terms of the contract.

WorldPeace would further show the court that this matter has already tried in the 281^st District Court. A final judgment was not signed in that matter until February 2003, even though it was tried in September 2002.

A careful look at the jury charge which is part of the final order will show that the 281^st District Court made a ruling that required the jury to find that WorldPeace did not indicate specifically in his contract that there would be a percentage recovery due on the truck. (Ex “V”)

This lawsuit is bared by res judicata in regards to Collins because it has already been tried to final conclusion. The State Bar refused to join into the lawsuit (Ex “B” & “C”) as is required by TRCP Rule 39 and the court agreed.

TRCP Rule 39 a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.

Therefore the State Bar is barred by res judicata from retrying this matter.

VI.

Initially, Respondent informed Complainant that the cost of serving the defendant was $150.00. However, Respondent later informed Complainant that the service fee was $250.00. Still later, Respondent expressed ignorance of the exact amount, but told Complainant that he would determine the amount and let her know [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.03(b), 8.04(a)(3)]. Complainant requested copies of the service fee statements, however Respondent failed to respond to Complainant’s request for verification of the service fee or to provide Complainant with those statements [TDRPC 1.03(a)].

WorldPeace would show that the amount of service expenses for Defendants were $250.00 and was being discussed after the Arbuckle case had already been tried. The question was how much were the expenses due to WorldPeace under the Retainer Agreement. There is no testimony by Collins that she did not authorize the filing/serving of the third party defendants, the Garza Brothers in the Arbuckle case.

The question was simply how much was the cost for serving the Garza Brothers.

Again, WorldPeace would show the court that the expense issue was not tried in the underlying case because Collins did not file a counter-claim of any nature other than for Rule 13 Sanctions and attorney fees in the WorldPeace v Collins case. The counter-claim regarding expenses would have been a compulsory counter claim per TRCP Rule 97.

a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim within the jurisdiction of the court, not the subject of a pending action, which at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

Collins did not file a counter-claim regarding expenses and she is barred from litigating the amount of expenses due under that contract. Since Collins is barred by res judicata through the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit, the Commission cannot now pick up her cause of action and make it an issue in this lawsuit of the expenses when Collins did not make expenses an issue in the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit.

VII.

On or about January 12, 2000, a final judgment was entered in No. 715-017; Johnell Collins, Plaintiff v. Alvin Arbuckle, et al, Defendants; Civil County Court at Law #2 of Harris County, Texas. That judgment awarded Collins of ownership of the truck and a monetary award of $3,000.00. Said monetary award was to be paid in installments of $100.00 on the 16^th day of each month to Respondent for the benefit of Complainant. The Final Judgment tracked the language of the Retainer Agreement. (Ex “X”) Collins was awarded title to the truck. “It was agreed that title to the 1979 Ford Tractor…and 1983 Lufkin Trailer…Should be awarded to Plaintiff.” Gross recovery was defined in the contract as any award or settlement.

VIII.

In a telephone conversation between Complainant and Respondent in or around February 2000, Respondent informed Complainant that he retained the February payment as final payment for serving Defendants in the above-stated cause of action. Complainant pointed out to Respondent that she already paid the $150.00 and that Respondent never provided her with the service receipts that she requested.

Again, Collins has presented no evidence that she paid the $150.00. This was not an issue in the underlying WorldPeace v. Collins case because Collins did not file a counter-claim.

The Commission has not produced any evidence that Collins paid $150.00 for the serving of those fees. Collins was required to file a compulsory counter claim in the WorldPeace v. Collins regarding these fees and regarding the alleged Arbuckle payments and she did not do that. Therefore the Commission’s is barred by res judicata from asserting those claims now.

This is a primary example of the focus of TRCP Rule 39 where WorldPeace has been put into double jeopardy regarding the same lawsuit with the same parties, same issues, and same facts that have already been tried in the 281^st district court.

IX.

On February 28, 2000, Complainant terminated Respondent’s services and retained new counsel. (Ex “Y”)

On March 2000, WorldPeace received a call from Wayne Slaughter, attorney at law, saying he represented Collins. The conversation was on the telephone speaker and Collins was present with Slaughter in his office. Wayne Slaughter became the attorney for Collins. Since Collins was represented by Wayne Slaughter, WorldPeace could not speak directly to Collins per TDRPC Rule 4.02(a).

TDRPC Rule 4.02 COMMUNICATION WITH ONE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause or encourage another to communicate about the subject of the representation with a person, organization or entity of government the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by the law to do so.

In a letter dated April 3, 2000 from Complainant to Respondent, Complainant again requested receipts for services of the defendants. Respondent again failed to respond [TDRPC 1.03(a)].

WorldPeace was not able to respond to Collins because Wayne Slaughter had become her attorney. There was no request from Wayne Slaughter, attorney at law, regarding anything other than the Retainer Agreement between WorldPeace and Collins. Which WorldPeace faxed him the day of the initial consultation.

In the letter dated April 3, 2000, Complainant also complained about Respondent’s retaining the entire amount of Arbuckle’s payments instead of dividing the payments with her according to the representation contract. However, Respondent converted all of Arbuckle’s payments to his own use without accounting to the Complainant for same, without notifying the complainant of the receipt of same, and without segregating the said payments until the dispute between Respondent and Complainant was resolved. Respondent failed to place funds in which Complainant had an interest in his trust account. [TDRPC 1.14(a), 1.14(b), 1.14(c), 8.04(a)(3)].

WorldPeace’s Retainer Agreement is clear that he was to receive his fees and expenses prior to dispersing any monies to Collins. Under Section III. Costs and Expenses. (Ex “A”), which is a copy of the Retainer Agreement.

Per Rule TDRPC 1.14.

(c) If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separated by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved, and the undisputed portion shall be distributed appropriately.

WorldPeace was not required to segregate any monies that were undisputed. Collins had no dispute that of the $3,000.00 cash that Arbuckle was to pay that she would owe WorldPeace 40%. That would mean that the first $1,200.00 money received from Arbuckle would in fact be payable to WorldPeace as fees.

Arbuckle was to pay $100.00 per month. Therefore it would be at least a year before Collins would have received any money whatsoever. However, Collins made demand on WorldPeace immediately after the Final Judgment was signed. Collins never paid WorldPeace anything after the initial $2,500 and the contract said WorldPeace had a lien on the fees.

In addition, there were other expenses that were due from Collins for the case, which Collins did not pay. Therefore Collins owed WorldPeace over $3,000.00 in expenses and fees and WorldPeace per his contract had the authority to keep the money for expenses and fees prior to dispersing any monies to Collins.

Therefore, WorldPeace was not required to keep these monies segregated. Regardless of whether or not WorldPeace was to get a percentage of the volume of the truck, there is no question but that Collins did not dispute that WorldPeace was to receive a percentage of the cash award plus his expenses. Again, there was no counterclaim for these monies in the underlying WorldPeace v. Collins suit therefore the Commission is barred by res judicata from trying this matter vicariously for Collins.

WorldPeace would also show the court that in this case he was offered a public reprimand by the State Bar. The State Bar achieved its public reprimand when they filed suit on WorldPeace. Therefore, WorldPeace’s constitutional rights to due process were violated because the Commission without due process achieved a public reprimand of WorldPeace by simply filing suit.

XI.

RULE VIOLATIONS

The acts and/or omissions of the Respondent described in paragraphs IV-X above, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct in violation of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”):

1.03(a) failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable request for information;

1.03(b) failed to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation;

1.14(a) failed to hold funds and other property belonging in whole or part of clients or third persons in a lawyer’s possession separate from the lawyer’s own property;

1.14(b) failed, upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, to promptly notify the client or third person and render a full accounting upon request;

1.14(c) failed to keep funds or other property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interest separate until there is an accounting and severance of their interests;

8.04(a)(1) violated these Rules, knowingly assisted or induced another to do so, or doing so through the acts of another, whether or not such violation occurred in the course of a client-lawyer relationship; and

8.04(a)(3) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

XII.

The complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of the Chief Disciplinary counsel of the State Bar of Texas by Johnell Collin’s filing of a complaint on or about June 1, 2000.

We reaffirm the “transactional” approach to res judicata. A subsequent suit will be barred if it arises out of the same subject matter of a previous suit and which through the exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior suit. For these reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and that of the trial court is affirmed.

Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp.; 837 S.W. 2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992)

A counterclaim is compulsory only if: (1) it is within the jurisdiction of the court; (2) it is not at the time of filing the answer the subject of a pending action; (3) the claim is mature and owned by the defendant at the time of filing the answer; (4) it arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (5) it is against an opposing party in the same capacity; and (6) it does not require the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. [FN14] A claim having all of these elements must be asserted in the initial action and cannot be asserted in later actions. [FN15]

Ingersoll-Rand Company v. Valero Energy Corporation; 977 S.W. 2d 203, 208 (Tex. 1999)

UNDISPUTED FACTS

1) Collins had filed suit in County Court at Law # 3, Harris County, Texas in order to acquire a clear title for her truck back from her live in boyfriend Alvin Arbuckle.

2) Collins was represented by Mr. Bard.

3) The county court judge told the parties that the case should be in family court and that was the end of the matter.

4) Collins came to WorldPeace and hired him to get title to the truck from Arbuckle.

5) WorldPeace wrote a contract with Collins for $2,500.00 down and a percentage of any gross recovery.

6) WorldPeace was successful at trial for getting title for Collins plus $3,000.00 that was to be paid to WorldPeace in the amount of $100.00 per month.

7) Six weeks after the judgment was signed Collins fired WorldPeace.

8) Collins hired Wayne Slaughter to represent her and had a conversation over the telephone in Slaughter’s office where they called WorldPeace.

9) Collins refused to pay WorldPeace his fee.

10) Collins filed a grievance against WorldPeace.

11) WorldPeace filed suit against Collins for his fees.

12) The State Bar then filed suit against WorldPeace.

13) WorldPeace filed a Motion to Consolidate the cases in the 281^st District Court.

14) The State Bar filed a motion objecting to the consolidation.

15) The court denied WorldPeace’s Motion to Consolidate.

16) The case was tried in the 281^st District Court in September 2002 and a final order was signed and entered in February 2003.

17) The underlying matters of the WorldPeace v. Collins case and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. WorldPeace are the exact same cases, with the exact same issues, the same parties, and the same facts.

18) Collins did not file a counter-claim for anything other than Rule 13 Sanctions and attorney’s fees.

19) Collins did not file for restitution.

20) Collins did not file for anything in regards to the monies allegedly paid to WorldPeace by Arbuckle.

21) After WorldPeace wrote a contract for any gross recovery the Supreme Court handed down the Levine case which indicated that there should be more specific statements regarding any recovery of non-cash benefits.

UNDENIABLE LAW

1) TRCP Rule 39 requires consolidation of the WorldPeace v. Collins case and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. WorldPeace.

2) The State Bar is barred by res judicata from filing suit on WorldPeace, because that matter has already been tried in.

ARGUMENT

XIII.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

FRASER-NASH

On or about June 19, 2001, Helene Fraser-Nash (hereinafter referred to as “Complaint Fraser-Nash”) hired John WorldPeace (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent”) to represent her in a foreclosure matter involving the Money Store. Respondent was paid Five Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($500.00) to stop the foreclosure per the grievance video and per Fraser-Nash WorldPeace did in fact stop the foreclosure.

On or about June 19, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash gave Respondent all her original documents associated with her civil claim. Respondent assured Complainant Fraser-Nash, he would copy these documents for her client file and return the original to her the following day. Respondent failed to return any of the original documents [TDRPC 1.15(d)].

WorldPeace would show the court that there was no urgency in returning Nash’s documents nor a deadline set by Nash. WorldPeace did in fact return Nash’s documents (Ex “D”) to her after receiving a written request. (Ex “E”) Further WorldPeace would show the Court that there is nothing in the Commission’s pleadings to show exactly what documents Fraser-Nash was talking about.

XIV.

After two weeks, Complainant Fraser-Nash telephoned Respondent to inquire about her case and her documents. Further, Complainant Fraser-Nash referred the Money Store to her attorney. She provided Money Store Respondent’s name, address, and telephone number. The Money Store made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Respondent by telephone. Respondent failed to return any of Money Store’s telephone calls [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)].

WorldPeace would show that many calls were made to the Money Store, not all by WorldPeace, but some daughter, Stephanie Cluver, who was handling this matter. See Affidavit (Ex “Z”) of Stephanie Cluver.

WorldPeace would show the court this matter is moot and not relevant because Fraser-Nash in her grievance hearing stated clearly that she paid WorldPeace $500.00 to stop the foreclosure on her home because she had a prior attorney to WorldPeace that could not handle the case.

Fraser-Nash hired WorldPeace and paid him $500.00 to stop the foreclosure. Fraser-Nash clearly stated under oath in the grievance hearing that the foreclosure was in fact stopped.

Fraser Nash stated on several occasions in the grievance video that WorldPeace said he could stop the foreclosure with a simple letter and a phone call. The foreclosure was stopped. WorldPeace was not required to make multiple phone calls just for the fun of it. WorldPeace told Fraser Nash that he would stop the foreclosure in one call, so it is entirely irrelevant how many calls WorldPeace actually made.

XV.

On or about July 13, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash telephoned Respondent and a left message that she would stop by his office to pick up her original documents because Respondent had failed to communicate with her regarding the Money Store. On or about July 16, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash and her husband went to Respondent’s office to collect her documents. Respondent persuaded Complaint Fraser Nash and her husband to keep him as their attorney and Respondent assured them that he would have the documents copied and return to them the following day. Respondent again failed to copy the documents or return them [TDRPC 1.03(a)(b)].

There is no testimony as to why the documents were critical to Fraser Nash. There was no testimony that Fraser-Nash returned to WorldPeace’s office to pick up her documents. No testimony that time was of the essence. If there was an urgency, the documents could have been copied right there while they waited.

WorldPeace did return the file to Nash. (Ex “D”)

XVI.

On or about August 2, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash sent Respondent a demand letter stating that she was terminating their attorney-client relationship and that she wanted her documents returned with a complete refund of the money she paid Respondent. Complainant Fraser-Nash’s demand letter was delivered to Respondent by a Deputy Sheriff. Respondent refused to surrender the papers and property belonging to Complainant Fraser-Nash to the Deputy despite having had his representation of Complainant Fraser-Nash terminated [TDRPC 1.15(d)].

WorldPeace per TDRPC Rule 1.05

(b) except as permitted by (1) reveal confidential information of a client or a former client to (ii) anyone else, other than the client, the client’s representatives, or the members, associates, or employees of the lawyer’s firm.

WorldPeace was not required to give the deputy a copy of Fraser Nash’s file. WorldPeace told the deputy and wrote on Nash’s letter (Ex “E”) that he would in fact send Fraser Nash her files and WorldPeace did exactly as he said. (Ex “D”) WorldPeace could not reach Fraser-Nash by telephone at the time the deputy appeared and Fraser-Nash had no answering machine.

The deputy was not under any court order. He was not there in any official capacity. He was simply there as a neighbor of Fraser Nash. WorldPeace was not going to violate TDRPC Rule 1.05(b)(1)(ii) by giving the deputy the file. There is no question that WorldPeace was not required to give the file to the deputy without authority.

Per (Ex “W”) the deputy signs for certified mail for the Fraser-Nash’s.

XVII.

Respondent did not ever return Complainant Fraser-Nash’s documents [TDRPC 1.15(d)]. Respondent failed to return Complainant Fraser-Nash’s telephone calls, thereby failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the statues of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.03(b)]. Respondent, though paid $500.00 failed to perform any meaningful legal services for Complainant Fraser-Nash and consciously disregarded his responsibility to Complainant Fraser-Nash [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)].

The grievance videotape is clear, Fraser-Nash said she paid WorldPeace $500.00 to stop the foreclosure and the foreclosure was in fact, stopped. Therefore Fraser-Nash cannot say that WorldPeace did nothing. This was a matter where Fraser-Nash already had one attorney. WorldPeace was the second attorney.

Fraser-Nash made no statements that any one else did any other work on this case except WorldPeace after June 19, 2001, and the foreclosure was in fact stopped.

Fraser-Nash said she hired WorldPeace to stop the foreclosure and it was stopped. She requested her file and it was mailed to her like WorldPeace said he would. (Ex “D”)

XVIII.

On or about September 5, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar of Texas. On or about September 27, 2001, Respondent was served with notice of the complaint filed against him by Complainant Fraser-Nash. Said notice required Respondent to provide a written response to the allegations of professional misconduct within thirty (30) days of receipt of same. Respondent failed to respond Notice of 2/19/02 FJC hearing; panel member list, subpoena and District Grievance Committee member list [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8)]. On or about December 27, 2001 Respondent was served with a subpoena to appear at a State Bar of Texas Investigatory Hearing on February 19, 2001 and, at that time to produce the complete client file of Helene Marie Fraser-Nash. Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on February 19,2002 and filed to produce the file [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8), TRDP 1.06(Q)(4)].

WorldPeace would show that he is not required to give the State Bar anything because the State Bar had stated that they were going to turn WorldPeace responses these things over to law enforcement. Therefore WorldPeace had a right to remain silent per the Fifth Amendment and Article 1 in Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.

At the beginning of each grievance hearing the Respondent is told that he has a right to remain silent.

Further WorldPeace would show the court that on February 19, he was on his way back from Dallas, Texas to attend the grievance hearing at 1:00 pm for Nash and at 1:15 pm for Apadoca. WorldPeace had car trouble in Corsicana. WorldPeace had called his daughter to call Mapes at the State Bar, which she did. Cluver informed Mapes that WorldPeace would not be able to attend the hearing. WorldPeace did not make the hearing.

The subpoena was specific. WorldPeace was suppose to deliver the documents at a certain time and place. WorldPeace was not able to make that certain time and place. No further request was made by the State Bar. The hearing was not reset.

Mapes had arbitrally reset the hearing on his own on a prior occasion on the day of the prior grievance hearing. (Ex “AA” & “AB”) But Mapes refused to reset the hearing for WorldPeace.

XIX.

RULE VIOLATIONS

The acts and/or omissions of the Respondent described in Paragraphs XIII-XVIII above, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct in violation of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of professional Conduct (“TDRPC”):

1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer;

1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the obligations owed to a client;

1.03(a) failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable request for information;

1.03(b) failed to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation;

1.15(d) failed, upon termination of representation to reasonably protect a client’s interests, give notice to the client to seek other counsel, or surrender papers and property which belongs to the client; and

8.04(a)(8) failed, to time furnish to the Chief Disciplinary Counsels office or a district grievance committee a response or other information as required by the Texas Rules Disciplinary Procedure, unless he or she in good faith timely asserts a privilege or other legal ground for failure to do so.

The acts and/or omissions of the Respondent regarding failure to comply with a subpoena described in paragraph XVIII above, constitutes conduct in violation of Rule 1.06(Q)(4) Texas Rules Disciplinary procedure which states:

1.06(Q)(4)4. Professional misconduct includes. Failure of a Respondent to furnish information subpoened by a Committee, unless he or she, in good faith, asserts a privilege or other legal grounds for the failure to do so.

XX.

The complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for the State Bar of Texas HELENE FRASER-NASH’S filing of a complaint on or about September 14, 2001.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

1) Nash had an attorney prior to WorldPeace who had been working on her problem with Home Equity, who was trying to foreclose.

2) The prior attorney withdrew from the case.

3) Nash contacted WorldPeace through responding to WorldPeace’s automatic dialer solicitation.

4) Nash paid WorldPeace $500.00 to stop the foreclosure on her house, which in her mind, was set for August 7, 2001.

5) Per the grievance hearing videotape Nash stated that WorldPeace did in fact stop the foreclosure.

6) Nash said that she first met WorldPeace on June 18, 2001.

7) Nash said that on July 19, 2001, her husband and her again met with WorldPeace.

8) Lendon Evans, a deputy neighbor of Nash, presented a request for the Nash file.

9) WorldPeace refused to give the file to the deputy. WorldPeace wrote on the bottom of the letter that he would send the filed by certified mail in a few days.

10) WorldPeace did send the file to Nash.

11) WorldPeace did not attend the grievance hearing because he was stuck in Corsicana, Texas.

12) The State Bar refused to reset the hearing.

XXI.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

PENNY JO REILLY

On or about November 2000, Phillip Apodaca (hereinafter referred to as “Apodaca”) hired Respondent to modify the divorce decree of Apodaca on which WorldPeace was his attorney. Specifically, Respondent was to modify the decree to prevent. Apodaca’s ex-wife from moving to Atlanta, Georgia, with their minor son.

WorldPeace would show after the November 7, 2000 hearing the court signed an order. The hearing regarding Apodaca’s son moving to Atlanta lasted for three hours plus WorldPeace spent three hours waiting to be heard. WorldPeace won that hearing and kept the child in Houston, Texas. (Ex “F”)

However, subsequent to that hearing, where Apodaca, his live in friend, Penny Reilly, his mother, his father, his ex-wife, his ex-wife sister and his ex-wife sister’s husband all testified, Apodaca told Emily, his ex-wife, that she could take the child to Atlanta, thereby negating all the work that WorldPeace had done to keep the child in Houston, Texas. (Ex “G”) A letter from Nancy Boler.

Apodoca then changed his mind again and told Emily that she could not take the child to Atlanta, Georgia. A second hearing took place on May 30^th in which Nanch Boler was again representing Emily Apodaca, WorldPeace represented Apadoca, Judge Frank Rynd, again heard the case, and again Apodaca, Penny Jo Reilly, Apodaca’s mother and father, his ex-wife and her sister and her sister’s husband again all testified on the same issues in the case.

However, at the end of the hearing the judge rendered an order (Ex “J”) in which he stated that Apodaca had refused to conform to his order of November 7, 2002 to participate in a drug abuse course, refused to participate in kids C.O.P.E. classes, refused to buy health insurance for his son. The judge was extremely upset. (Ex “J”)

The judge also made several restrictions regarding Penny Jo Reilly, with whom he was disgusted. Due to the fact that Apodaca had in fact told his ex-wife that she could take the child to Atlanta and more importantly his blantly refusal to follow the court’s order, the court allowed the child to move to Atlanta, Georgia.

However, WorldPeace talked to the opposing attorney and as a result, (Ex “H”) Ms. Apadoca did agree not to go to Atlanta until the final trial on August 13, 2001. The order from the judge was quite clear. (Ex “J”) Apadoca knew the date of the final hearing was August 13 hearing.

On August 4, Mr. Apadoca’s parents came in to see WorldPeace and hired WorldPeace and paid him $500.00 (Ex “K”) to file an Intervenor for them so they could acquire some grandparent’s rights regarding their grandson.

The judge had stated off the record to WorldPeace and Boler that he had wished that the grandparents had some kind of pleading because in the judge’s opinion the child should not be with either parent and definitely not with Penny Jo Reilly. After thinking about it for many months, Apadoca’s parents determined that they would go ahead and try to get some kind of grandparents rights to help keep Eric in Houston.

WorldPeace would not be taking $500.00 to file an Inventor on a final trial that was going to take place nine days later on August 13, 2001, if WorldPeace was not going to be at the hearing. There was no reason for WorldPeace not to be at the August 13 hearing.

However, the reason that WorldPeace did not attend the hearing was because in conversing with Apodaca he found out that Apodaca was still on drugs and he could not pass a drug test. The court had in November 2000, at the first hearing, ordered both Emily and Phillip Apodaca to take a drug test. (Ex “L”) Apodaca got a drug evaluation on July 11, 2001, and that evaluation said Apodaca had a drug problem. This was a month before trial. (Ex “M”)

WorldPeace told Apodaca that if he was using drugs that he would never get his child again. Further, the only issue at the hearing was the child going to Atlanta. Therefore, Apodaca decided not to show up at trial. After the trial took place without Apodaca, the child was allowed to go to Atlanta.

WorldPeace talked to Apodaca and said in that conversation that Penny Jo Reilly did not give a damn about his son. Because of that remark, Penny Jo Reilly filed a grievance on behalf of Phillip Apodaca. In the judges’ order of May 30, 2001, it was clear that he had contempt for Penny Jo Reilly and it seemed obvious from that order that Penny Jo Reilly did not care about Apodaca’s son. On August 28, 2001, Phillip Apodaca retrieved his entire file from WorldPeace. (Ex “N”) Apodaca continued to vacillate regarding whether he would let the child go to Atlanta or not.

In the first hearing, he wanted him to stay in Houston. WorldPeace accomplished that. Then Apodaca changed his mind and he said he did not care whether the child went to Atlanta. We had a second hearing. The child did not go to Atlanta even though the court allowed it after the second hearing because WorldPeace convinced the other attorney to convince Ms. Apodaca not to go. (Ex “H”)

Then Apodaca at the final trial decided that he was going to let the child go to Atlanta due to his drug use. Then the evening after the hearing, Apodaca decided that he wanted the child to stay in Houston.

The problem that Mr. Apodaca had was the girl friend who is 10 years his senior and two of whose children do not live with her, does not want Apodaca’s son is her life. Apodaca’s mother insisted that the child be in Phillip’s life. So the problem was the conflict between Apodaca’s mother and his girlfriend.

The judge was extremely upset that the girlfriend was living with Apodaca without being married to him. Generally, in a family law case, the court stops any visitation when there are unmarried people in the house overnight. On August 28, 2001, Apodaca got his file from WorldPeace and filed a Motion for New Trial which was granted on October 2, 2001. (Ex “P” & “Q”)

In November, 2001, Apodaca’s parents hired another attorney to file another Intervenor (Exhibit “O”) and 30 days later they dismissed their Intervenor.

In the end Apodaca entered into a mediated settlement where he finally allowed Emily Apodaca, his ex-wife to take their child to Atlanta.

XXII.

On or about November 2000, Temporary Orders were entered in this matter that prevented the relocation of Apodaca’s son. On June 4, 2001, the Temporary Orders to keep Apocada’s son in Harris County were lifted subject to generous visitation by Apodaca pending a final trial set for August 13, 2001. Apodaca was aware of the trial date and was prepared to attend the trial. During the time prior to August 13, 2001, Apocada completed his divorcing parents class and was able to obtain health insurance for his son pending the insurance company’s receipt of the son’s medical records so that he was in compliance with the court’s orders.

XXIII.

On or about August 9, 2001, Respondent informed Apodaca that there was no longer a pending hearing date of August 13, 2002, and Respondent instructed Apodaca that it was not necessary for Apodaca to attend on August 13, 2002. Respondent failed to appear for the hearing. However, the trial took place as scheduled on August 13, 2001 and the Temporary Orders were modified in Apodaca;s ex-wife’s favor and Apodaca’s son moved to Atlanta [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1001(b)(2), 1.03(a), 1.03(b)].

After being the Attorney on Apodaca’s divorce, attending two hearings regarding the ex-wife going to Atlanta and after taking $500.00 form Apodaca’s parents to file an Intervenor, why would WorldPeace tell Apodaca there was no hearing. WorldPeace and his staff did tell Apodaca the court made a mistake and did not have the August 13^th hearing on the docket.

In the end Apodaca agreed to let Emily go to Atlanta. (Ex “R”)

XXIV.

On or about August 31, 2001, Ms. Penny Jo Reilly and Apodaca (hereinafter “Reilly/Apodoca”) filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar of Texas. On or about October 22, 2001, Respondent was served with notice of the complaint filed against him by Reilly/Apodaca. Said notice required Respondent to provide a written response to the allegations of professional misconduct within thirty (30) days of receipt of same. Respondent failed to respond [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8)]. On or about November 18, 2001 Respondent was served with a subpoena to appear at a State Bar of Texas Investigatory Hearing on February 19, 2002 and, at that time to produce the complete client file of Phillip Apodaca. Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on February 19, 2001 and failed to produce the file [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8), TRDP 1,06(Q)(4)].

WorldPece was stuck in Corsicana.

XXV.

RULE VIOLATIONS

The acts and/or omissions of the Respondent described in paragraphs XXI – XIV above, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct in violation of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”):

1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer;

1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the obligations owed to a client;

1.03(a) failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable request for information;

1.03(b) failed to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation;

1.06(Q)(4)4. Professional misconduct includes. Failure of a Respondent to furnish information subpoened by a Commiteee, unless he or she, in good faith, asserts a privilege or other legal grounds for the failure to do so.

XXVI.

The complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas by PENNY JO REILLY’S filing of a complaint on or about September 14, 2001.

WorldPeace rights were violated because the grievance committee wanted a public reprimand and the commission got it when they filed suit.

UNDENIABLE FACTS

1) WorldPeace was Apodaca’s attorney in his divorce in April 2000.

2) In November 2000, WorldPeace was retained by Apodaca to stop his ex-wife from going to Atlanta, Georgia.

3) A hearing was held in the 257^th District Court where WorldPeace did in fact stop Apodaca’s ex-wife from going to Atlanta with the child.

4) After the hearing Apodaca told his ex-wife that she could go to Atlanta.

5) A second hearing was held regarding Apodaca’s ex-wife going to Atlanta.

6) Because Apodaca had not taken a parenting class, gone to drug class, and not carrying health insurance on the child; per the court orders of November 7, 2000, hearing the judge allowed Apodaca’s ex-wife to go to Atlanta with the child.

7) After the May 30^th hearing WorldPeace worked out an agreement with Apodaca’s ex-wife’s attorney such that she would not go to Atlanta.

8) The court ordered a final hearing to be held on August 13, 2001, regarding the going to Atlanta issue.

9) The judge made negative remarks about Penny Jo Reilly in his rendition of the order on May 30^th.

10) On August 4^th WorldPeace was retained by Apodaca’s parents to file an intervenor in the lawsuit to get the grandparents rights. Several days prior to the hearing WorldPeace communicated with Apodaca. Apodaca had a drug evaluation that showed that he was drug dependent.

11) Apodaca and WorldPeace did not attend the August 13, 2001 final hearing.

12) On August 28, 2001, Apodaca acquired his file from WorldPeace.

13) On August 28, 2001, Apodaca filed a Motion for New Trial.

14) On October ___, ___, the Motion for New Trial was granted.

15) In November 2001, Apodaca’s parents hired Robert Hinijoso to file an intervenor for the grandparents rights.

16) In December 2001, Apodaca’s parents withdrew their intervenor.

17) In April 2002, a final mediated agreement was reached to where Apodaca’s ex-wife could take the child to Atlanta.

VII. THIRD PARTY CLAIM – PHILLIP APODACA

In April 2000, WorldPeace was hired by Apodaca to stop his ex-wife from moving to Atlanta with their son. WorldPeace prepared and attended a three hour hearing in December 2000 on the matter of relocating Apodaca’s son to Atlanta, Georgia in the 257^th District Court, Harris County, Texas (No. 1999-52423). The court ordered the child to remain in Houston. However, the court also ordered Apodaca to get into a drug abuse program, attend a parenting course and acquire insurance for his son. The court also ordered Apodaca and his wife to immediately be tested for drugs.

Soon after the hearing Apodaca told his ex-wife that she could take the child to Atlanta. WorldPeace received a letter from Apodaca’s wife’s new attorney and WorldPeace attended a second three hour hearing in May 2001 to prevent the ex-wife from going to Atlanta. At this repetitive hearing, the judge allowed the child to move to Atlanta mainly due to the fact that Apodaca had not attended a drug abuse program, not attended a parenting course and had not provided insurance for his son.

Trial was set for August 2001.

About a week before trial, WorldPeace contacted Apodaca. Apodaca told WorldPeace that he was still using drugs. A July 2001, drug evaluation concluded that Apodaca was drug dependent. WorldPeace told Apodaca that if he was still on drugs that he should not attend trial because the judge would be very mad. If Apodaca attended trial, he would probably never be able to get custody of his child. The only issue was whether the child would be allowed to go to Atlanta or not.

Apodaca did not go to trial.

Apodaca only paid WorldPeace $500. WorldPeace spent over twenty hours on Apodaca’s suit and is owed $3,000.

VIII. CAUSES OF ACTION AND DAMAGES

WorldPeace sues Apodaca for $2500 under quantum meruit.

XXVII.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

DARLENE A. WILLIAMS

On or about November 1999, John WorldPeace (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent”) randomly sent a generic written advertisement via facsimile to Darlene A. Williams employer (hereinafter referred to as “Complainant Williams”) for the purpose of soliciting new business.

XXVIII.

On or about November 9, 1999, Complainant Williams hired Respondent to represent her in the collection of a promissory note. Respondent was given One Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($100.00) to draft a demand letter which was done.

On or about January 6, 2000, Respondent drafted Complainant Williams’ demand letter. On February 28, 2001, month later WorldPeace was paid $375.00 in legal fees to proceed on the lawsuit.

Respondent failed to execute a contingency fee agreement with Complainant Williams [TDRPC 1.04(d)].

WorldPeace failed to file Complainant Williams’ lawsuit [TDRPC 1.01(b)(2)]. Respondent failed to perform any meaningful legal services for Complainant Williams other than writing the described letter and consciously disregarded his responsibility to Complainant Williams [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)].

WorldPeace would show that after he received the $375.00 from Williams, he continued his due diligence and researched the matter regarding Darlene Williams. The law clearly states that in the event that a person charges more than twice the usury amount of interest, that person looses not only the interest but also the principal. (Ex “S”)

Per the TDRPC Rule 3.01

A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.

TDRPC Rule 3.01 states that attorney should not file a frivolous lawsuit.

Ms. William’s lawsuit was frivolous. There is no question that the $100.00 was paid to send a demand letter which was sent. Had Williams collected any monies she would not have owed WorldPeace anything.

The second thing to be done was to file a lawsuit. After WorldPeace received the $375, he continued to perform his due diligence and to research the matter. That is when WorldPeace found that a suit would have been frivolous. WorldPeace communicated this information to Ms. Williams. There was nothing further to do in the court but WorldPece agreed to try to get some money for Ms. Williams.

WorldPeace did about 3 hours of research, worth about $450.00. Ms. Williams had paid WorldPeace $375.00 and that was the end of the matter.

WorldPeace did not file a written response within 30 days of the receipt of the letter but WorldPeace did file a response at the grievance hearing and the chairman of that panel committee accepted WorldPeace’s response. WorldPeace has a Fifth amendment right not to respond to the State Bar’s request for information.

There was no contingency contract between Williams and WorldPeace because there was no suit was filed. Had WorldPeace filed a lawsuit, there may have been a contingency contract if that had been their final agreement before he filed it. But WorldPeace was not prepared to file suit at that point in time. Therefore a contingency contract was not written because no suit was going to be filed.

WorldPeace would show the court that the Collins contract that WorldPeace does have a habit of executing contingency contracts when a suit has been filed. In the case of Williams, there was no contract because when WorldPeace took the monies, he was not sure if he was going to file a suit or not and had to do more due diligence.

In the Lang matter he states that WorldPeace was not going to file suit for a couple of weeks. The reason for that was again so WorldPeace could research the matter and until the matter was researched, until WorldPeace was actually, ready to file suit, there was not going to be a contract written.

XXIX.

Throughout Respondent’s representation of Complainant Williams, Complainant Williams attempted to contact Respondent by telephone to obtain the status of her lawsuit. Respondent failed to respond to Complainant Williams’ request for information and failed to keep his client reasonably informed regarding the matter [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.03(b)].

WorldPeace would show that he talked to Williams several times and she testified to that in the grievance hearing.

XXX.

On or about December 11, 2001, Complainant Williams filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar of Texas. On or about January 10, 2002, Respondent was served with notice of the complaint filed against him by Complainant Williams. Said notice required Respondent to provide a written response to the allegations of professional misconduct with thirty (30) days of receipt of same. Respondent failed to respond [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8)].

XXXI.

The acts and/or omissions of the Respondent described in paragraphs XXVII-XXX above, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct in violation of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”):

1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer;

1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the obligations owed to a client;

1.03(a) failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter;

1.04(d) entered into a contingent fee agreement prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law, and/or failing to enter into a written contingency fee agreement that states the method by which the fee is to be determined; and

XXXII.

The complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of the Chief Disciplinary counsel of the State Bar of Texas by DARLENE A. WILLIAMS’ filing of a complaint on or about December 11, 2001.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

1) Williams had a promissory note that was for 25% interest. The note was an unsecured note not referencing any other transactions.

2) Williams paid WorldPeace $100.00 to write a demand letter.

3) Williams paid WorldPeace $375.00 to proceed on with the case.

UNDENIABLE LAW

1) A note in excess of 10% is usurious. At the time that Darlene Williams signed her note if an interest rate on the note is more than twice the usurious rate then the lender loses both the interest and the principle.

2) WorldPeace is not required to file a frivolous lawsuit per the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

XXXIII.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

JOHN V. LYNCH

On or around August, 2001, John V. Lynch (hereinafter referred to as “Complainant Lynch”) retained Respondent for representation in Cause No. SC82C00004767, John V. Lynch v. Janet Louise Lachman; In the Small Claims Court Precinct 8, Place 2 of Harris County, Texas. At the time of the initial consultation, Complainant Lynch paid Respondent One Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($100.00). Respondent verbally acknowledged receipt of the $100.00 but failed to provide a written receipt. Respondent did not provide Lynch with a written contract or a verbal statement indicating the terms of representation because there was no contract [TDRPC 1.04(c)].

Per the grievance form filed by Mr. Lynch it clearly states that Mr. Lynch paid WorldPeace $100.00 but there was no discussion of a contract. (Ex “AC”) Further, per Lynch’s affidavit, (Ex “AD”) he has stated he never talked to WorldPeace again except on one occasion and WorldPeace said he did not have time to talk.

There was no contact. There was no object of a contract. There was no meeting of the minds. There was no consideration. Other than the initial $100.00 which Mr. Lynch paid for a one hour consultation no monies were paid.

There was no contract, Per TDRPC Preamble Scope No. 12 Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so.

It states that all grievances are based upon a contractual relationship between the client and the attorney. There was no contract between WorldPeace and Lynch.

XXXIV.

Throughout Respondent’s representation, complainant Lynch received various papers from Janet Lachman to which Complainant Lynch forwarded to Respondent’s office. Several court dates were set and a jury had been requested. Complainant Lynch notified Respondent’s office by faxing the material over to him and thereafter continued to fax information to Respondent’s office as Complainant Lynch received it from the court.

XXXV.

The scheduled court date was postponed and a hearing was set. Complainant Lynch showed up for the hearing and Respondent did not [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)]. Complainant Lynch called Respondent’s office and got an answering machine. Complainant Lynch left a message for Respondent to call. Respondent failed to return Complainant Lynch’s call [TDRPC 1.03(a)]. Complainant Lynch continued to gather information and facts to substantiate his case against Janet Lachman and forwarded it to Complainant Lynch. Subsequently, a hearing was set for December 28, 2001. Complainant Lynch notified Respondent and bundled all files and information together and mailed to Respondent’s office. Thereafter; Complainant Lynch tried for weeks to get Respondent to call to which Respondent id not return (TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.03(b)].

Per the documents that were presented by the State Bar, Lynch went to the J.P. court on three occasions after he talked to WorldPeace. On no occasion did WorldPeace show up. Certainly, Mr. Lynch understood that WorldPeace was not representing him. There was no information for WorldPeace to communicate to Lynch because Lynch fully understood his case.

WorldPeace would also show the court that Lynch showed up at court at final trial but did not answer and therefore he brought on his own doom.

Further, the case was not in the justice court where Lynch would be allowed an attorney, but in the small claims court where attorneys are not allowed. (Ex “AE”)

WorldPeace would also show the exhibits to the State Bar that the attorney that he sued stated that Lynch’s had pattern and practice of suing attorneys. Not to mention the fact that Mr. Lynch has a criminal record for criminal mischief. (Ex “AE”)

This is a lawsuit that shows that it is necessary for claimant to prove a suit within a suit. To prove that he even had a case. To prove that WorldPeace could have won the case.

XXXVI.

Complainant Lynch appeared for the hearing on December 28, 2001, however neither Respondent, nor anyone from his office, appeared. [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)]. Complainant Lynch called Respondent’s office and was unable to speak with anyone. Complainant Lynch contact Respondent at his home telephone and spoke with Stephanie, Respondent’s daughter, who informed him that Respondent’s office had “been closed” for the Christmas holidays. Stephanie assured Complainant Lynch that everything was under control and that she personally had been in contract with Janet Lachman via the telephone. The trial was reset for January 28, 2002.

XXXVII.

Complainant Lynch continued to obtain information to substantiate his case against Janet Lachman and attempted for days to contact Respondent to see if Complaint Lynch needed to come in to the office and discuss the case further. Complainant Lynch was unable to make contact with Respondent.

XXXVIII.

On Friday, January 25^th, Complainant Lynch called Respondent’s office and was informed by LeAnne, a secretary in the office, that Respondent was working on a bid divorce case and, as far as she knew, there should not be a problem with the January 28, 2002 setting. Complainant Lynch appeared in court on Monday, January 28^th, at 8:00 a.m. The docket was called at that time and no one from Respondent’s office appeared on Complainant Lynch’s behalf [TDRPC 1.01(b)(2)]. Complainant Lynch had no records or files for the trial to defend himself and subsequently, a default judgment for nearly $5,000 was entered against Complainant Lynch.

Afterwards, Complainant Lynch attempted to call Respondent’s office, but go an answering machine. Complainant Lynch continued to call Respondent’s and left messages for Respondent to discuss Respondent filing an appeal. Respondent failed to return those calls [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.039b)].

Later, Complainant Lynch was able to speak with LeAnne and Complainant Lynch request his files LeAnne said she was not in a position to send the paper so Complainant Lynch. Complainant Lynch then called early one morning and was able to speak with Respondent and when asked about Complainant Lynch’s file, Respondent informed him that he know about the case but couldn’t find the file. Respondent ending with informing Complainant Lynch that when he found the file, he would call Complaint Lynch. Respondent did not call Complainant Lynch or seen his file [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.15(d)]. Complainant Lynch later spoke with Stephanie, Respondent’s daughter, and she informed Complainant Lynch that she has file and would give it to him. Complainant Lynch did not receive the file [TDRPC 1.15(d)]. Thereafter, Complainant Lynch sent a certified mail demand for his file as well as a fax copy of the demand to his office. To date, the certified letter has not been signed for.

XXXIX.

Thereafter, Complainant Lynch received a telephone call form LeAnne, on February 27^th, who state the file have been mailed back to Complainant Lynch “several days ago” to the address Respondent’s office had on record. Complainant Lynch never received the file from Respondent. {TDRPC 1.15(d)].

XL.

RULE VIOLATIONS

The acts and/or omission of the Respondent described in paragraphs XXXIII – XXXIII above, which occurred on or after January 1990, constitute conduct in violation of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”):

1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer;

1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the obligations owed to a client;

1.03(a) failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable request for information;

1.03(b) failed to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation;

1.04(d) for entering into a contingent fee agreement prohibited by paragraph (e) or other law, and/or failing to enter into a written contingency fee agreement that states the method by which the fee is to be determined; and

XLI.

The complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas by JOHN V. LYNCH’S file of a complaint on or about march 12, 2002.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

1) Lynch stated that no contract was discussed at the initial meeting with WorldPeace, but that he paid WorldPeace $100.00 for the initial consultation.

2) Lynch stated that he went to court three times on this hearing and at no time did WorldPeace show up.

3) Lynch stated that he never talked to WorldPeace except one time after the initial meeting for a few moments.

4) No contract was discussed with WorldPeace.

5) Lynch never paid WorldPeace anything beyond the $100.00 for the initial consultation.

UNDENIABLE LAW

1) Per the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure the attorney owes nothing to the client if there is no contract.

2) In order to have a contract there must be two people having a meeting of the minds. A consideration of an object to be accomplished must be met. These are the essential elements of a contract.

XLII.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

JOHN F. LANG

On or about January 20, 2001, Complainant Lang received a facsimile advertisement for the law office of Respondent. The advertisement listed Attorney Malpractice and Fraud, Probate and Automobile Dealer problems as some of the legal areas that Respondent possessed expertise. Complainant Lang contacted Respondent because he was experiencing legal problems related to his wrecker business. Complainant Lang was having difficulty with “car dumping” at his car storage lot. Three insurance companies had settled auto accident claims with their perspective clients by totaling out the vehicles, but failed to remove the vehicles from Complainant Lang’s storage lot or pay Complainant Lang for the storage of the vehicles.

XLIII.

On or about January 30, 2001, Complainant Lang hired Respondent to file suit against these insurance companies under Vernon’s Revised Civil Statute, Article 6687-9a, Section 14A regarding the storage of vehicles and insurance companies. Complainant Lang paid Respondent Nine Hundred Thirty and 00/100 Dollars ($930.00).

Complainant Lang provided Respondent with all of his original paperwork for these matters.

Further, Respondent informed Complainant Lang that the lawsuits against the insurance companies would be filed within two (2) weeks. Respondent failed to file these suits [TDRPC 1.01(b)(2)]. Respondent failed to perform any meaningful legal services for the fee paid by Complainant Lang [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1)]. Respondent failed to file suit against the insurance companies responsible for Complainant Lang’s storage fees as he had agreed to do [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)].

WorldPeace would show the court that he received $930.00 from Lang. WorldPeace said he would send demand letters and research the case before filing suit.

Lang on the grievance video clearly states that Mr. WorldPeace called him back after a month and said he was not going to file suit unless Lang added the individual owners of the car to the lawsuit.

Lang refused to allow WorldPeace to add the owners to the lawsuit. Lang said the title to the cars were in the insurance companies names (Ex “T”) refutes this. Therefore there was no longer a contract between Lang and WorldPeace.

In addition, WorldPeace under the TDRPC Rule 1.15.

(b)(4) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent or with which the lawyer has fundamental disagreement

Regarding withdrawal representation of a client if he determines that he has a conflict with the client over how to proceed with the case.

WorldPeace would show that this case just like the Nash case, that WorldPeace was the second attorney on the case.

WorldPeace would show that the insurance companies had determined that they did not read the law the same way that Mr. Lang read it and contrary to Lang’s testimony in the grievance committee hearing. Title had not transferred to the insurance company. (Ex “T”) Further, WorldPeace would show that he did hours of research and could not find any law regarding this particular statute. It was going to be a case of first impression. Mr. Lang stated he was not going to pay WorldPeace by the hour to proceed with this lawsuit and WorldPeace was not going to proceed on a contingency without being able to sue the owners of the case.

XLIV.

After weeks of inactivity, Complainant Lang attempted to contact Respondent by telephone. He was informed that Respondent was unavailable. Complainant Lang left numerous messages requesting Respondent to return his telephone calls. Respondent failed to return Complainant Lang’s telephone calls [TDRPC 1.03(a)]. On or about September 5, 2001, Complainant Lang sent Respondent a letter demanding his original documents and a refund of the Nine Hundred Thirty and 00/100 Dollar ($930.00) fee.

Respondent failed to respond to Complainant Lang’s letter [TDRPC 1.03(a)]. Complainant Lang called and left messages for Respondent 4-5 times during the representation. Respondent only returned one of these calls [TDRPC 1.03(a)]. Respondent did not terminate his representation of Complainant or advise Complainant that his claims were frivolous or that there was a problem with interpretation of the simple state involved [TDRPC 1.03(b)].

Respondent suggested suing the owners of the cars involved, but did not follow Complainant Lang’s instructions to sue the insurance companies and not the owners [1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2), 1.02(a)(1)].

XLV.

On or about November 13, 2001, Complainant Lang sent Respondent a second letter demanding his original documents and a refund of the Nine Hundred Thirty and 00/100 Dollar ($930.00) fee. Again, Respondent failed to respond to complainant Lang’s letter [TDRPC 1.03(a). to date, Respondent has failed to surrender papers and property which belongs to Complainant Lang and has failed to refund an unearned fee.

[TDRPC 1.15(d)].

WorldPeace would show the court both letters were sent to the wrong address. (Ex “AF”)

XLVI.

On or about May 14, 2002, Respondent admitted receipt of a State Bar of Texas Subpoena Duces Tecum, commanding the Respondent furnish all records of the designated trust account into which he deposited monies received relating to his representation of Complainant Lang. Respondent failed to provide the trust account records subpoenaed by the committee [TDRPC 8.01(b), TRDP 1.06(Q)(4).

WorldPeace would show the court that the subpoena from the State Bar requires WorldPeace to submit the Trust Accounts, where he deposited Mr. Lang’s money. WorldPeace did not deposit money in the Trust Account. He deposited the money into his personal account. Therefore, WorldPeace could not produce what did not in fact exist.

XLVII.

RULE VIOLATIONS

The acts and/or omission of the Respondent described in paragraphs XXXVIII – XLII above, which occurred on or after January 1990, constitute conduct in violation of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”):

1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer;

1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the obligations owed to a client;

1.02(A)(1) for failing to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives and general methods of representation;

1.03(a) failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable request for information;

8.01(b) failed to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary authority.

XLVIII.

The complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention of the Chief Disciplinary counsel of the State Bar of Texas by JOHN F. LANG’S filing of a complaint on or about April 19, 2002.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

1) Lang hired an attorney prior to hiring WorldPeace to sue the insurance companies who had allegedly been not paying him storage fees for settling the claim.

2) Lang’s prior attorney refused to pursue his case.

3) Lang contacted WorldPeace to file suit on the insurance companies. Lang paid WorldPeace $930.00.

4) Contrary to Lang’s assertion in his affidavit’s in the grievance hearing videotape the insurance companies had denied transferring title to the owners.

5) There was no written contract in the Lang matter.

6) Lang, contrary to the statements by the State Bar, Lang admitted speaking to WorldPeace on more than one occasion after hiring WorldPeace.

7) Lang stated in the grievance hearing that WorldPeace did in fact call him about one month after he retained WorldPeace and Lang admitted that WorldPeace told him that he was not going to file suit unless Lang allowed WorldPeace to sue the individual car owners.

8) Lang sent two letters to WorldPeace. These letters were sent to the wrong address at WorldPeace’s prior place of business. Neither of these letters does Lang have a green card for.

9) WorldPeace never deposited any of Lang’s $930.00 in his trust account. Rather WorldPeace deposited said money that in his operating account.

UNDENIABLE LAW

1) There is no evidence that WorldPeace deposited any of Lang’s monies in his trust account.

IV. Third Party Claim – JOHN LANG

Third party Defendant, John Lang, is an individual residing and having a place of business in Harris County, Texas.

V. Facts

On or about January 30, 2001, WorldPeace contracted with John Lang to file a suit against several insurance companies under Vernon’s Revised Civil Statute Article No. 6687-a Section 14a regarding storage of vehicles at Lang’s storage lot. Lang told WorldPeace that he had tried to hire several attorney’s to file suit against the insurance companies without success. Lang stated that the insurance companies denied that they owed any money under the statute that Lang was citing.

WorldPeace told Lang that he would investigate the statute and that he would file suit if Lang’s claims turned out to be actionable. After researching the cited statute, WorldPeace informed Lang that he could find no law on that particular section that was on point with Lang’s fact pattern. WorldPeace informed Lang that he was not going to file suit unless he could add the automobile owner’s to the lawsuit.

WorldPeace informed Lang that he would need to sue the individual insureds who had signed the storage contract with Lang otherwise the insurance companies would claim that they had paid the insured and they did not owe Lang anything.

The insurance companies did not have a contract with Lang. It was the insured who had signed the contract with Lang for storage fees and who were in fact the ones who Lang should sue for his storage fees.

Lang asserted the statute imposed an obligation on the insurance company. But Lang is not an attorney.

WorldPeace informed Lang that he was not going to take this matter on a contingency basis unless Lang allowed WorldPeace to sue the insured owners of the automobiles stored at Lang’s storage lot. Lang admitted this in the grievance hearing.

WorldPeace informed Lang that he would charge $150.00 an hour for researching the matter. WorldPeace informed Lang that the insureds were necessary parties to his proposed lawsuit against the insurance companies.

Lang refused to allow WorldPeace to sue the insured. WorldPeace informed Lang that if he filed only on the insurance companies that Lang and WorldPeace would potentially be filing a frivolous and groundless suit under Rule 13 and could be sanctioned.

The problem is that if the insurance companies were to pay Lang storage fees, there would be no money for the insured. Lang should have informed the insureds that they would have to make sure the insurance companies gave them enough money to pay his storage fees in addition to reimbursing them for their damages.

WorldPeace is a Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU) and a Chartered Property and Casualty Underwriter (CPCU) and is familiar with insurance company claims procedures. WorldPeace was an independent insurance agent from 1972 to 1977.

Lang never made a demand on the insureds owners of the vehicle.

WorldPeace closed his file. Lang paid WorldPeace $930.00 ($900.00 in attorney fees and $30.00 in filing fees). WorldPeace’s fees in this matter are $1,700.00. Lang owes WorldPeace $800.00.

VI. Cause of Action and damages

WorldPeace sues Lang under Quantum Meruit for the amount of $800.00.

VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

WorldPeace sues Dawn Miller and J. G. Molleston, attorneys for the State Bar and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline for injunctive relief regarding their violation of WorldPeace's Texas Constitutional rights of due process, equal protection, freedom of religion and rights against self-incrimination.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, WorldPeace requests that the Commission take nothing by way of their Petition, that WorldPeace recover the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the Commission’s filing of the Original Petition, cost, reasonable attorney’s fees, fees of expert witnesses, and deposition expenses, and grant such other and further relief at law or in equity as this court deems proper.

Respectfully submitted,

                                                                        __________________________________
                                                                        John WorldPeace
                                                                        TBA No. 21872800
                                                                        2620 Fountain View, Suite 106
                                                                        Houston, Texas   77057
                                                                        Tel: 713-784-7618
                                                                        Fax: 713-784-9063

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was forwarded to opposing counsel on July 21, 2003 by CMRRR.

_________________________________ John WorldPeace

NO. 2002-42081

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WORLDPEACE

STATE OF TEXAS §

COUNTY OF HARRIS §

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared John WorldPeace, who being by me first duly sworn, on his oath did depose and state as follows:

“My name is John WorldPeace. I am over the age of eighteen years, have never been convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude, and am competent to make this affidavit. I am duly authorized and qualified to make this affidavit. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and they are true and correct.

1) The Commission for Lawyer Discipline (CLD) does not have the legal capacity to sue WorldPeace, 2) That the Commission for Lawyer Discipline is not entitled to recover in the capacity in which it sues, 3) that there is another suit pending in this state between the same parties involving the same claim, 4) there has been an accord and satisfaction, 5) duress, 6 estoppel, and 7) illegality.

The Collins matter was tried in the 281^st District Court and the Commission therefore banned by res judicata from refilling it in this lawsuit.

I refused, in some cases, to submit information to the State Bar because I have a right against self incrimination and a right as an attorney to violate a law to challenge the law without violating the TDRPC.

Further affiant sayeth not.”

____________________________________
John WorldPeace

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this ____ day of _________, 2003.

____________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE
STATE OF TEXAS

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