NO. 2002-42081
COMMISSION FOR
LAWYER
§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DISCIPLINE
§
§
V. §
§
JOHN WORLDPEACE § 269TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
RESPONDENT’S FIRST AMENDED MOTION TO
RECUSE JUDGE JAMES R. FRY
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF
SAID COURT
COMES NOW, John WorldPeace, Respondent in the above styled and numbered
cause, and files this RESPONDENT’S FIRST AMENDED MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE JAMES
R. FRY and would show the Court the following:
TABLE
OF CONTENTS
I.
QUESTION REGARDING JURISDICTION TO HEAR RECUSAL…………………...2
II.
INCORPORTION OF LETTERS FROM WORLDPEACE TO JUDGE FRY
INTO THIS MOTION FOR
RECUSAL……………………………………………………….2
III.
CORE ALLEGATIONS THAT JAMES R.
FRY IS
BIASED AND PREDISPOSED IN THIS
LAWSUIT…………………………………………2
SUMMARY………………………………………………………………………………4
IV.
FACTS THAT INDICATE THAT JUDGE FRY IS BIASED AND PREDISPOSED AGAINST
WORLDPEACE IN THIS LAWSUIT…………………………………………….4
I. QUESTION REGARDING
JURISDICTION TO HEAR RECUSAL
WorldPeace is not sure from looking at the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure whether this recusal needs to be
referred to the Administrative Judge in the Second Administrative Judicial
Region including Harris County per Rule 18a(c) TRCP or whether it needs to go to
the Supreme Court of Texas per Rule 3.02 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
Rule
3.02 does not specifically speak to a motion for recusal due to facts discovered
sixty days after Respondent is served with notice of the trial judge’s
appointment by the Supreme Court in a disciplinary action.
Rule 3.02 does indicate a prohibition against judges residing in the same
Administrative Judicial Region as the Respondent being assigned to the
disciplinary petition.
WorldPeace
believes that since Judge Fry determined not to recuse himself, this matter will
need to be sent by the Harris County Clerk to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of
Texas and a judge must be appointed by the Supreme Court to hear WorldPeace’s
Motion to Recuse Judge Fry.
The
Administrative Judge, Olen Underwood, of the Second Administrative Region,
resides in the same Administrative Judicial Region as WorldPeace and further
Judge Underwood only has jurisdiction to appoint a judge from within his
Administrative Region and therefore has no jurisdiction per Rule 3.02 TRDP to
assign himself or any other judge to the underlying lawsuit.
WorldPeace
has filed an Objection to Judge Underwood Presiding over the Recusal and filed
an Application for Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus with the Supreme Court on this
issue.
WorldPeace
does not waive his position, rights, or argument.
II. INCORPORTION
OF LETTERS FROM WORLDPEACE TO JUDGE FRY
INTO
THIS MOTION FOR RECUSAL
In hopes That Judge Fry would not require a
recusal hearing
WorldPeace
would show the court that he sent two letters to Judge Fry on
III.
CORE ALLEGATIONS THAT JAMES R. FRY IS
BIASED
AND PREDISPOSED IN THIS LAWSUIT
The three primary reasons that WorldPeace believes that Judge
Fry is biased and predisposed against WorldPeace in this matter are as follows.
1)
Judge Fry is a Democrat and WorldPeace ran for governor in the 2002
Democratic Primary and conducted a vicious campaign stating that the Democratic
Primary was racially focused and biased against WorldPeace who is White.
WorldPeace has a web page regarding the Democratic Party’s tactics in
the governor’s race which is still posted on the internet at www.johnworldpeace.com.
(Exhibit “P”)
WorldPeace’s
predictions that the greed and corruption in the Democratic Party was going to
destroy the Democratic Party in
2)
WorldPeace would show the court that he used to be a member of the
Masonic Lodge but withdrew his membership in 1988 (as he did from all
organizations of which he was a member) after changing his name to John
WorldPeace. WorldPeace alleges that
Judge Fry is a Mason and views WorldPeace’s withdrawal from Masonary as a
rejection of Masonry. (Exhibit
“Y”)
3)
WorldPeace would show the court that after the most recent Judgment for
Disbarment (
WorldPeace
has been prosecuting two lawsuits against the Presbyterian Church regarding the
corruption within that organization (Cause No. 99-158-P; Estate of Mary
Richards Martin, Deceased; In the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas and
Cause No. 2002-20203 Joyce Wolter v. Delgatto et. al., 280th
District Court, Harris County, Texas). WorldPeace alleges
that Judge Fry took personal offense at WorldPeace’s attack on his religious
denomination, as evidenced by WorldPeace’s web page (www.presbyterians-r-us.com)
(Exhibit “Z”)
SUMMARY
WorldPeace
would show the court that WorldPeace has rejected Judge Fry’s political party,
his Masonic affiliation and his religious denomination and that WorldPeace’s
attacks upon the Democratic Party and the Presbyterian Church have been vicious
as evidenced by WorldPeace’s web pages. (Exhibit
“P” & “Z”) All these
matters began and were being prosecuted before Judge Fry was appointed to hear
the underlying disciplinary petition.
Below, WorldPeace would show the court that many of the
rulings that Judge Fry has made in the underlying lawsuit are a blantant abuses
of discretion and only make sense when considered in light of the above bias and
predisposition.
WorldPeace
moves to recuse Judge Fry per Rule 18b(2)(a & b) TRCP.
IV. FACTS
THAT INDICATE THAT JUDGE FRY IS BIASED AND PREDISPOSED AGAINST WORLDPEACE IN
THIS LAWSUIT
1) WorldPeace would show the
court that in the beginning of the underlying lawsuit, WorldPeace objected to
the jurisdiction of the court under Rule 3.01 TRDP (Exhibit “RA”).
Eighty (80) days after the Commission filed its Original Disciplinary
Petition against WorldPeace, the Commission in violation of Rule 3.01 TRDP added
five additional grievances to the original lawsuit which originally included
only the Johnell Collins complaint. (Note:
Per Rule 3.07 TRDP a disciplinary petition must go to trial in 180 days.
So the additional grievances had to go to trial in 100 days, which was a
disadvantage to WorldPeace.) On
In pre-trial, Mr. Molleston, attorney for the Commission, stated to the
Judge Fry after being queried, that the Commission has violated Rule 3.01 and
added additional grievances to other lawsuits.
(Exhibit “B”)
On
June 25, 2003, WorldPeace filed a motion with Judge Fry to require Mr. Molleston
to produce any cases that he had regarding adding on additional grievances after
a disciplinary petition had already been filed. (Exhibit “E”)
Molleston stated in pretrial that in the six years that he had been with
the State Bar he had violated Rule 3.01 on previous occasions but refused to
produce any cases. (Exhibit “B”
& “AD” & “AE”)
Molleston refused to produce any cases or respond to
WorldPeace’s motion and Judge Fry refused to compel Molleston to produce any
cases because WorldPeace alleges that Judge Fry knew that no such cases exist
and to require Molleston to produce these non-existent cases would result in
Molleston’s disbarment per Rule 3.03 (1)(4)(5),(b)(c) TDRPC.
(Exhibit “RC”)
There
is no “on point” case law on this Rule 3.01 issue.
However, Rule 3.01 is clear, “All disciplinary petitions MUST be filed
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. (Exhibit
“RA”)
Since
Judge Fry was not appointed to the additional five grievances per Rule 3.02 TRDP
his order regarding those grievances is void.
“A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering
the judgment has no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject
matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a
court.” Mapco,
Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W. 2d 700, 703 (
There
are only about sixty disciplinary cases in the case law between May 1992, when
the current TRDP became effective, and the present.
Judge
Fry overruled WorldPeace’s Plea to the Jurisdiction.
2) WorldPeace would show the
court that at the end of trial in the underlying case, Judge Fry on
In
pretrial, Judge Fry granted the Commission’s Motion to Sever the case,
(Exhibit “U”) in particular WorldPeace’s mandatory constitutional
counterclaims and Judge Fry restated that he had severed the mandatory
constitutional counterclaims during his final ruling.
(Exhibit “A”)
The
court also severed WorldPeace’s mandatory counterclaims regarding John Lang
and Philip Apodaca. At pre-trial,
Judge Fry said that he was only going to try the rule violations and that is
what he did. (Ex “A”)
Due
to the inclusion of a “mother hubbard clause”, the first Judgment for
Disbarment was a final order which did not reference any other parts of the
lawsuit.
No
order reflecting the pretrial severance rulings was signed prior to trial, or at
the time the First Judgment for Disbarment was signed.
This created a problem because the First Judgment for Disbarment became a
global final judgment as opposed to a final judgment on the Rule violations
only.
On
On
The common practice of Judge Fry in the lawsuit was to let motions
accumulate and then set a hearing to hear all motions filed as of that date.
This was done because Judge Fry did not live near
After
trial, Judge Fry entered his first Judgment of Disbarment which contained a
“mother hubbard clause” which stated that “all relief not expressly
granted is hereby denied”. (Exhibit
“C”)
Had
WorldPeace not timely filed a Motion to Modify, then all of his counterclaims
and untried causes of action that had been severed would have been dismissed by
the first Judgment for Disbarment. Judge
Fry refused to sign a severance order but tried to dismiss the balance of the
lawsuit with a “Mother Hubbard” clause in the First Judgment for Disbarment.
3) On
4)
On August 5, 2003, after the first Judgment for Disbarment was set aside,
WorldPeace filed an additional cause of action against Johnell Collins as a
mandatory counter claim (Exhibit “I”) and also filed an additional cause of
action for a declaratory judgment, on August 13, 2003, (Exhibit “K”) to have
the court declare sections of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure to be
unconstitutional.
Since Judge Fry refused to sign a severance order, WorldPeace
was forced to file these supplemental petitions under the cause number assigned
to the case in chief.
5)
WorldPeace would show the court that Judge Fry came into
Judge
Fry did not, in either of the orders that he signed, speak directly to the issue
of the Collins’ counter claim filed by WorldPeace nor did Judge Fry speak
directly to the issue of WorldPeace’s additional cause of action for a
Declaratory Judgment.
Judge
Fry did indirectly reference the two supplemental petitions in his order
granting the Commission’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Exhibit “N”) However,
and this is pivotal, those supplemental petitions against Collins and for
declaratory judgment could have been filed in the new “A” lawsuit against
Lang and Apodaca and so they could not be dismissed by Judge Fry simply because
they were not filed seven days before the Commission’s Motion for No-evidence
Summary Judgment which was set on July 28, 2003, by submission.
There was no such deadline on the “A” case.
So
even if Judge Fry refused to consider the supplemental petitions with the
Commission’s Motion for Summary Judgment, he cannot refuse to consider them in
the “A” case or he could sever them into another lawsuit.
The problem is that the
Judge
Fry did not sign an order severing the constitutional counterclaims or
WorldPeace’s cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
as he ruled in pre-trial.
Consequently,
Judge Fry has still not entered a final order in this case because all of the
parties and causes of action have not been disposed of per Rule 3.01, TRCP.
(Exhibit “RE”)
The Judgment for Disbarment of
Further,
Judge Fry included in his
The
Summary Judgment order did not have a “mother hubbard clause”.
(Exhibit “N”)
The
problem with the Commission’s Motion for No-evidence Summary Judgment was that
the Commission did not designate the elements of WorldPeace’s cause of action
for Injunctive Relief (Exhibit “AJ”) as mandated by Rule 166a(i) TRCP.
(Exhibit “RF”)
Judge
Fry and the Commission have a habit of ignoring the statutory law.
Rule 3.01 TRDP (Exhibit “RA”) and Rule 166a(i) TRCP (Exhibit “RF”)
use the word “MUST”. In regards to both rules, Judge Fry ruled that “MUST” means
optional.
The
case law is clear, the movant MUST state the elements of which there is no
evidence in a No-evidence Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Exhibit “AH” & “RF”) The
Commission did not do this and yet Judge Fry granted the Summary Judgment any
way. (Exhibit “N”)
6) WorldPeace would show the
court that it has been over a year since the State Bar of Texas filed suit
against WorldPeace. Per Rule 3.07 of
the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Exhibit “RB”) it is way beyond
the 180 day limit mandated to try the lawsuit.
No further trials have been set in this matter.
There is not a final judgment per Rule 3.01 TRCP concerning all issues
and it has been six months beyond the deadline that the court had to try the
underlying case.
7) Judge Fry knew, per
WorldPeace’s
Judge
Fry knows that the underlying lawsuit must be retried.
But, Judge Fry has determined that he is not going to retry the case but
instead intends to disbar WorldPeace arbitrarily by manipulating the facts and
law by stating he ruled on having Rule 174 TRCP (Exhibit “RG”) separate
trial as opposed to severing the case in chief into separate lawsuits.
However, in Mathis v. Bill de la
Garza, 778 S.W. 2d 105 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1989) (Exhibit “S”) the
court encountered a similar question regarding severance and separate trials.
Judge Fry stated over and over he was severing the constitutional
counterclaims and he signed a final order and that included nothing but the Rule
violations.
8)
Judge Fry signed a Judgment for Disbarment on
It
is interesting that Judge Fry would wait until two days after WorldPeace
officially filed to run for Mayor of
9) Judge Fry tried to
manipulate his second Judgment for Disbarment around the fact that it was an
abuse of discretion to sever the mandatory counterclaims.
By saying he had made a Rule 174 TRCP (Exhibit “RG”) decision which
is contrary to the record. (Exhibit
“S”)
10) Judge Fry abused his
discretion by refusing to hear WorldPeace’s August 5, 2003, Motion for Sever
Order (Exhibit “J”) to which the Commission filed no answer or
WorldPeace’s Motion to Compel Production of other Rule 3.01 TRDP violations by
the Commission (Exhibit “E”) to which Molleston filed no answer.
Both
of these motions are relevant to the case in chief.
Also, since there is at this time an “A” case, those motions must be
set for hearings.
To
refuse to set a hearing is an abuse of discretion.
(Exhibit “AK”)
11)
In the second Judgment for Disbarment dated
12)
Judge Fry indicates in the
The
determination to sever WorldPeace’s mandatory counterclaims came in pretrial
after the Commission withdrew its Motion for Severance (Exhibit “U”) of
WorldPeace’s counterclaims and then reasserted its Motion.
(Exhibit “A”)
13)
Further, during the course of the trial on the Rule Violations,
WorldPeace created a Bill of Exception (WorldPeace prays the Court to take
judicial notice of that Bill of Exception) having to do with his mandatory
Constitutional counterclaim regarding religious discrimination by the
Commission. There would have been no
reason for that Bill of Exception if Judge Fry had in fact determined to have
Rule 174 TRCP separate trials as opposed to separate lawsuits by severing the
case in chief per the local rules. Judge
Fry did not stop WorldPeace from creating his Bill of Exception by reminding
WorldPeace that there would be separate trials as opposed to a severed lawsuits.
Further, Judge Fry would have us believe that when he used the
word sever with regards to Lang and Apodaca he meant separate lawsuits, but when
he used sever, regarding WorldPeace’s mandatory counterclaims, he meant
separate trials within one lawsuit.
14)
In addition, Judge Fry knew that WorldPeace had added two supplemental petitions
to the lawsuit after Judge Fry vacated his April 23, 2003, Judgment for
Disbarment on June 23, 2003; said supplements were dated August 5, 2003 (Adding
a Collin’s counterclaim) (Exhibit “I”) and August 13, 2003 (Adding
a Delcaratory Judgment), (Exhibit “K”) more than seven days prior to the
second Judgment for Disbarment on August 27, 2003.
As it stands, the supplemental cause of action of
15)
Judge Fry added a “Mother Hubbard” clause to his
16)
Judge Fry entered a Judgment for Disbarment in (Exhibit “L”) which he
found Disbarment for each rule violation which is contrary to his ruling at
trial when he disbarred WorldPeace for having 23 cumulative violations.
17)
WorldPeace would also show the court that the WorldPeace v. Collins matter (Cause
No. 2000-31108; WorldPeace v.
Collins, 281st District Court,
WorldPeace
would show that the Commission appeared in the Collins lawsuit by filing
responses to several motions and filed two motions of its own.
(Exhibit “CA” -- “CI”)
The
problem is that the Commission filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction which was never
signed. So the final judgment in WorldPeace v. Collins is a final judgment with regards to the
Commission as well as Collins. (Exhibit
“AF” & “AG”)
If
the Commission files a motion alleging the Collins Final Judgment is
interlocutory, then there is a problem with the fact that WorldPeace claims
against Collins will have to be retried in the 269th because they are
mandatory counterclaims like Lang and Apodaca.
In
fact, WorldPeace refiled against Collins in his supplemental petition on
WorldPeace
tried to consolidate the cases in the 281st District Court and the
Commission objected. (Exhibit
“AC”)
The
Commission was aware of the res judicata
problem and should have intervened in the WorldPeace
v. Collins lawsuit and then moved to have Judge Fry replace Judge Bland in
the disciplinary petition. Or the
Commission should have moved to consolidate the case in the 281st
District Court with the case in the 269th District Court.
The Commission refused. Therefore,
the Commission manipulated itself into a res judicata scenario at its own free will.
That
being said the real problem is that the Commission was never dismissed from the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit and when the final judgment was signed
(Exhibit “AA”) it barred the Collins grievance from being tried in this
lawsuit.
SUMMARY
Judge Fry knew he had no jurisdiction over WorldPeace because the
Commission did not abide by Rule 3.01 TRDP and he knew Collins was barred by res judicata. Therefore,
the entire lawsuit and every act of Judge Fry was an abuse of discretion.
It cannot be doubted that these rulings were due to Judge Fry’s bias.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, WorldPeace prays the court to recuse Judge
Fry from this lawsuit per Rule 18b(2)(a & b) and for such other and further
relief at law or in equity as this court deems proper.
Respectfully
submitted,
__________________________________
John WorldPeace
TBA No. 21872800
2620 Fountainview,
Tel: 713-784-7618
Fax: 713-784-9063
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was hand
delivered to opposing counsel on
_________________________________
John WorldPeace
EXHIBITS
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
G.
Summary Judgment
H.
Party Claims
I.
J.
K.
L.
N.
Judgment
O.
Jurisdiction
P.
Copy of index page regarding the 2002 Governor’s race.
Q.
Motion for No-Evidence Summary Judgment
R.
S.
U.
V.
Disbarment
X.
___________________________________________________________________________
Y.
WorldPeace’s Motion to Recuse Judge Fry in the Underlying Lawsuit
Z.
Copy of index page regarding Presbyterian-R-Us webpage
AA.
AB.
Severance Abuse of Discretion cases (on mandatory counterclaims)
AC.
AD.
AE.
AF.
Internet print out on orders in WorldPeace
v. Collins
AG.
AH.
Authority for No-evidence Summary Judgment
AI.
Abuse of Discretion – Authorities
AJ.
Permanent Injunction – Authorities
AK.
In re: Johnnie Tasby (40 S.W. 3d 90)
CA.
CB.
CC.
CD.
to Disqualify Dawn Miller
CE.
to Show Authority
CF.
to Consolidate
CG.
Order
CI.
State Bar of
RA.
Rule 3.01
RB.
Rule 3.07
RC.
Rule 3.03
RD.
Harris County Local Rules regarding Severance
RE.
Rule 3.01
RF.
Rule 166a(i)
RG.
Rule 174
NO. 2002-42081
COMMISSION FOR
LAWYER
§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DISCIPLINE
§
§
V. §
§
JOHN WORLDPEACE § 269TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WORLDPEACE
“My name is John WorldPeace. I
am over the age of eighteen years, have never been convicted of a felony or
crime of moral turpitude, and am competent to make this affidavit.
I am duly authorized and qualified to make this affidavit.
I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein, and they are true
and correct.
I have read the foregoing Motion to Recuse and swear that the facts
contained therein are true and are further verified
by the trial record.
I cannot get a fair trial before Judge Fry due to his being a Democrat, a
Mason, and an elder in the Presbyterian Church.
The exhibits attached to the Motion to Recuse are true and correct copies
of the originals. The transcriptions
are correct renditions of audio tapes made my WorldPeace during the entire
trial.
___________________________________
John WorldPeace
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO
BEFORE ME on this _____day of ___________, 2003.
____________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE
STATE OF
NO. 2002-42081
COMMISSION FOR
LAWYER
§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DISCIPLINE
§
§
V. §
§
JOHN WORLDPEACE § 269TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER
On
this date, the court considered Defendant’s MOTION TO RECUSAL UNDER RULE
18B(2)(A) TCPRC. After considering
the motion, the Court, GRANTS the motion.
SIGNED on _______________
_____________________________
Presiding Judge
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