![[THE WORLDPEACE SIGN]](wppin.gif)
![[THE WORLDPEACE SIGN]](pinquarter.jpg)
NO. 2002-42081
COMMISSION FOR
LAWYER
§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DISCIPLINE
§
§
V. §
§
JOHN WORLDPEACE § 269TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DEFENDANT’S EIGHTH AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMS
TO
THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT
COMES NOW, John WorldPeace,
Defendant in the above styled and numbered cause, and files this his
DEFENDANT’S SIXTH AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY
CLAIMS and would show the Court the following:
NOTE:
Due to the present confusion
regarding the
Respondent’s August 5, 2003, Supplemental Petition Regarding Johnell
Collins and Respondent’s August 13, 2003, issues regarding Declaratory Judgment
has been inserted into this petition which now includes all the causes of
action and all the parties.
JUDICIAL
NOTICE
WorldPeace prays the court to take
judicial notice of the file in this lawsuit.
I. PARTIES
1.01 Petitioner, Commission for Lawyer Discipline,
is a governmental body under the State Bar of Texas.
1.02 Respondent, WorldPeace is an individual
residing and doing business in Houston, Harris County, Texas.
1.03 Third Party Defendant, John Lang is an
individual residing and doing business in
1.04
Third Party Defendant, Philip Apodaca is an individual residing in
Houston, Harris County, Texas.
1.05
Third Party Defendant, Johnell Collins, is an individual residing in
Houston, Harris County, Texas.
1.06 Counter Defendants, J. G.
Molleston, Dawn Miller and Leigh Arneman, attorneys at law, are individuals and
residents of Houston, Harris County, Texas.
1.07 Third Party Defendant, the
Attorney General of
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PARTIES
………………………………....................................................................................2
TABLE OF
CONTENTS……………………………………………….....................................3
I. GENERAL DENIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES…………...................................5
II. WORLDPEACE’S COUNTER CLAIMS AND DEFENSES……………….....................7
A. COUNTERCLAIM - RULE 13 SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
COMMISSION’S ATTORNEYS…………………………………………………………………………………….7
B. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE: THE STATE BAR’S
VIOLATION OF
WORLDPEACE’S EQUAL
PROTECTION RIGHTS……………………………………….7
(1.) free
speech violations……………………………………………………………8
(2.) RELIGIOUS
DESCRIMINATION………………………………………………………..8
C(1) DEFENSE:
ATTORNEY FEES - STATE BAR………………………………..............9
C(2) COUNTERCLAIM: ATTORNEY FEES -
WORLDPEACE…………………………10
D. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL -
DUE PROCESS……10
E. DEFENSE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
F. CONTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL -
THE GRIEVANCE PROCESS IS OPPRESSIVE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS…………………………12
G. DEFENSE: REGARDING LANG, LYNCH, NASH,
WILLIAMS AND APODACA
THE “SUIT WITHIN A SUIT”
REQUIREMENT……………….…………….......………..13
H. CONSTITUTIONAL SELF INCRIMINATION VIOLATIONS
REGARDING RULE 801 AND 804 TDRPC…………………………………………………………………………..14
I. RES JUDICATA………………………………...................................................................15
J. DEFENSE: SEVERANCE OF COMPLAINANTS- UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUE
PROCESS……………………………………………………………………………………….17
K. CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT…………………………..18
L. COUNTERCLAIM: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS...18
M. WORLDPEACE’S CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER
N. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES - INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF………………………………..19
III. DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST
COMPLAINANTS………………20
O. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION - COLLINS
COMPLAINT………………………………20
P. THIRD PARTY CLAIMS AGAINST JOHNELL
COLLINS…………………………...32
Q. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION -
FRASER-NASH………………………………....…..35
R. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION - PENNY JO
REILLY………………………………..….42
S. THIRD PARTY CLAIM - PHILLIP
APODACA…………………………….…………..49
T. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION - DARLENE
WILLIAMS…………………………….50
U. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION - JOHN V.
LYNCH……………………..………………..55
V. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION - JOHN F.
LANG………………………………..……….60
W. THIRD PARTY CLAIM - JOHN
LANG………………………………..........................66
PRAYER………………………………………………………………........................………..68
I. GENERAL DENIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
2.01 Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 92,
Defendant John WorldPeace asserts a general denial to each and every claim and
cause of action set forth in Plaintiff Commission for Lawyer Discipline and
demands that Plaintiff Commission for Lawyer Discipline prove their allegations
by the greater weight and preponderance of the credible evidence before a jury,
as is required by the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas.
2.02 In addition, WorldPeace also alleges that 1)
the Commission for Lawyer Discipline (CLD) does not have the legal capacity to
sue WorldPeace, 2) that the Commission for Lawyer Discipline is not entitled to
recover in the capacity in which it sues, 3) that there is another suit pending
in this state between the same parties involving the same claim, 4) there has
been an accord and satisfaction, 5) duress, 6) estoppel, and 7) illegality.
2.03 In the Lynch complainant, WorldPeace alleges
there was no contract between WorldPeace and Lynch and therefore WorldPeace
owed no duty to Lynch.
2.04 WorldPeace pleads the affirmative defense res judicata in the Collins complainant
which was tried in the 281st District Court after the 281st
District Court denied WorldPeace Motion to Consolidate. The Commission opposed WorldPeace’s motion.
2.05 WorldPeace also pleads the defense of a “suit
within a suit”. All suits against an
attorney by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline are per the common law,
malpractice suits. The civil law
requires that in order to prove malpractice against a lawyer, which the courts
have defined as a suit for negligence, the Commission must prove that the
complainant would have won the underlying lawsuit.
The
Commission has specifically alleged in most of the complaints in this lawsuit
that WorldPeace violated Rule 1.01 (b)(1) TDRPC which includes “neglect” which
is a derivative of negligence.
Therefore, the Commission must prove in the Apodaca, Williams, Lynch,
Nash and Lang cases that they would have won their underlying suits.
In
addition, WorldPeace asserts that Apodaca did in fact try the underlying suit
without success and therefore WorldPeace is not liable to Apodaca for
negligence.
In
the Williams and Lang cases, it appears that the statute of limitations has run
in the underlying cases and they did not file suit after they filed a grievance
against WorldPeace and before the statute of limitations ran. Therefore, they
have waived their right to file suit and any suit by the Commission against
WorldPeace for not filing suit is frivolous, has been waived and is barred to
the Commission.
2.06 In regards to the Rule 8.01 TDRPC and Rule
1.06(Q)(4) TRDP violations alleged by the Commission against WorldPeace. WorldPeace would point out comment 6 under
Rule 8.04(c) and comment 10 under Rule 1.02(c).
When
the Collin’s grievance was filed, WorldPeace informed the State Bar that he was
going to shut down the grievance process.
WorldPeace
asserts that he has a right to challenge the TDRPC by not complying with the
TDRPC particularly in regards to information requested from WorldPeace in the
grievance process. In demanding
information from WorldPeace when the State Bar is not required to give
WorldPeace information, WorldPeace is disadvantaged in any future lawsuit
against him. Comment 2 under Rule 8.01
protects the attorney’s unstated invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
2.07 The grievance process allows a one sided
development of the case in that the lawyer is not allowed to see or question
the grievance committee, the complainant or see the evidence against him. Consequently, frivolous grievances proceed to
trial.
2.08 In addition WorldPeace would show his Fifth
Amendment Rights under the United States Constitution and Act 1, Section 10 of
the Texas Constitution protect him from self incrimination in any grievance
matter. In all initial requests for a
response, the State Bar states that the attorney’s response may be turned over
to law enforcement which indirectly indicates criminal prosecution is being
considered by the State Bar.
Lastly,
at the beginning of each grievance hearing the attorney is read his Fifth
Amendment Rights. This is an indication
that the demand for information prior to the grievance hearing is also
protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Therefore, the admonishment by the grievance hearing that the Fifth
Amendment is applicable, is an admission that the Respondent attorney is not
required to file a response. And if the
Respondent is not required to file a statement prior to the grievance hearing,
then the Respondent cannot be charged with violating any TDRPC that relate to the
failure of the Respondent attorney to communicate with the State Bar about a
grievance.
II. WORLDPEACE’S COUNTERCLAIMS AND FURTHER
DEFENSES
A. COUNTERCLAIM – RULE 13 SANCTIONS AGAINST THE
COMMISSION’S ATTORNEYS
WorldPeace
counter sues Dawn Miller, Leigh Arnemann and J. G. Molleston for TRCP Rule 13
Sanctions and sanctions under Chapter 9 and 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code for filing and perpetuating a frivolous and groundless cause of
action.
WorldPeace
would show the court that each complaint should be considered separately such
that sanctions should be awarded on each frivolous and groundless grievance as
opposed to the entire lawsuit.
B. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE: THE STATE BAR’S VIOLATION OF WORLDPEACE’S
EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS
On
There
articles have nothing to do with any of the six complainants which form the
basis of the Commission’s lawsuit. Four
articles seem to hold a common theme about race which was a high profile issue
in the 2002 Texas Governor’s race. There
are no allegation in this lawsuit by the Commission that even remotely relate
to these articles.
(1) FREE SPEECH
VIOLATIONS
The implication is that the
Commission filed suit against WorldPeace for his political activism and has
therefore violated WorldPeace’s constitutional right to free speech.
(2) RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION
In
addition, to the above articles, the Commission also included WorldPeace’s web
page regarding his present run for Mayor of Houston. Within the WorldPeace for Mayor Page, there is a reference to
WorldPeace’s religious beliefs and there is a link from that page to the WorldPeace Peace Page where
WorldPeace has extensive writings about religion and the interrelationship
between religion and politics and the law.
There can
be little doubt that the Commission has no other reason to bring WorldPeace’s
web pages into evidence in this case for any reason except to attempt to try
WorldPeace’s religious and political beliefs to the jury.
It is a violation of Article I,
Section 3 of the
WorldPeace
would show the court that when an opponent in any lawsuit begins to personally
attack the opposing lawyer or party, it is because there is no basis for the
underlying case.
WorldPeace
has filed for Rule 13 sanctions but now has undeniable evidence that the State
Bar maliciously filed suit on WorldPeace by way of five frivolous complaints
and one complaint that had already been tried.
WorldPeace sues the State Bar for
religious discrimination.
C(1). DEFENSE:
ATTORNEY FEES – STATE BAR
The dollar
value of the State Bar attorney’s is what he or she gets paid by the State Bar. That is the undeniable going rate. That is what the State Bar can purchase an
attorney for on the open market. To
allow a State Bar attorney to allege that he or she should be paid what a
private attorney charges is nonsense.
When
applying the reasonable fees standards, the salary of the Commission’s attorney
is the undeniable reasonable salary of the State Bar attorney. It is the value of the State Bar attorney’s
time for that kind of work.
Further,
since the State Bar attorneys are salaried, the State Bar would have to prove
that “but for” the WorldPeace complaints it would not have hired its attorneys
in order to be awarded attorneys fees.
This is the way it works in the real world. When someone needs an attorney, they hire one
at the going rate.
However, in
the case of the State Bar, their budget authorizes the hiring of staff
attorneys and those attorneys are not working on a contract basis. They are full time employees.
Therefore,
the State Bar has not incurred any additional attorney fees for its prosecution
of the complaints against WorldPeace which would justify attorney fee
sanctions. The State Bar must prove that
“but for” the complaints against WorldPeace they would not have salaried an
attorney to file suit against WorldPeace.
The State
Bar cannot do this. The only case law
that the State Bar has offered is off point because it discusses private
attorneys working pro bono for the State Bar and then being awarded attorney
fees. None of the State Bar attorneys in
this lawsuit are private pro bono attorneys.
C(2). COUNTERCLAIM: ATTORNEY FEES – WORLDPEACE
Since the
State Bar per the TRDP and TDRPC claim they can receive attorney fees when none
have been incurred, WorldPeace alleges he can as an attorney be awarded
attorney fees for the time he had to spend defending himself in this lawsuit.
It does not
matter that WorldPeace is pro se.
The
principal seems to be that time spent by the Commission’s attorney is
compensible even through no fees were incurred and it is unjust to allow those
fees to the Bar and then deny attorneys fees to the Respondent’s attorney.
D. COUNTERCLAIM
AND DEFENSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL - DUE
PROCESS
WorldPeace
would allege that the State Bar in the complaints of Collins, Apodaca and Lynch
recommended a sanction of public reprimand for WorldPeace. WorldPeace would show the court that his
rights of due process were violated under both the
In other
words, the State Bar has the power to impose a sanction of private or public
reprimand on WorldPeace without WorldPeace being given any real
alternative. WorldPeace would show the
court that even the most frivolous of grievances can put pressure on an
attorney to accept a private or public reprimand even when it is not deserved
because the alternative is a trial de novo in the District Court which amounts
to a public reprimand.
WorldPeace
would also show the court that the alternative to a trial de novo is a
Evidentiary Hearing where the attorney has less rights than he does in a civil
trial. No one can doubt that an
Evidentiary Hearing is little more than the reinforcement of the State Bar
grievance process.
WorldPeace
would show the court that the only real option for an attorney to get a fair
hearing in a grievance is a trial de novo in the civil court where he can level
the playing field between himself and the State Bar.
E. DEFENSE:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
WorldPeace
would show the court that the range of punishment which allows disbarment for
the most minor acts of Professional Misconduct, such that failing to return one
phone call, can result in disbarment and is therefore arbitrary and therefore
unconstitutional.
WorldPeace
would show the court that virtually all lawsuits have a range of punishment for
damages in civil cases to a definite strata of punishments in the criminal
cases such that the punishment fits the crime.
The
grievance process is a quasi criminal procedure. The grievance process gives a Fifth Amendment
warning at the grievance hearings: they are related to grand jury proceedings.
Therefore,
there should be a range of punishment applied to various violations.
F. COUNTERCLAIM AND DEFENSE: UNCONSTITUTIONAL -
THE GRIEVANCE PROCESS IS OPPRESSIVE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
WorldPeace
would show that the grievance process is unconstitutional due to its
oppressive, arbitrary and capriciousness as exemplified by: 1) Attorney
respondents in the grievance process are subject to being sanctioned for
revealing any confidences in the process but if the complainant non-attorney
reveals those confidences there is no sanctions applicable to the complainant,
2) There is a conflict in laws such that confidences that are prohibited from
being revealed can be revealed in a pleading in a lawsuit without
repercussions: 3) The senior investigator can designate intolerant grievance
panels to hear grievances against attorneys the investigator wants sanctioned;
4) the offer of a private or public reprimand by the grievance committee can be
forced upon an attorney because the filing of a civil suit against the attorney
acts as a public reprimand thus making a settlement offer of a private or
public reprimand an empty offer; 5) the commission can enforce double sanctions
through Rule 8.04 (a)(1) which boosts any violation of the TDRPC; 6) the
attorney is intimidated and coerced into presenting to the grievance panel
evidence that will violate his rights against self incrimination - all demands
for information from the State Bar stating that the information can be
forwarded to law enforcement and all grievance hearings open with an admonition
to the attorney about his rights against self incrimination; 7) the grievance
process can be abused to influence legitimate attorney client fee disputes ; 8)
the Commission can seek attorney fees even when it incurs none; 9) attorney
fees can be calculated on the rates charged by private attorneys when the State
Bar’s in house attorneys make about 20% of the private rate - the best evidence
of reasonable attorney fees is what the State Bar attorneys are paid; 10) attorney fees can be charged for
attorneys who are employed by the State Bar and no proof is required to be
offered by the State Bar that “but for” the acts of the Respondent, the State
Bar would not have employed an attorney;
11) there is no range of punishment that limits the sanctions available
to the court in a disciplinary action so not returning one phone call can
result in disbarment; there is no standard for which the various judges who
hear these matters can use as a guideline.
(12) the attorneys for the State Bar are immune from prosecution for
their tortious and even criminal acts committed during the course of attempting
to sanction an attorney; (13) the most
abusive attorneys, like Jim Adler of Houston, can avoid prosecution by becoming
members of the grievance panels; (14) the grievance process is so skewed
against the respondent attorney that his best strategy is to not cooperate with
the State Bar and let the grievance go into a civil lawsuit where the
respondent has a level playing field under the law and the TRCP. 15)
The process allows for arbitrary application of the TDRPC to attorneys. 16) A pro se Respondent attorney is not
allowed attorney fees. 17) The State Bar is allowed to combine
grievances into one lawsuit by alleging common violations of the TDRPC even
though those violations do not apply to every grievance.
The
solution to all these issues is to disband the grievance process and open the
TDRPC to the client in a civil lawsuit.
Any other system allows for abuses by the grievance bureaucracy.
G. DEFENSE:
Regarding Lang, Lynch, Nash, Williams and Apodaca the “suit within a suit”
requirement
WorldPeace
would show the court that the suit that the Commission has filed against
WorldPeace is in essence a malpractice suit.
As such, the Commission is required to prove a “suit within a
suit”. The Commission is required to
prove that Lang, Lynch, Nash, Williams, Apodaca would have won their suits had
WorldPeace not been negligent.
Further,
WorldPeace would show the court that all but Lynch’s claims come under the four
year statute of limitation and that Lang, Williams and Apodaca were still able
to file suit after filing a grievance against WorldPeace. WorldPeace would show the court that none of
the complainants have made an effort to file suit.
WorldPeace
would show the court that the lawsuit that the Commission has filed against
WorldPeace is frivolous and groundless.
WorldPeace would show the court that the Commission is taking on causes
of action that the complainants are not willing to prosecute themselves.
WorldPeace
would show the court that there the standard of neglect in a State Bar suit
against an attorney should not have a lesser standard of care than the common
law requires of an attorney in a legal malpractice case. Either the attorney was negligent or he was
not. And that negligence must have
caused harm. There are many neglectful
acts of an attorney that do not cause harm.
The complaintant must prove that he or she was harmed if there the
attorney is to be found negligent.
The TDRPC
is too broad such that an attorney could neglect to call a client without any
harm to the client and yet for this neglect the attorney could be disbarred
because there is no range of punishment for this kind of infraction.
H. CONSTITUTION SELF INCRIMINATION AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS REGARDING RULE 801 AND 804 TDRPC
WorldPeace
would show the court that in several of the complaints the Commission has
alleged Rule 804 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Number Eight of Rule 804(a) indicates that
WorldPeace failed to timely furnish to
the Chief Disciplinary Council Office or District Grievance Committee a
response or other information as required by the
WorldPeace
would show the court that per comment number six of that rule it states that a lawyer may refuse to comply with an
obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief openly asserted that no
valuable obligation exists. The
provisions of Rule 1.02c concerning a good faith challenge of validity, scope,
meaning or application of law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the
practice of law.
Further,
WorldPeace would show that per Rule 801 comment number two, it sates that this
rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and corresponding provision of Article 1 Section 10 of the Texas
Constitution. A person relying on such provision in response to a specific question a
more general demand for information, however, should do so openly and not use the right of non disclosure
and non asserted justification for failure to comply with this rule.
WorldPeace
would show the court that the language of the comment uses the word should as
opposed to shall. WorldPeace is
therefore not required to openly assert the Fifth Amendment per the rules.
Further,
WorldPeace would show the court that in each Bar Grievance it states that the
State Bar is going to turn over the information that it acquires to law
enforcement officials. The Miranda
decision begins with “you have the right
to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against you, etc.” WorldPeace had a right to remain silent and
that is exactly what he did at the grievance portion of the disciplinary
process.
I. RES JUDICATA
WorldPeace
would show the court that the Collins complaint was tried in the 281st
District Court, Harris County, Texas (No. 2000-31108; WorldPeace v. Collins,
281st District Court, Harris County, Texas) which was filed by
WorldPeace on
The
Commission filed suit on WorldPeace in this cause regarding the Collins
complaint on
WorldPeace
filed a motion to have the Commission’s cause of action regarding Collins in
this case consolidated with WorldPeace’s cause of action against Collins in the
281st District Court.
The
Commission objected to WorldPeace’s motion and the 281st District
Court abused its discretion by refusing to consolidate the cases under TRCP
Rule 39.
Final
judgment was entered on
The problem
in this case is that the Commission has not applied the same argument that
cases cannot be combined with regard to WorldPeace’s Third Party Claims against
Lang and Apodaca. Either, cases can be
combined or the cannot.
There is no
overriding TRDP Rule that prevents the combining of suits under Rule 39 TRCP
and therefore the State Bar’s action should have been consolidated with the
WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit that had been filed a full year prior to the
Commission’s lawsuit.
Per the
local rules, WorldPeace was required to file for the consolidation in the 281st
District Court which he did. This court
had no jurisdiction per the local rules to consolidate the lawsuit.
Since the
lawsuits were not consolidated per Rule 39, TRCP, the Commission is barred by
res judicata from retrying the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit.
In
addition, the Commission is barred from filing a cause of action for
Restitution in this lawsuit because Collins failed to file for restitution in
the underlying case.
Lastly, the
Commission appeared in the 281st District Court lawsuit and filed a
Plea to the Jurisdiction for which an order was never signed. The Commission’s complaint regarding Collins
was tried to conclusion in the 281st District Court per the
J. DEFENSE:
SEVERANCE OF COMPLAINANTS -
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DUE PROCESS
WorldPeace
would show the court that range of damages in this lawsuit is not just death
penalty sanctions but the loss of one’s vocation.
WorldPeace
would show the court that he cannot get a fair trial with six grievances
consolidated is one lawsuit. WorldPeace
would show the court this prejudices the jury against WorldPeace due to the
number of grievances. This is true even
if all grievances are frivolous and groundless which they are.
Further,
WorldPeace would show the court that in a combined trial there must be an
agreement by 10 of the 12 jurors on each compliant as opposed to an agreement
on the overall verdict.
An
agreement on the overall verdict could require some bargaining between the jury
on voting for or against particular complaints in order to reach an overall
verdict.
This
results in factors being considered which one outside the facts of a particular
complaint but go to the negotiation by the jury of a verdict which they can all
sign their name to.
This
unnecessarily burdens some jurors to indirectly vote against the attorney on a
complaintant that they would normally not vote against. It also suggests to the jury that they are to
consider whether the attorney should be sanctioned based on the number of
grievances as opposed to the merit of each individual grievance.
There
should be separate jury findings on each grievance and no jury finding on the
combined grievances.
K. CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
ADDITIONAL PARTY
Third
Party Defendant, Attorney General of
SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE
WorldPeace
asserts the affirmative defense of unconstitutionality of the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure.
CAUSE OF ACTION – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
WorldPeace
sues for Declaratory Judgment regarding the unconstitutionality of certain
sections Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and the interpretation of
certain sections of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.
WorldPeace
prays for a Declaratory Judgment regarding the unconstitutionality of the
following sections of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedures: 1.06 j, p, q, r, 2.09; 2.11; 2.13; 2.15;
2.17; 2.18; 3.05; 3.07; 3.10; 3.11; 3.12; 3.13; 3.14; 13.01; 14.01; 14.02;
15.04; 15.05; 15.06; 15.07; 15.10; 15.11; 15.13.
WorldPeace
prays for a clarification of the following sections of the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedures: 1.06 n, p, q, r; 2.09; 2.10 b; 2.11; 2.13; 2.14; 2.15;
2.17; 2.18; 2.20; 3.01; 3.02; 3.03; 3.05; 3.07; 3.08 b, e, f; 3.09; 3.10; 3.11;
3.12; 3.13; 3.14; 4.06 a; 13.01; 15.01; 15.02; 15.05; 15.06; 15.07; 15.10;
15.11.
WorldPeace
prays for a declaratory judgment regarding the application of an attorney’s
constitutional rights against self incrimination with regards to all phases of
a disciplinary procedure.
L.
COUNTERCLAIM: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
WorldPeace
would show the court that the entire grievance process as applied to WorldPeace
in this lawsuit has been abusive, malicious, and aggressive. Further, WorldPeace would show the court that
the specific grievances have no basis in fact or law and therefore were
frivolous and groundless.
WorldPeace
would show the court that the State Bar has a history of illegally filing a
lawsuit against WorldPeace.
Therefore,
WorldPeace sues the State Bar for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
and sues for damages equal to the value of his legal fees in this lawsuit.
M. WORLDPEACE’S CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER
The
Low-income Women of
WorldPeace
would show the court that the Commission manipulated the complainants against
him such that the majority of the grievances were heard by the Alan Levine
Committee.
Alan
Levine stated in a grievance hearing to the complainant that “she could go down
the street and find any number of LEGITIMATE ATTORNEYS.”
Further,
WorldPeace would show that he is being discriminated against because he has
compared Ariel Sharon to Adolph Hitler on his web page and the Jewish element
in the grievance process has taken offense and discriminated against WorldPeace
for being a Christian.
The
facts were made into a Bill of Review in the underlying trial. Attached as Exhibit “A” is a table regarding
the complaints against WorldPeace and the associated committees against
WorldPeace. WorldPeace asserts a cause
of action for religious discrimination per the
N. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES - INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
WorldPeace
sues Miller and Molleston, attorneys for the Bar, and the Commission for Lawyer
Discipline for injunctive relief
and conspiracy regarding
their violation of WorldPeace's Constitutional rights of due process, equal
protection, freedom of religion and speech, rights against self-incrimination
and rights under the Texas Equal Rights Amendment.
III. DEFENSES
AND COUNTERCLAIMS AGAINST COMPLAINANTS
O.
FIRST CAUSE OF
ACTION
COLLINS COMPLAINT
On
or about January 27, 1999, Johnell Collins (hereinafter referred to as
“Complainant” borrowed some $22,000.00 from Bank One to purchase a 1979 Ford
Semi-Tractor and a 1993 Lufkin Trailer (hereinafter referred to as “the truck”)
to be used by Complainant’s companion, Alvin Arbuckle (hereinafter referred to
as “Arbuckle”). In March 1999, Collins
threw Arbuckle out of her house after they had been living together for three
months. Collins did not immediately
register the semi tractor with the State of
1.
Collins
hirded ___ Bard, attorney at law, to represent her in obtaining title to the
truck. Collins went to Arbuckle’s where
the truck was being stored and took possession of it.
Suit
was filed in County Court at Law No. 3 by Bard, for Collins against
Arbuckle. When the judge heard the
matter, the judge stated that the problem sounded like a family matter to her
and that the lawsuit really belonged in the family court.
After
this statement by the court, Collins, made an appointment with WorldPeace. WorldPeace wrote a contract with
Collins. Normally WorldPeace charges a
$100 non-refundable retainer for a first interview which usually includes a
intitial demand letter to the opposing party.
However,
in this case, WorldPeace was not starting from scratch, but he had to overcome
the fact that Collins had already received a negative ruling from Judge
Bradshaw Hull in CCCL # 3. Had Collins
not received a negative ruling, then there would have been no need for her to
been looking for another attorney.
WorldPeace
told Collins that he had sued Judge Bradshaw-Hull’s husband and therefore she
would have to recuse herself if WorldPeace substituted in on the lawsuit. None-the-less WorldPeace had to overcome the
negative handling of the lawsuit which would go to the new judge.
Therefore,
WorldPeace charged Collins a $2,400 non-refundable retainer just to get the
case back to zero as if nothing had been done by the prior attorney. Collins agreed to the $2,400 plus an
additional percentage of any gross recovery.
WorldPeace
substituted into the lawsuit and had the lawsuit moved to
The
problem with the truck was that it was a business assets which was used to make
money. The intrinsic value of the truck
was $22,000 but the true value of the truck was $1,700 per week in income. Therefore, the annual value of the truck was
about $90,000.
On
or about
Gross
recover was defined as any award or settlement including attorney fees.
Complainant
paid the non-refundable retainer and understood the contract to be that she
would pay all expenses and receive a percentage of any cash recovery.
WorldPeace
understood the contract to mean that he would get the applicable percentages of
any award or settlement, cash or otherwise.
Respondent
did not tell Complainant that he expected to be paid a percentage on the value
of the truck [TDRPC 1.03(a)].
This matter is a simple contract dispute and nothing
more. It would be very unfortunate if
every time there was a contract dispute, between an attorney and client the
client would file a grievance with the State Bar.
The Retainer Agreement
between Collins and WorldPeace was self explanatory and clear WorldPeace would
receive a percentage of any gross recovery (any award or settlement).
When both parties have different understanding of the
contract terms, there is no meeting of the minds and therefore no contract.
WorldPeace used the
words “a percentage of ‘any gross recovery’” in his Retainer Agreement. He did not use the word cash. He did not use the word amount. He used gross recovery to mean any gross
recovery.
The law changed after
the Retainer Agreement was signed between WorldPeace and Collins with the
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Levine v.
Bayne, Swell & Krause; 405 S.W. 3d 92 (Tex. 2001). Levine
said an attorney must be specific in his contract regarding non cash
recoveries. WorldPeace used the words
“any gross recovery” and defined that as any award or settlement. The Levine
talked about a phrase in a contract that said, “any amount received by
settlement or recovery”. There is a
difference between the words gross recovery and the words “any amount
recovered”. Amount indicates money. WorldPeace alleges that his contract did not
come under the Levine ruling and will
appeal the 281st District Court’s ruling on this matter.
There can be no bar
violation by WorldPeace simply because after his best abilities to draft a
contract that seemed to him to be self explanatory and after the subsequent Levine ruling Collins challenged the
terms of the contract.
WorldPeace would further
show the court that this matter has already tried in the 281st
District Court. A final judgment was not
signed in that matter until February 2003, even though it was tried in
September 2002.
A careful look at the jury charge which is part of the
final order will show that the 281st District Court made a ruling
that required the jury to find that WorldPeace did not indicate specifically in
his contract that there would be a percentage recovery due on the truck. (Ex “V”)
This lawsuit is bared by
res judicata in regards to Collins
because it has already been tried to final conclusion. The State Bar refused to join into the
lawsuit (Ex “B” & “C”) as is required by TRCP Rule 39 and the court agreed.
TRCP Rule 39
a) Persons to be Joined if
Feasible. A person who is subject to
service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (2) he claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.
Therefore the
State Bar is barred by res judicata from
retrying this matter.
2.
Initially,
Respondent informed Complainant that the cost of serving the defendant was
$150.00. However, Respondent later
informed Complainant that the service fee was $250.00. Still later, Respondent expressed ignorance
of the exact amount, but told Complainant that he would determine the amount
and let her know [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.03(b), 8.04(a)(3)]. Complainant requested copies of the service
fee statements, however Respondent failed to respond to Complainant’s request
for verification of the service fee or to provide Complainant with those
statements [TDRPC 1.03(a)].
WorldPeace would show
that the amount of service expenses for Defendants were $250.00 and was being
discussed after the Arbuckle case had already been tried. The question was how much were the expenses
due to WorldPeace under the Retainer Agreement.
There is no testimony by Collins that she did not authorize the
filing/serving of the third party defendants, the Garza Brothers in the
Arbuckle case.
The question was simply
how much was the cost for serving the Garza Brothers.
Again, WorldPeace would show the court that the expense issue was not
tried in the underlying case because Collins did not file a counter-claim of
any nature other than for Rule 13 Sanctions and attorney fees in the WorldPeace v Collins case. The counter-claim regarding expenses would
have been a compulsory counter claim per TRCP Rule 97.
a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim within the jurisdiction of the court, not the subject of a pending
action, which at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has against any
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction.
Collins did not file a counter-claim regarding
expenses and she is barred from litigating the amount of expenses due under
that contract. Since Collins is barred
by res judicata through the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit, the
Commission cannot now pick up her cause of action and make it an issue in this
lawsuit of the expenses when Collins did not make expenses an issue in the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit.
3.
On
or about January 12, 2000, a final judgment was entered in No. 715-017; Johnell Collins, Plaintiff v. Alvin Arbuckle, et al,
Defendants; Civil County Court at Law #2 of Harris County, Texas. That judgment awarded Collins of
ownership of the truck and a monetary award of $3,000.00. Said monetary award was to be paid in
installments of $100.00 on the 16th day of each month to Respondent
for the benefit of Complainant. The
Final Judgment tracked the language of the Retainer Agreement. (Ex “X”)
Collins was awarded title to the truck.
“It was agreed that title to the
1979 Ford Tractor…and 1983
4.
In
a telephone conversation between Complainant and Respondent in or around
February 2000, Respondent informed Complainant that he retained the February
payment as final payment for serving Defendants in the above-stated cause of
action. Complainant pointed out to
Respondent that she already paid the $150.00 and that Respondent never provided
her with the service receipts that she requested.
Again, Collins has presented
no evidence that she paid the $150.00.
This was not an issue in the underlying WorldPeace v. Collins case because Collins did not file a
counter-claim.
The Commission has not produced any evidence that
Collins paid $150.00 for the serving of those fees. Collins was required to file a compulsory
counter claim in the WorldPeace v.
Collins regarding these fees and regarding the alleged Arbuckle payments
and she did not do that. Therefore the
Commission’s is barred by res judicata
from asserting those claims now.
This is a primary example of the focus of TRCP Rule 39
where WorldPeace has been put into double jeopardy regarding the same lawsuit
with the same parties, same issues, and same facts that have already been tried
in the 281st district court.
5.
On
On March 2000,
WorldPeace received a call from Wayne Slaughter, attorney at law, saying he
represented Collins. The conversation
was on the telephone speaker and Collins was present with Slaughter in his
office. Wayne Slaughter became the
attorney for Collins. Since Collins was
represented by Wayne Slaughter, WorldPeace could not speak directly to Collins
per TDRPC Rule 4.02(a).
TDRPC Rule 4.02 COMMUNICATION WITH ONE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate or cause or encourage another to communicate about the subject of
the representation with a person, organization or entity of government the lawyer
knows to be represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the
lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by the law to do
so.
6.
In
a letter dated April 3, 2000 from Complainant to Respondent, Complainant again
requested receipts for services of the defendants. Respondent again failed to respond [TDRPC
1.03(a)].
WorldPeace was not able
to respond to Collins because Wayne Slaughter had become her attorney. There was no request from Wayne Slaughter,
attorney at law, regarding anything other than the Retainer Agreement between
WorldPeace and Collins. Which WorldPeace
faxed him the day of the initial consultation.
In
the letter dated April 3, 2000, Complainant also complained about Respondent’s
retaining the entire amount of Arbuckle’s payments instead of dividing the
payments with her according to the representation contract. However, Respondent converted all of
Arbuckle’s payments to his own use without accounting to the Complainant for
same, without notifying the complainant of the receipt of same, and without
segregating the said payments until the dispute between Respondent and
Complainant was resolved. Respondent
failed to place funds in which Complainant had an interest in his trust
account. [TDRPC 1.14(a), 1.14(b), 1.14(c), 8.04(a)(3)].
WorldPeace’s Retainer
Agreement is clear that he was to receive his fees and expenses prior to
dispersing any monies to Collins. Under
Section III. Costs and Expenses. (Ex “A”), which is a copy of the Retainer
Agreement.
Per Rule TDRPC 1.14.
(c) If a
dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute
shall be kept separated by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved, and the
undisputed portion shall be distributed appropriately.
WorldPeace was not required to segregate any monies
that were undisputed. Collins had no
dispute that of the $3,000.00 cash that Arbuckle was to pay that she would owe
WorldPeace 40%. That would mean that the
first $1,200.00 money received from Arbuckle would in fact be payable to
WorldPeace as fees.
Arbuckle was to pay $100.00 per month. Therefore it would be at least a year before
Collins would have received any money whatsoever. However, Collins made demand on WorldPeace
immediately after the Final Judgment was signed. Collins never paid WorldPeace anything after
the initial $2,500 and the contract said WorldPeace had a lien on the
fees.
In addition, there were other expenses that were due
from Collins for the case, which Collins did not pay. Therefore Collins owed WorldPeace over
$3,000.00 in expenses and fees and WorldPeace per his contract had the
authority to keep the money for expenses and fees prior to dispersing any
monies to Collins.
Therefore, WorldPeace
was not required to keep these monies segregated. Regardless of whether or not WorldPeace was
to get a percentage of the volume of the truck, there is no question but that
Collins did not dispute that WorldPeace was to receive a percentage of the cash
award plus his expenses. Again, there
was no counterclaim for these monies in the underlying WorldPeace v. Collins suit therefore the Commission is barred by res judicata from trying this matter
vicariously for Collins.
WorldPeace would also
show the court that in this case he was offered a public reprimand by the State
Bar. The State Bar achieved its public
reprimand when they filed suit on WorldPeace.
Therefore, WorldPeace’s constitutional rights to due process were
violated because the Commission without due process achieved a public reprimand
of WorldPeace by simply filing suit.
7.
RULE
VIOLATIONS
The
acts and/or omissions of the Respondent described in paragraphs IV-X above,
which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct in violation of
the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
(“TDRPC”):
1.03(a) failed to keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable request for
information;
1.03(b) failed to explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation;
1.14(a) failed to hold funds and other property
belonging in whole or part of clients or third persons in a lawyer’s possession
separate from the lawyer’s own property;
1.14(b) failed, upon receiving funds or other
property in which a client or third person has an interest, to promptly notify
the client or third person and render a full accounting upon request;
1.14(c) failed to keep funds or other property in
which both the lawyer and another person claim interest separate until there is
an accounting and severance of their interests;
8.04(a)(1) violated these Rules, knowingly assisted or
induced another to do so, or doing so through the acts of another, whether or
not such violation occurred in the course of a client-lawyer relationship; and
8.04(a)(3) engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.
8.
The
complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the attention
of the Chief Disciplinary counsel of the State Bar of Texas by Johnell Collin’s
filing of a complaint on or about June 1, 2000.
We reaffirm the
“transactional” approach to res judicata.
A subsequent suit will be barred if it arises out of the same subject
matter of a previous suit and which through the exercise of diligence, could
have been litigated in a prior suit. For
these reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and that of the
trial court is affirmed.
Barr v. Resolution Trust
Corp.; 837 S.W. 2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1992)
A counterclaim is compulsory
only if: (1) it is within the jurisdiction of the court; (2) it is not at the
time of filing the answer the subject of a pending action; (3) the claim is
mature and owned by the defendant at the time of filing the answer; (4) it
arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party’s claim; (5) it is against an opposing party in the same
capacity; and (6) it does not require the presence of third parties over whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. [FN14]
A claim having all of these elements must be asserted in the initial
action and cannot be asserted in later actions.
[FN15]
Ingersoll-Rand Company v.
Valero Energy Corporation; 977 S.W. 2d 203, 208 (Tex. 1999)
UNDISPUTED
FACTS
1) Collins had filed suit in County Court at Law
# 3, Harris County, Texas in order to acquire a clear title for her truck back
from her live in boyfriend Alvin Arbuckle.
2) Collins was represented by Mr. Bard.
3) The county court judge told the parties that
the case should be in family court and that was the end of the matter.
4) Collins came to WorldPeace and hired him to
get title to the truck from Arbuckle.
5) WorldPeace wrote a contract with Collins for
$2,500.00 down and a percentage of any gross recovery.
6) WorldPeace was successful at trial for
getting title for Collins plus $3,000.00 that was to be paid to WorldPeace in
the amount of $100.00 per month.
7) Six weeks after the judgment was signed
Collins fired WorldPeace.
8) Collins hired Wayne Slaughter to represent
her and had a conversation over the telephone in Slaughter’s office where they
called WorldPeace.
9) Collins refused to pay WorldPeace his fee.
10)
Collins filed a grievance against WorldPeace.
11) WorldPeace filed suit against Collins for his
fees.
12) The State Bar then filed suit against
WorldPeace.
13) WorldPeace filed a Motion to Consolidate the
cases in the 281st District Court.
14) The State Bar filed a motion objecting to the
consolidation.
15) The court denied WorldPeace’s Motion to
Consolidate.
16) The case was tried in the 281st
District Court in September 2002 and a final order was signed and entered in
February 2003.
17) The underlying matters of the WorldPeace v. Collins case and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline v.
WorldPeace are the exact same cases, with the exact same issues, the same
parties, and the same facts.
18) Collins did not file a counter-claim for
anything other than Rule 13 Sanctions and attorney’s fees.
19) Collins did not file for restitution.
20) Collins did not file for anything in regards
to the monies allegedly paid to WorldPeace by Arbuckle.
21) After WorldPeace wrote a contract for any
gross recovery the Supreme Court handed down the Levine case which indicated
that there should be more specific statements regarding any recovery of
non-cash benefits.
UNDENIABLE LAW
1) TRCP Rule 39 requires consolidation of the WorldPeace v. Collins case and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline v.
WorldPeace.
2) The State Bar is barred by res judicata from
filing suit on WorldPeace, because that matter has already been tried in.
ARGUMENT
P.
THIRD PARTY CLAIMS AGAINST
JOHNELL COLLINS
On
or about April 28, 1999, WorldPeace entered into a Retainer Fee Agreement with
Defendant whereby WorldPeace would substitute into an ongoing lawsuit (Cause No. 715,017:
In the
County Civil Court at Law Number Two; Harris County, Texas) in which
Defendant was trying to recover title to a 1979 For Semi-Tractor and a 1983
Lufkin Trailer; said title being in
the name of Alvin Arbuckle.
The
value of the Tractor/Trailer was $22,000.00.
Due to the fact that the underlying lawsuit had been mishandled by the
prior attorney and WorldPeace was going to have to do significant work to
reestablish Defendant’s position in the lawsuit, WorldPeace demanded a $2,500
non-refundable fee in addition to his contingency fee.
WorldPeace
substituted into the lawsuit which was called to trial on January 1, 2000.
Per the final judgment in that
lawsuit, title to the $22,000.00 tractor/trailer was vested in Defendant and in
addition Defendant was awarded $3,000.00 in damages. Therefore, the total amount awarded to
Defendant in that lawsuit was $25,000.00.
From
the date of the final judgment up to the date of this Motion for Summary
Judgment,
WorldPeace has collected and
maintained in his possession $1,000.00 from Arbuckle, Defendant in the
underlying lawsuit.
Defendant
Collins has refused to pay WorldPeace one cent of his fee per the Retainer Fee
Agreement.
CAUSES OF ACTION AND DAMAGES
WorldPeace
sues Defendant for fraud, breach of contract and quantum meruit and
alleges actual damages in excess of
$10,000.00. As the fraudulent acts of
Defendant were
committed with actual malice,
WorldPeace sues Defendant for exemplary damages.
FACTS
REGARDING SLANDER, INVASION OF PRIVACY AND
INTENTIONAL
INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
WorldPeace
represented Defendant in Cause No.
715,017; Collins v. Arbuckle; CCCL
No. Three,
Harris County, Texas. Due to the
efforts of WorldPeace, Defendant prevailed in that
case and recovered the equivalent
of $15,000. Defendant per her contract
with WorldPeace owed WorldPeace $10,000 in attorney fees. Defendant refused to pay WorldPeace and WorldPeace
sued Defendant in Cause No. 2000-31108, WorldPeace
v. Collins; 281st Judicial District court, Harris County, Texas.
Prior to WorldPeace filing
suit, Defendant filed a complaint with the State Bar of Texas against
WorldPeace. The Defendant was repeatedly
warned by the State not to reveal
anything about the
grievance to anyone other than her attorney or the Chief Disciplinary
Counsel.
WorldPeace
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in Cause
No. 2000-31108 and Defendant filed a
response on October 21, 2000.
In
said response, Defendant revealed on the front page of said response the fact
that she had filed a grievance on WorldPeace.
In
addition on page 5 of Defendant’s affidavit supporting her Response to
WorldPeace’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant incredibly quoted the State
Bar’s warning to her regarding revealing anything about the grievance
and then state that “A panel apparently
made a ruling on July 18, 2000, and it is my understanding that Attorney
WorldPeace gave notice of appeal and the matter is set for trial in mid
November, 2000.”
WorldPeace
would show the court that Defendant’s statement is incorrect.
ARGUMENT
Every
person in general and the State Bar in specific understands that a lawyer’s
Reputation is critical to his
success in practicing law. That is why
the State Bar demands that its
Grievance proceedings be kept
absolutely confidential until such time as a settlement is reached with the
lawyer for sanctions or suit is actually filed in the District Court. If no wrongful acts are found against the
lawyer, the grievance will be dismissed without publicity.
The
purpose of the State Bar rules is to prevent individuals like Defendant from
using the
Grievance process to gain ad
advantage in a lawsuit; just exactly what the Defendant is
attempting in this lawsuit.
Defendant
is a practicing nurse and is fully aware of the importance of reputation in the
field of law because it is also important in the field of medicine.
Defendant
intentionally, knowingly and maliciously made public the groundless
grievance she filed against
WorldPeace. In addition, Defendant
intentionally, knowingly and maliciously lied with regard to WorldPeace being
sued by the State Bar. If in fact the
State Bar had filed suit against WorldPeace, said lawsuit would be on file in
the Ancillary Court on the
first floor of the Harris County
courthouse; which it is not because no such suit exists.
In
an attempt to avoid paying WorldPeace his fees in the Collins v. Arbuckle suit,
Defendant filed a meritless
grievance with the State Bar and then in a further attempt to use the grievance
process as a lever to avoid paying WorldPeace his fees, Defendant, contrary to
the
specific warnings of the State Bar
made her grievance a part of the public record; all to the
severe detriment of WorldPeace’s
reputation.
Now,
due to the malicious acts of Defendant, WorldPeace will have to contend with
other attorneys referencing said
slanderous statements by Defendant.
WorldPeace’s reputation has been irrevocably tarnished by the
intentional acts of Defendant.
CAUSES OF ACTION AND DAMAGES
WorldPeace
sues Defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress and alleges
Actual damages in excess of
$100,000.
As
the acts of Defendant were committed with actual malice, WorldPeace sues for
exemplary damages.
Q.
SECOND CAUSE
OF ACTION
FRASER-NASH
On
or about June 19, 2001, Helene Fraser-Nash (hereinafter referred to as
“Complaint Fraser-Nash”) hired John WorldPeace (hereinafter referred to as
“Respondent”) to represent her in a foreclosure matter involving the Money Store. Respondent was paid Five Hundred and 00/100
Dollars ($500.00) to stop the foreclosure per the grievance video and per
Fraser-Nash WorldPeace did in fact stop the foreclosure.
On or about
June 19, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash gave Respondent all her original
documents associated with her civil claim.
Respondent assured Complainant Fraser-Nash, he would copy these
documents for her client file and return the original to her the following
day. Respondent failed to return any of
the original documents [TDRPC 1.15(d)].
WorldPeace would show
the court that there was no urgency in returning Nash’s documents nor a
deadline set by Nash. WorldPeace did in
fact return Nash’s documents (Ex “D”) to her after receiving a written request. (Ex “E”)
Further WorldPeace would show the Court that there is nothing in the
Commission’s pleadings to show exactly what documents Fraser-Nash was talking
about.
1.
After
two weeks, Complainant Fraser-Nash telephoned Respondent to inquire about her
case and her documents. Further,
Complainant Fraser-Nash referred the Money Store to her attorney. She provided Money Store Respondent’s name,
address, and telephone number. The Money
Store made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Respondent by
telephone. Respondent failed to return
any of Money Store’s telephone calls [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)].
WorldPeace would show
that many calls were made to the Money Store, not all by WorldPeace, but some
daughter, Stephanie Cluver, who was handling this matter. See Affidavit (Ex “Z”) of Stephanie Cluver.
WorldPeace would show
the court this matter is moot and not relevant because Fraser-Nash in her
grievance hearing stated clearly that she paid WorldPeace $500.00 to stop the
foreclosure on her home because she had a prior attorney to WorldPeace that
could not handle the case.
Fraser-Nash hired WorldPeace and paid him $500.00 to
stop the foreclosure. Fraser-Nash
clearly stated under oath in the grievance hearing that the foreclosure was in
fact stopped.
Fraser Nash stated on
several occasions in the grievance video that WorldPeace said he could stop the
foreclosure with a simple letter and a phone call. The foreclosure was stopped. WorldPeace was not required to make multiple
phone calls just for the fun of it.
WorldPeace told Fraser Nash that he would stop the foreclosure in one
call, so it is entirely irrelevant how many calls WorldPeace actually made.
2.
On
or about July 13, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash telephoned Respondent and a
left message that she would stop by his office to pick up her original
documents because Respondent had failed to communicate with her regarding the
Money Store. On or about July 16, 2001,
Complainant Fraser-Nash and her husband went to Respondent’s office to collect
her documents. Respondent persuaded
Complaint Fraser Nash and her husband to keep him as their attorney and
Respondent assured them that he would have the documents copied and return to
them the following day. Respondent again
failed to copy the documents or return them [TDRPC 1.03(a)(b)].
There is no testimony as to why the
documents were critical to Fraser Nash.
There was no testimony that Fraser-Nash returned to WorldPeace’s office
to pick up her documents. No testimony
that time was of the essence. If there
was an urgency, the documents could have been copied right there while they
waited.
WorldPeace did return
the file to Nash. (Ex “D”)
3.
On
or about August 2, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash sent Respondent a demand
letter stating that she was terminating their attorney-client relationship and
that she wanted her documents returned with a complete refund of the money she
paid Respondent. Complainant
Fraser-Nash’s demand letter was delivered to Respondent by a Deputy Sheriff. Respondent refused to surrender the papers
and property belonging to Complainant Fraser-Nash to the Deputy despite having
had his representation of Complainant Fraser-Nash terminated [TDRPC 1.15(d)].
WorldPeace per TDRPC
Rule 1.05
(b)
except as permitted by (1) reveal
confidential information of a client or a former client to (ii) anyone else, other than the client, the
client’s representatives, or the members, associates, or employees of the
lawyer’s firm.
WorldPeace was not required to give the deputy a copy
of Fraser Nash’s file. WorldPeace told
the deputy and wrote on Nash’s letter (Ex “E”) that he would in fact send
Fraser Nash her files and WorldPeace did exactly as he said. (Ex “D”)
WorldPeace could not reach Fraser-Nash by telephone at the time the
deputy appeared and Fraser-Nash had no answering machine.
The deputy was not under
any court order. He was not there in any
official capacity. He was simply there
as a neighbor of Fraser Nash. WorldPeace
was not going to violate TDRPC Rule 1.05(b)(1)(ii) by giving the deputy the
file. There is no question that
WorldPeace was not required to give the file to the deputy without authority.
Per (Ex “W”) the deputy
signs for certified mail for the Fraser-Nash’s.
4.
Respondent
did not ever return Complainant Fraser-Nash’s documents [TDRPC 1.15(d)]. Respondent failed to return Complainant
Fraser-Nash’s telephone calls, thereby failing to keep a client reasonably
informed about the statues of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.03(b)]. Respondent, though paid $500.00 failed to
perform any meaningful legal services for Complainant Fraser-Nash and
consciously disregarded his responsibility to Complainant Fraser-Nash [TDRPC
1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)].
The grievance videotape
is clear, Fraser-Nash said she paid WorldPeace $500.00 to stop the foreclosure
and the foreclosure was in fact, stopped.
Therefore Fraser-Nash cannot say that WorldPeace did nothing. This was a matter where Fraser-Nash already
had one attorney. WorldPeace was the
second attorney.
Fraser-Nash made no statements that any one else did
any other work on this case except WorldPeace after June 19, 2001, and the
foreclosure was in fact stopped.
Fraser-Nash said she
hired WorldPeace to stop the foreclosure and it was stopped. She requested her file and it was mailed to
her like WorldPeace said he would. (Ex
“D”)
5.
On
or about September 5, 2001, Complainant Fraser-Nash filed a complaint against
Respondent with the State Bar of Texas.
On or about September 27, 2001, Respondent was served with notice of the
complaint filed against him by Complainant Fraser-Nash. Said notice required Respondent to provide a
written response to the allegations of professional misconduct within thirty
(30) days of receipt of same. Respondent
failed to respond Notice of 2/19/02 FJC hearing; panel member list, subpoena
and District Grievance Committee member list [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8)]. On or about December 27, 2001 Respondent was
served with a subpoena to appear at a State Bar of Texas Investigatory Hearing
on February 19, 2001 and, at that time to produce the complete client file of
Helene Marie Fraser-Nash. Respondent
failed to appear at the hearing on February 19,2002 and filed to produce the
file [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8), TRDP 1.06(Q)(4)].
WorldPeace would show that he is not
required to give the State Bar anything because the State Bar had stated that
they were going to turn WorldPeace responses these things over to law
enforcement. Therefore WorldPeace had a right
to remain silent per the Fifth Amendment and Article 1 in Section 10 of the
Texas Constitution.
At the beginning of each
grievance hearing the Respondent is told that he has a right to remain silent.
Further WorldPeace would
show the court that on February 19, he was on his way back from Dallas, Texas
to attend the grievance hearing at 1:00 pm for Nash and at 1:15 pm for
Apadoca. WorldPeace had car trouble in
Corsicana. WorldPeace had called his
daughter to call Mapes at the State Bar, which she did. Cluver informed Mapes that WorldPeace would
not be able to attend the hearing.
WorldPeace did not make the hearing.
The subpoena was
specific. WorldPeace was suppose to
deliver the documents at a certain time and place. WorldPeace was not able to make that certain
time and place. No further request was
made by the State Bar. The hearing was
not reset.
Mapes had arbitrally reset the hearing on his own on a
prior occasion on the day of the prior grievance hearing. (Ex “AA” & “AB”) But Mapes refused to reset the hearing for
WorldPeace.
6.
RULE
VIOLATIONS
The acts
and/or omissions of the Respondent described in Paragraphs XIII-XVIII above,
which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct in violation of
the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of professional Conduct
(“TDRPC”):
1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the
lawyer;
1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the
obligations owed to a client;
1.03(a)
failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter
and promptly comply with reasonable request for information;
1.03(b) failed to explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation;
1.15(d) failed, upon termination of representation to
reasonably protect a client’s interests, give notice to the client to seek
other counsel, or surrender papers and property which belongs to the client;
and
8.04(a)(8) failed, to time furnish to the Chief
Disciplinary Counsels office or a district grievance committee a response or
other information as required by the Texas Rules Disciplinary Procedure, unless he or she in good faith
timely asserts a privilege or other legal ground for failure to do so.
The
acts and/or omissions of the Respondent regarding failure to comply with a
subpoena described in paragraph XVIII above, constitutes conduct in violation
of Rule 1.06(Q)(4) Texas Rules Disciplinary procedure which states:
1.06(Q)(4)4. Professional misconduct includes. Failure of a Respondent to furnish
information subpoened by a Committee, unless he or she, in good faith, asserts
a privilege or other legal grounds for the failure to do so.
7.
The
complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the
attention of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for the State Bar of Texas HELENE
FRASER-NASH’S filing of a complaint on or about September 14, 2001.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1) Nash had an attorney prior to WorldPeace who
had been working on her problem with Home Equity, who was trying to foreclose.
2) The prior attorney withdrew from the case.
3) Nash contacted WorldPeace through responding
to WorldPeace’s automatic dialer solicitation.
4) Nash paid WorldPeace $500.00 to stop the
foreclosure on her house, which in her mind, was set for August 7, 2001.
5) Per the grievance hearing videotape Nash
stated that WorldPeace did in fact stop the foreclosure.
6) Nash said that she first met WorldPeace on
June 18, 2001.
7) Nash said that on July 19, 2001, her husband
and her again met with WorldPeace.
8) Lendon Evans, a deputy neighbor of Nash,
presented a request for the Nash file.
9) WorldPeace refused to give the file to the
deputy. WorldPeace wrote on the bottom
of the letter that he would send the filed by certified mail in a few days.
10) WorldPeace did send the file to Nash.
11) WorldPeace did not attend the grievance
hearing because he was stuck in Corsicana, Texas.
12) The State Bar refused to reset the hearing.
R.
THIRD CAUSE
OF ACTION
PENNY JO
REILLY
On or about
November 2000, Phillip Apodaca (hereinafter referred to as “Apodaca”) hired
Respondent to modify the divorce decree of Apodaca on which WorldPeace was his
attorney. Specifically, Respondent was
to modify the decree to prevent.
Apodaca’s ex-wife from moving to Atlanta, Georgia, with their minor son.
WorldPeace would show
after the November 7, 2000 hearing the court signed an order. The hearing regarding Apodaca’s son moving to
Atlanta lasted for three hours plus WorldPeace spent three hours waiting to be
heard. WorldPeace won that hearing and
kept the child in Houston, Texas. (Ex
“F”)
However, subsequent to
that hearing, where Apodaca, his live in friend, Penny Reilly, his mother, his
father, his ex-wife, his ex-wife sister and his ex-wife sister’s husband all
testified, Apodaca told Emily, his ex-wife, that she could take the child to
Atlanta, thereby negating all the work that WorldPeace had done to keep the
child in Houston, Texas. (Ex “G”) A
letter from Nancy Boler.
Apodoca then changed his mind again and told Emily
that she could not take the child to Atlanta, Georgia. A second hearing took place on May 30th
in which Nanch Boler was again representing Emily Apodaca, WorldPeace
represented Apadoca, Judge Frank Rynd, again heard the case, and again Apodaca,
Penny Jo Reilly, Apodaca’s mother and father, his ex-wife and her sister and
her sister’s husband again all testified
on the same issues in the case.
However, at the end of the hearing the judge rendered
an order (Ex “J”) in which he stated
that Apodaca had refused to conform to his order of November 7, 2002 to
participate in a drug abuse course, refused to participate in kids C.O.P.E.
classes, refused to buy health insurance for his son. The judge was extremely upset. (Ex “J”)
The judge also made
several restrictions regarding Penny Jo Reilly, with whom he was
disgusted. Due to the fact that Apodaca
had in fact told his ex-wife that she could take the child to Atlanta and more
importantly his blantly refusal to follow the court’s order, the court allowed
the child to move to Atlanta, Georgia.
However, WorldPeace
talked to the opposing attorney and as a result, (Ex “H”) Ms. Apadoca did agree
not to go to Atlanta until the final trial on August 13, 2001. The order from the judge was quite clear. (Ex “J”)
Apadoca knew the date of the final hearing was August 13 hearing.
On August 4, Mr.
Apadoca’s parents came in to see WorldPeace and hired WorldPeace and paid him
$500.00 (Ex “K”) to file an Intervenor for them so they could acquire some
grandparent’s rights regarding their grandson.
The judge had stated off
the record to WorldPeace and Boler that he had wished that the grandparents had
some kind of pleading because in the judge’s opinion the child should not be
with either parent and definitely not with Penny Jo Reilly. After thinking about it for many months,
Apadoca’s parents determined that they would go ahead and try to get some kind
of grandparents rights to help keep Eric in Houston.
WorldPeace would not be
taking $500.00 to file an Inventor on a final trial that was going to take
place nine days later on August 13, 2001, if WorldPeace was not going to be at
the hearing. There was no reason for WorldPeace
not to be at the August 13 hearing.
However, the reason that WorldPeace did not attend the
hearing was because in conversing with Apodaca he found out that Apodaca was
still on drugs and he could not pass a drug test. The court had in November 2000, at the first
hearing, ordered both Emily and Phillip Apodaca to take a drug test. (Ex “L”)
Apodaca got a drug evaluation on July 11, 2001, and that evaluation said
Apodaca had a drug problem. This was a
month before trial. (Ex “M”)
WorldPeace told Apodaca
that if he was using drugs that he would never get his child again. Further, the only issue at the hearing was
the child going to Atlanta. Therefore,
Apodaca decided not to show up at trial.
After the trial took place without Apodaca, the child was allowed to go
to Atlanta.
WorldPeace talked to Apodaca and said in that
conversation that Penny Jo Reilly did not give a damn about his son. Because of that remark, Penny Jo Reilly filed
a grievance on behalf of Phillip Apodaca.
In the judges’ order of May 30, 2001, it was clear that he had contempt
for Penny Jo Reilly and it seemed obvious from that order that Penny Jo Reilly
did not care about Apodaca’s son. On
August 28, 2001, Phillip Apodaca retrieved his entire file from
WorldPeace. (Ex “N”) Apodaca continued to vacillate regarding
whether he would let the child go to Atlanta or not.
In the first hearing, he wanted him to stay in
Houston. WorldPeace accomplished
that. Then Apodaca changed his mind and
he said he did not care whether the child went to Atlanta. We had a second hearing. The child did not go to Atlanta even though
the court allowed it after the second hearing because WorldPeace convinced the
other attorney to convince Ms. Apodaca not to go. (Ex “H”)
Then Apodaca at the final trial decided that he was
going to let the child go to Atlanta due to his drug use. Then the evening after the hearing, Apodaca
decided that he wanted the child to stay in Houston.
The problem that Mr.
Apodaca had was the girl friend who is 10 years his senior and two of whose
children do not live with her, does not want Apodaca’s son is her life. Apodaca’s mother insisted that the child be
in Phillip’s life. So the problem was
the conflict between Apodaca’s mother and his girlfriend.
The judge was extremely
upset that the girlfriend was living with Apodaca without being married to
him. Generally, in a family law case,
the court stops any visitation when there are unmarried people in the house overnight. On August 28, 2001, Apodaca got his file from
WorldPeace and filed a Motion for New Trial which was granted on October 2,
2001. (Ex “P” & “Q”)
In November, 2001, Apodaca’s parents hired another
attorney to file another Intervenor (Exhibit “O”) and 30 days later they
dismissed their Intervenor.
In the end Apodaca entered into a mediated settlement
where he finally allowed Emily Apodaca, his ex-wife to take their child to
Atlanta.
1.
On
or about November 2000, Temporary Orders were entered in this matter that
prevented the relocation of Apodaca’s son.
On June 4, 2001, the Temporary Orders to keep Apocada’s son in Harris County
were lifted subject to generous visitation by Apodaca pending a final trial set
for August 13, 2001. Apodaca was aware
of the trial date and was prepared to attend the trial. During the time prior to August 13, 2001,
Apocada completed his divorcing parents class and was able to obtain health
insurance for his son pending the insurance company’s receipt of the son’s
medical records so that he was in compliance with the court’s orders.
2.
On
or about August 9, 2001, Respondent informed Apodaca that there was no longer a
pending hearing date of August 13, 2002, and Respondent instructed Apodaca that
it was not necessary for Apodaca to attend on August 13, 2002. Respondent failed to appear for the hearing. However, the trial took place as scheduled on
August 13, 2001 and the Temporary Orders were modified in Apodaca;s ex-wife’s
favor and Apodaca’s son moved to Atlanta [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1001(b)(2),
1.03(a), 1.03(b)].
After being the Attorney
on Apodaca’s divorce, attending two hearings regarding the ex-wife going to
Atlanta and after taking $500.00 form Apodaca’s parents to file an Intervenor,
why would WorldPeace tell Apodaca there was no hearing. WorldPeace and his staff did tell Apodaca the
court made a mistake and did not have the August 13th hearing on the
docket.
In the end Apodaca
agreed to let Emily go to Atlanta. (Ex “R”)
3.
On
or about August 31, 2001, Ms. Penny Jo Reilly and Apodaca (hereinafter
“Reilly/Apodoca”) filed a complaint against Respondent with the State Bar of
Texas. On or about October 22, 2001,
Respondent was served with notice of the complaint filed against him by
Reilly/Apodaca. Said notice required
Respondent to provide a written response to the allegations of professional
misconduct within thirty (30) days of receipt of same. Respondent failed to respond [TDRPC
8.04(a)(8)]. On or about November 18,
2001 Respondent was served with a subpoena to appear at a State Bar of Texas
Investigatory Hearing on February 19, 2002 and, at that time to produce the
complete client file of Phillip Apodaca.
Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on February 19, 2001 and
failed to produce the file [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8), TRDP 1,06(Q)(4)].
WorldPece was stuck in
Corsicana.
4.
RULE
VIOLATIONS
The
acts and/or omissions of the Respondent described in paragraphs XXI – XIV
above, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct in
violation of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”):
1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer;
1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the
obligations owed to a client;
1.03(a)
failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter
and promptly comply with reasonable request for information;
1.03(b) failed to explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation;
8.04(a)(8) failed, to time furnish to the Chief
Disciplinary Counsels office or a district grievance committee a response or other
information as required by the Texas Rules Disciplinary Procedure, unless he or she in good faith
timely asserts a privilege or other legal ground for failure to do so.
The
acts and/or omissions of the Respondent regarding failure to comply with a
subpoena described in paragraph XVIII above, constitutes conduct in violation
of Rule 1.06(Q)(4) Texas Rules Disciplinary procedure which states:
1.06(Q)(4)4. Professional misconduct includes. Failure of a Respondent to furnish
information subpoened by a Commiteee, unless he or she, in good faith, asserts
a privilege or other legal grounds for the failure to do so.
5.
The
complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the
attention of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas by PENNY
JO REILLY’S filing of a complaint on or about September 14, 2001.
WorldPeace rights were
violated because the grievance committee wanted a public reprimand and the
commission got it when they filed suit.
UNDENIABLE FACTS
1) WorldPeace was Apodaca’s attorney in his
divorce in April 2000.
2) In November 2000, WorldPeace was retained by
Apodaca to stop his ex-wife from going to Atlanta, Georgia.
3) A hearing was held in the 257th
District Court where WorldPeace did in fact stop Apodaca’s ex-wife from going
to Atlanta with the child.
4) After the hearing Apodaca told his ex-wife
that she could go to Atlanta.
5) A second hearing was held regarding Apodaca’s
ex-wife going to Atlanta.
6) Because Apodaca had not taken a parenting
class, gone to drug class, and not carrying health insurance on the child; per
the court orders of November 7, 2000, hearing the judge allowed Apodaca’s
ex-wife to go to Atlanta with the child.
7) After the May 30th hearing
WorldPeace worked out an agreement with Apodaca’s ex-wife’s attorney such that
she would not go to Atlanta.
8) The court ordered a final hearing to be held
on August 13, 2001, regarding the going to Atlanta issue.
9) The judge made negative remarks about Penny
Jo Reilly in his rendition of the order on May 30th.
10) On August 4th WorldPeace was
retained by Apodaca’s parents to file an intervenor in the lawsuit to get the
grandparents rights. Several days prior
to the hearing WorldPeace communicated with Apodaca. Apodaca had a drug evaluation that showed
that he was drug dependent.
11) Apodaca and WorldPeace did not attend the
August 13, 2001 final hearing.
12) On August 28, 2001, Apodaca acquired his file
from WorldPeace.
13) On August 28, 2001, Apodaca filed a Motion for
New Trial.
14) On October ___, ___, the Motion for New Trial
was granted.
15) In November 2001, Apodaca’s parents hired
Robert Hinijoso to file an intervenor for the grandparents rights.
16) In December 2001, Apodaca’s parents withdrew
their intervenor.
17) In April 2002, a final mediated agreement was
reached to where Apodaca’s ex-wife could take the child to Atlanta.
S. THIRD PARTY CLAIM – PHILLIP APODACA
In April
2000, WorldPeace was hired by Apodaca to stop his ex-wife from moving to
Atlanta with their son. WorldPeace
prepared and attended a three hour hearing in December 2000 on the matter of
relocating Apodaca’s son to Atlanta, Georgia in the 257th District
Court, Harris County, Texas (No. 1999-52423).
The court ordered the child to remain in Houston. However, the court also ordered Apodaca to
get into a drug abuse program, attend a parenting course and acquire insurance
for his son. The court also ordered
Apodaca and his wife to immediately be tested for drugs.
Soon after
the hearing Apodaca told his ex-wife that she could take the child to
Atlanta. WorldPeace received a letter
from Apodaca’s wife’s new attorney and WorldPeace attended a second three hour
hearing in May 2001 to prevent the ex-wife from going to Atlanta. At this repetitive hearing, the judge allowed
the child to move to Atlanta mainly due to the fact that Apodaca had not
attended a drug abuse program, not attended a parenting course and had not
provided insurance for his son.
Trial was
set for August 2001.
About a week
before trial, WorldPeace contacted Apodaca.
Apodaca told WorldPeace that he was still using drugs. A July 2001, drug evaluation concluded that
Apodaca was drug dependent. WorldPeace
told Apodaca that if he was still on drugs that he should not attend trial
because the judge would be very mad. If
Apodaca attended trial, he would probably never be able to get custody of his
child. The only issue was whether the child would be allowed to go to Atlanta
or not.
Apodaca did
not go to trial.
Apodaca
only paid WorldPeace $500. WorldPeace
spent over twenty hours on Apodaca’s suit and is owed $3,000.
1. CAUSES OF
ACTION AND DAMAGES
WorldPeace
sues Apodaca for $2500 under quantum meruit.
T.
FOURTH
CAUSE OF ACTION
DARLENE A.
WILLIAMS
On or about
November 1999, John WorldPeace (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent”)
randomly sent a generic written advertisement via facsimile to Darlene A.
Williams employer (hereinafter referred to as “Complainant Williams”) for the
purpose of soliciting new business.
1.
On
or about November 9, 1999, Complainant Williams hired Respondent to represent
her in the collection of a promissory note.
Respondent was given One Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($100.00) to draft a
demand letter which was done.
On or about
January 6, 2000, Respondent drafted Complainant Williams’ demand letter. On February 28, 2001, month later WorldPeace
was paid $375.00 in legal fees to proceed on the lawsuit.
Respondent
failed to execute a contingency fee agreement with Complainant Williams [TDRPC
1.04(d)].
WorldPeace
failed to file Complainant Williams’ lawsuit [TDRPC 1.01(b)(2)]. Respondent failed to perform any meaningful
legal services for Complainant Williams other than writing the described letter
and consciously disregarded his responsibility to Complainant Williams [TDRPC
1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)].
WorldPeace would show that after he
received the $375.00 from Williams, he continued his due diligence and
researched the matter regarding Darlene Williams. The law clearly states that in the event that
a person charges more than twice the usury amount of interest, that person
looses not only the interest but also the principal. (Ex “S”)
Per the TDRPC Rule 3.01
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes
that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.
TDRPC Rule 3.01 states that attorney should not file a
frivolous lawsuit.
Ms. William’s lawsuit
was frivolous. There is no question that
the $100.00 was paid to send a demand letter which was sent. Had Williams collected any monies she would
not have owed WorldPeace anything.
The second thing to be
done was to file a lawsuit. After
WorldPeace received the $375, he continued to perform his due diligence and to
research the matter. That is when WorldPeace
found that a suit would have been frivolous.
WorldPeace communicated this information to Ms. Williams. There was nothing further to do in the court
but WorldPece agreed to try to get some money for Ms. Williams.
WorldPeace did about 3
hours of research, worth about $450.00.
Ms. Williams had paid WorldPeace $375.00 and that was the end of the
matter.
WorldPeace did not file
a written response within 30 days of the receipt of the letter but WorldPeace
did file a response at the grievance hearing and the chairman of that panel
committee accepted WorldPeace’s response.
WorldPeace has a Fifth amendment right not to respond to the State Bar’s
request for information.
There was no contingency
contract between Williams and WorldPeace because there was no suit was
filed. Had WorldPeace filed a lawsuit,
there may have been a contingency contract if that had been their final
agreement before he filed it. But
WorldPeace was not prepared to file suit at that point in time. Therefore a contingency contract was not
written because no suit was going to be filed.
WorldPeace would show
the court that the Collins contract that WorldPeace does have a habit of
executing contingency contracts when a suit has been filed. In the case of Williams, there was no
contract because when WorldPeace took the monies, he was not sure if he was
going to file a suit or not and had to do more due diligence.
In the Lang matter he
states that WorldPeace was not going to file suit for a couple of weeks. The reason for that was again so WorldPeace
could research the matter and until the matter was researched, until WorldPeace
was actually, ready to file suit, there was not going to be a contract
written.
2.
Throughout
Respondent’s representation of Complainant Williams, Complainant Williams
attempted to contact Respondent by telephone to obtain the status of her
lawsuit. Respondent failed to respond to
Complainant Williams’ request for information and failed to keep his client
reasonably informed regarding the matter [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.03(b)].
WorldPeace would show
that he talked to Williams several times and she testified to that in the
grievance hearing.
3.
On
or about December 11, 2001, Complainant Williams filed a complaint against
Respondent with the State Bar of Texas.
On or about January 10, 2002, Respondent was served with notice of the
complaint filed against him by Complainant Williams. Said notice required Respondent to provide a
written response to the allegations of professional misconduct with thirty (30)
days of receipt of same. Respondent
failed to respond [TDRPC 8.04(a)(8)].
4.
The
acts and/or omissions of the Respondent described in paragraphs XXVII-XXX
above, which occurred on or after January 1, 1990, constitute conduct in
violation of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct (“TDRPC”):
1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the
lawyer;
1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the
obligations owed to a client;
1.03(a)
failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter;
1.04(d) entered into a contingent fee agreement
prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law, and/or failing to enter into a
written contingency fee agreement that states the method by which the fee is to
be determined; and
8.04(a)(8) failed, to time furnish to the Chief
Disciplinary Counsels office or a district grievance committee a response or
other information as required by the Texas Rules Disciplinary Procedure, unless he or she in good faith
timely asserts a privilege or other legal ground for failure to do so.
5.
The
complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the
attention of the Chief Disciplinary counsel of the State Bar of Texas by
DARLENE A. WILLIAMS’ filing of a complaint on or about December 11, 2001.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1) Williams had a promissory note that was for
25% interest. The note was an unsecured
note not referencing any other transactions.
2) Williams paid WorldPeace $100.00 to write a
demand letter.
3) Williams paid WorldPeace $375.00 to proceed
on with the case.
UNDENIABLE LAW
1) A note in excess of 10% is usurious. At the time that Darlene Williams signed her
note if an interest rate on the note is more than twice the usurious rate then
the lender loses both the interest and the principle.
2) WorldPeace is not required to file a
frivolous lawsuit per the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.
U.
FIFTH CAUSE
OF ACTION
JOHN V.
LYNCH
On
or around August, 2001, John V. Lynch (hereinafter referred to as “Complainant
Lynch”) retained Respondent for representation in Cause No. SC82C00004767, John V. Lynch v. Janet Louise Lachman; In the
Small Claims Court Precinct 8, Place 2 of Harris County, Texas. At the time of the initial consultation,
Complainant Lynch paid Respondent One Hundred and 00/100 Dollars
($100.00). Respondent verbally
acknowledged receipt of the $100.00 but failed to provide a written
receipt. Respondent did not provide
Lynch with a written contract or a verbal statement indicating the terms of
representation because there was no contract [TDRPC 1.04(c)].
Per the grievance form
filed by Mr. Lynch it clearly states that Mr. Lynch paid WorldPeace $100.00 but
there was no discussion of a contract.
(Ex “AC”) Further, per Lynch’s
affidavit, (Ex “AD”) he has stated he never talked to WorldPeace again except
on one occasion and WorldPeace said he did not have time to talk.
There was no
contact. There was no object of a
contract. There was no meeting of the
minds. There was no consideration. Other than the initial $100.00 which Mr.
Lynch paid for a one hour consultation no monies were paid.
There was no contract,
Per TDRPC Preamble Scope No. 12 Most of
the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the
client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has
agreed to do so.
It states that all grievances are based upon a
contractual relationship between the client and the attorney. There was no contract between WorldPeace and
Lynch.
1.
Throughout
Respondent’s representation, complainant Lynch received various papers from
Janet Lachman to which Complainant Lynch forwarded to Respondent’s office. Several court dates were set and a jury had
been requested. Complainant Lynch
notified Respondent’s office by faxing the material over to him and thereafter
continued to fax information to Respondent’s office as Complainant Lynch
received it from the court.
2.
The
scheduled court date was postponed and a hearing was set. Complainant Lynch showed up for the hearing
and Respondent did not [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)]. Complainant Lynch called Respondent’s office
and got an answering machine.
Complainant Lynch left a message for Respondent to call. Respondent failed to return Complainant
Lynch’s call [TDRPC 1.03(a)].
Complainant Lynch continued to gather information and facts to
substantiate his case against Janet Lachman and forwarded it to Complainant
Lynch. Subsequently, a hearing was set
for December 28, 2001. Complainant Lynch
notified Respondent and bundled all files and information together and mailed
to Respondent’s office. Thereafter;
Complainant Lynch tried for weeks to get Respondent to call to which Respondent
id not return (TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.03(b)].
Per the documents that were presented by
the State Bar, Lynch went to the J.P. court on three occasions after he talked
to WorldPeace. On no occasion did
WorldPeace show up. Certainly, Mr. Lynch
understood that WorldPeace was not representing him. There was no information for WorldPeace to
communicate to Lynch because Lynch fully understood his case.
WorldPeace would also show the court that Lynch showed
up at court at final trial but did not answer and therefore he brought on his
own doom.
Further, the case was not in the justice court where
Lynch would be allowed an attorney, but in the small claims court where
attorneys are not allowed. (Ex “AE”)
WorldPeace would also show the exhibits to the State
Bar that the attorney that he sued stated that Lynch’s had pattern and practice
of suing attorneys. Not to mention the
fact that Mr. Lynch has a criminal record for criminal mischief. (Ex “AE”)
This is a lawsuit that shows that it is necessary for
claimant to prove a suit within a suit.
To prove that he even had a case.
To prove that WorldPeace could have won the case.
3.
Complainant
Lynch appeared for the hearing on December 28, 2001, however neither
Respondent, nor anyone from his office, appeared. [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1),
1.01(b)(2)]. Complainant Lynch called
Respondent’s office and was unable to speak with anyone. Complainant Lynch contact Respondent at his
home telephone and spoke with Stephanie, Respondent’s daughter, who informed
him that Respondent’s office had “been closed” for the Christmas holidays. Stephanie assured Complainant Lynch that
everything was under control and that she personally had been in contract with
Janet Lachman via the telephone. The
trial was reset for January 28, 2002.
4.
Complainant
Lynch continued to obtain information to substantiate his case against Janet
Lachman and attempted for days to contact Respondent to see if Complaint Lynch
needed to come in to the office and discuss the case further. Complainant Lynch was unable to make contact
with Respondent.
5.
On
Friday, January 25th, Complainant Lynch called Respondent’s office
and was informed by LeAnne, a secretary in the office, that Respondent was
working on a bid divorce case and, as far as she knew, there should not be a
problem with the January 28, 2002 setting.
Complainant Lynch appeared in court on Monday, January 28th,
at 8:00 a.m. The docket was called at
that time and no one from Respondent’s office appeared on Complainant Lynch’s
behalf [TDRPC 1.01(b)(2)]. Complainant
Lynch had no records or files for the trial to defend himself and subsequently,
a default judgment for nearly $5,000 was entered against Complainant
Lynch.
Afterwards,
Complainant Lynch attempted to call Respondent’s office, but go an answering
machine. Complainant Lynch continued to
call Respondent’s and left messages for Respondent to discuss Respondent filing
an appeal. Respondent failed to return
those calls [TDRPC 1.03(a), 1.039b)].
Later,
Complainant Lynch was able to speak with LeAnne and Complainant Lynch request
his files LeAnne said she was not in a position to send the paper so
Complainant Lynch. Complainant Lynch
then called early one morning and was able to speak with Respondent and when
asked about Complainant Lynch’s file, Respondent informed him that he know
about the case but couldn’t find the file.
Respondent ending with informing Complainant Lynch that when he found
the file, he would call Complaint Lynch.
Respondent did not call Complainant Lynch or seen his file [TDRPC
1.03(a), 1.15(d)]. Complainant Lynch
later spoke with Stephanie, Respondent’s daughter, and she informed Complainant
Lynch that she has file and would give it to him. Complainant Lynch did not receive the file
[TDRPC 1.15(d)]. Thereafter, Complainant
Lynch sent a certified mail demand for his file as well as a fax copy of the
demand to his office. To date, the certified
letter has not been signed for.
6.
Thereafter,
Complainant Lynch received a telephone call form LeAnne, on February 27th,
who state the file have been mailed back to Complainant Lynch “several days
ago” to the address Respondent’s office had on record. Complainant Lynch never received the file
from Respondent. {TDRPC 1.15(d)].
7.
RULE
VIOLATIONS
The
acts and/or omission of the Respondent described in paragraphs XXXIII – XXXIII
above, which occurred on or after January 1990, constitute conduct in violation
of the following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
(“TDRPC”):
1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the
lawyer;
1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the
obligations owed to a client;
1.03(a)
failed to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter
and promptly comply with reasonable request for information;
1.03(b) failed to explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation;
1.04(d) for entering into a
contingent fee agreement prohibited by paragraph (e) or other law, and/or
failing to enter into a written contingency fee agreement that states the
method by which the fee is to be determined; and
1.15(d)
failed, upon termination of representation to reasonably protect a
client’s interests, give notice to the client to seek other counsel, or
surrender papers and property which belongs to the client; and
8.
The
complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the
attention of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas by JOHN
V. LYNCH’S file of a complaint on or about march 12, 2002.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1) Lynch stated that no contract was discussed
at the initial meeting with WorldPeace, but that he paid WorldPeace $100.00 for
the initial consultation.
2) Lynch stated that he went to court three
times on this hearing and at no time did WorldPeace show up.
3) Lynch stated that he never talked to
WorldPeace except one time after the initial meeting for a few moments.
4) No contract was discussed with WorldPeace.
5) Lynch never paid WorldPeace anything beyond
the $100.00 for the initial consultation.
UNDENIABLE LAW
1) Per the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure
the attorney owes nothing to the client if there is no contract.
2) In order to have a contract there must be two
people having a meeting of the minds. A
consideration of an object to be accomplished must be met. These are the essential elements of a
contract.
V.
SIXTH CAUSE
OF ACTION
JOHN F.
LANG
On or about
January 20, 2001, Complainant Lang received a facsimile advertisement for the
law office of Respondent. The
advertisement listed Attorney Malpractice and Fraud, Probate and Automobile
Dealer problems as some of the legal areas that Respondent possessed
expertise. Complainant Lang contacted
Respondent because he was experiencing legal problems related to his wrecker
business. Complainant Lang was having
difficulty with “car dumping” at his car storage lot. Three insurance companies had settled auto
accident claims with their perspective clients by totaling out the vehicles,
but failed to remove the vehicles from Complainant Lang’s storage lot or pay
Complainant Lang for the storage of the vehicles.
1.
On or about
January 30, 2001, Complainant Lang hired Respondent to file suit against these
insurance companies under Vernon’s Revised Civil Statute, Article 6687-9a,
Section 14A regarding the storage of vehicles and insurance companies. Complainant Lang paid Respondent Nine Hundred
Thirty and 00/100 Dollars ($930.00).
Complainant
Lang provided Respondent with all of his original paperwork for these
matters.
Further,
Respondent informed Complainant Lang that the lawsuits against the insurance
companies would be filed within two (2) weeks.
Respondent failed to file these suits [TDRPC 1.01(b)(2)]. Respondent failed to perform any meaningful
legal services for the fee paid by Complainant Lang [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1)]. Respondent failed to file suit against the
insurance companies responsible for Complainant Lang’s storage fees as he had
agreed to do [TDRPC 1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2)].
WorldPeace would show the court that he received
$930.00 from Lang. WorldPeace said he
would send demand letters and research the case before filing suit.
Lang on the grievance video clearly states that Mr.
WorldPeace called him back after a month and said he was not going to file suit
unless Lang added the individual owners of the car to the lawsuit.
Lang refused to allow WorldPeace to add the owners to
the lawsuit. Lang said the title to the
cars were in the insurance companies names (Ex “T”) refutes this. Therefore there was no longer a contract
between Lang and WorldPeace.
In addition, WorldPeace under the TDRPC Rule 1.15.
(b)(4) a client insists upon pursuing an objective
that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent or with which the lawyer has
fundamental disagreement
Regarding withdrawal representation of a client if he
determines that he has a conflict with the client over how to proceed with the
case.
WorldPeace would show that this case just like the
Nash case, that WorldPeace was the second attorney on the case.
WorldPeace would show that the insurance companies had
determined that they did not read the law the same way that Mr. Lang read it
and contrary to Lang’s testimony in the grievance committee hearing. Title had not transferred to the insurance
company. (Ex “T”) Further, WorldPeace would show that he did
hours of research and could not find any law regarding this particular statute. It was going to be a case of first
impression. Mr. Lang stated he was
not going to pay WorldPeace by the hour to proceed with this lawsuit and
WorldPeace was not going to proceed on a contingency without being able to sue
the owners of the case.
2.
After weeks
of inactivity, Complainant Lang attempted to contact Respondent by
telephone. He was informed that
Respondent was unavailable. Complainant
Lang left numerous messages requesting Respondent to return his telephone
calls. Respondent failed to return
Complainant Lang’s telephone calls [TDRPC 1.03(a)]. On or about September 5, 2001, Complainant
Lang sent Respondent a letter demanding his original documents and a refund of
the Nine Hundred Thirty and 00/100 Dollar ($930.00) fee.
Respondent
failed to respond to Complainant Lang’s letter [TDRPC 1.03(a)]. Complainant Lang called and left messages for
Respondent 4-5 times during the representation.
Respondent only returned one of these calls [TDRPC 1.03(a)]. Respondent did not terminate his
representation of Complainant or advise Complainant that his claims were
frivolous or that there was a problem with interpretation of the simple state
involved [TDRPC 1.03(b)].
Respondent
suggested suing the owners of the cars involved, but did not follow Complainant
Lang’s instructions to sue the insurance companies and not the owners
[1.01(b)(1), 1.01(b)(2), 1.02(a)(1)].
3.
On
or about November 13, 2001, Complainant Lang sent Respondent a second letter
demanding his original documents and a refund of the Nine Hundred Thirty and
00/100 Dollar ($930.00) fee. Again,
Respondent failed to respond to complainant Lang’s letter [TDRPC 1.03(a). to date, Respondent has failed to surrender
papers and property which belongs to Complainant Lang and has failed to refund
an unearned fee.
[TDRPC 1.15(d)].
WorldPeace
would show the court both letters were sent to the wrong address. (Ex “AF”)
4.
On
or about May 14, 2002, Respondent admitted receipt of a State Bar of Texas
Subpoena Duces Tecum, commanding the Respondent furnish all records of the
designated trust account into which he deposited monies received relating to
his representation of Complainant Lang.
Respondent failed to provide the trust account records subpoenaed by the
committee [TDRPC 8.01(b), TRDP
1.06(Q)(4).
WorldPeace would show the court that the
subpoena from the State Bar requires WorldPeace to submit the Trust Accounts,
where he deposited Mr. Lang’s money.
WorldPeace did not deposit money in the Trust Account. He deposited the money into his personal
account. Therefore, WorldPeace could not
produce what did not in fact exist.
5.
RULE
VIOLATIONS
The acts
and/or omission of the Respondent described in paragraphs XXXVIII – XLII above,
which occurred on or after January 1990, constitute conduct in violation of the
following Rules of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
(“TDRPC”):
1.01(b)(1) neglected a legal matter entrusted to the
lawyer;
1.01(b)(2) failed to carry out completely the
obligations owed to a client;
1.02(A)(1)
for failing to abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives
and general methods of representation;
1.03(a) failed to keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable request for
information;
1.15(d)
failed, upon termination of representation to reasonably protect a
client’s interests, give notice to the client to seek other counsel, or
surrender papers and property which belongs to the client; and
8.01(b) failed to respond to a lawful demand for
information from a disciplinary authority.
The acts
and/or omissions of the Respondent regarding failure to comply with a subpoena
described in paragraph XVIII above, constitutes conduct in violation of Rule
1.06(Q)(4) Texas Rules Disciplinary procedure which states:
1.06(Q)(4)4. Professional misconduct includes. Failure of a Respondent to furnish
information subpoened by a Commiteee, unless he or she, in good faith, asserts
a privilege or other legal grounds for the failure to do so.
6.
The
complaint that forms the basis of this cause of action was brought to the
attention of the Chief Disciplinary counsel of the State Bar of Texas by JOHN
F. LANG’S filing of a complaint on or about April 19, 2002.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
1) Lang hired an attorney prior to hiring
WorldPeace to sue the insurance companies who had allegedly been not paying him
storage fees for settling the claim.
2) Lang’s prior attorney refused to pursue his
case.
3) Lang contacted WorldPeace to file suit on the
insurance companies. Lang paid
WorldPeace $930.00.
4) Contrary to Lang’s assertion in his
affidavit’s in the grievance hearing videotape the insurance companies had
denied transferring title to the owners.
5) There was no written contract in the Lang
matter.
6) Lang, contrary to the statements by the State
Bar, Lang admitted speaking to WorldPeace on more than one occasion after
hiring WorldPeace.
7) Lang stated in the grievance hearing that
WorldPeace did in fact call him about one month after he retained WorldPeace
and Lang admitted that WorldPeace told him that he was not going to file suit
unless Lang allowed WorldPeace to sue the individual car owners.
8) Lang sent two letters to WorldPeace. These letters were sent to the wrong address
at WorldPeace’s prior place of business.
Neither of these letters does Lang have a green card for.
9) WorldPeace never deposited any of Lang’s
$930.00 in his trust account. Rather
WorldPeace deposited said money that in his operating account.
UNDENIABLE LAW
1) There is no evidence that WorldPeace
deposited any of Lang’s monies in his trust account.
W. Third
Party Claim – JOHN LANG
Third party
Defendant, John Lang, is an individual residing and having a place of business
in Harris County, Texas.
1. Facts
On
or about January 30, 2001, WorldPeace contracted with John Lang to file a suit
against several insurance companies under Vernon’s Revised Civil Statute
Article No. 6687-a Section 14a regarding storage of vehicles at Lang’s storage
lot. Lang told WorldPeace that he had
tried to hire several attorney’s to file suit against the insurance companies
without success. Lang stated that the
insurance companies denied that they owed any money under the statute that Lang
was citing.
WorldPeace
told Lang that he would investigate the statute and that he would file suit
if Lang’s claims turned out to be actionable. After researching the cited statute,
WorldPeace informed Lang that he could find no law on that particular section
that was on point with Lang’s fact pattern.
WorldPeace informed Lang that he was not going to file suit unless he
could add the automobile owner’s to the lawsuit.
WorldPeace
informed Lang that he would need to sue the individual insureds who had signed
the storage contract with Lang otherwise the insurance companies would claim
that they had paid the insured and they did not owe Lang anything.
The
insurance companies did not have a contract with Lang. It was the insured who had signed the
contract with Lang for storage fees and who were in fact the ones who Lang
should sue for his storage fees.
Lang
asserted the statute imposed an obligation on the insurance company. But Lang is not an attorney.
WorldPeace
informed Lang that he was not going to take this matter on a contingency basis
unless Lang allowed WorldPeace to sue the insured owners of the automobiles
stored at Lang’s storage lot. Lang
admitted this in the grievance hearing.
WorldPeace
informed Lang that he would charge $150.00 an hour for researching the
matter. WorldPeace informed Lang that
the insureds were necessary parties to his proposed lawsuit against the
insurance companies.
Lang
refused to allow WorldPeace to sue the insured.
WorldPeace informed Lang that if he filed only on the insurance
companies that Lang and WorldPeace would potentially be filing a frivolous and
groundless suit under Rule 13 and could be sanctioned.
The problem
is that if the insurance companies were to pay Lang storage fees, there would
be no money for the insured. Lang should
have informed the insureds that they would have to make sure the insurance
companies gave them enough money to pay his storage fees in addition to reimbursing
them for their damages.
WorldPeace
is a Chartered Life Underwriter (CLU) and a Chartered Property and Casualty
Underwriter (CPCU) and is familiar with insurance company claims
procedures. WorldPeace was an
independent insurance agent from 1972 to 1977.
Lang never
made a demand on the insureds owners of the vehicle.
WorldPeace
closed his file. Lang paid WorldPeace
$930.00 ($900.00 in attorney fees and $30.00 in filing fees). WorldPeace’s fees in this matter are
$1,700.00. Lang owes WorldPeace $800.00.
2. Cause of Action and damages
WorldPeace sues Lang under Quantum
Meruit for the amount of $800.00.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, WorldPeace requests that the Commission take nothing by way of their Petition, that WorldPeace recover the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the Commission’s filing of the Original Petition, cost, reasonable attorney’s fees, fees of expert witnesses, and deposition expenses, and grant such other and further relief at law or in equity as this court deems proper.
Respectfully
submitted,
__________________________________
John
WorldPeace
TBA
No. 21872800
2620
Fountain View, Suite 106
Houston,
Texas 77057
Tel: 713-784-7618
Fax: 713-784-9063
CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
pleading was forwarded to opposing counsel on November 4, 2003 by fax.
John
WorldPeace
NO. 2002-42081
COMMISSION FOR
LAWYER
§ IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DISCIPLINE
§
§
V. §
§
JOHN WORLDPEACE § 269TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AFFIDAVIT OF
JOHN WORLDPEACE
COUNTY OF HARRIS §
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day
personally appeared John WorldPeace, who being by me first duly sworn, on his
oath did depose and state as follows:
I refused, in some cases, to submit information to
the State Bar because I have a right against self incrimination and a right as
an attorney to violate a law to challenge the law without violating the TDRPC.
____________________________________
John WorldPeace
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this ____ day
of _________, 2003.
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE
STATE OF TEXAS
How can we manifest peace on earth if we do not include everyone (all races, all nations, all religions, both sexes) in our vision of Peace?
![[THE WORLDPEACE BANNER]](wpbanner.gif)
The WorldPeace
Insignia
: Explanation
To order a WorldPeace Insignia lapel pin, go to: Order
To the John WorldPeace Galleries Page
To the WorldPeace Peace Page