IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL...................................................................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..............................................................................................iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........................................................................................vi

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION................................................................................viii

ISSUES PRESENTED.......................................................................................................ix

STATEMENT OF FACTS ……………………………………………………………….1

ISSUE ONE.........................................................................................................................2

Did Judge Fry abuse his discretion by intentionally setting an October 15, 2003 , disbarment date in his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment, a date prior to the date when the court loses its plenary power which is the date the Judgment for Disbarment becomes enforceable?

ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………….……..5

PRAYER..............................................................................................................................8

APPENDIX……………………………………………………………………….……...10

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WORLDPEACE…………………………………………….…11

Appleton v. Appleton ……………………………………………………………………...4

Crouch v. Gleason…………………………………………………………………………4

Guajardo v. Conwell………………………………………………………………………3

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Abascal……………………………………4

In re: Meador……………………………………………………………………………...5

In re: News America Publishing, Inc……………………………………………………..5

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp………………………………………………………………..3

Monroe v. Blackmon……………………………………………………………………...5

Thompson v. Beyer………………………………………………………………………..3

Trinity Capital Corporation v. Briones……………………………………………………5

Vansteen Marine Supply, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Insurance, Co. ………………………...4

Woosley v. Smith………………………………………………………………………….4

Rule 3.01 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure………………………………………..8

Rule 3.14 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure………………………………………..2

Rule 301 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure………………………………………………...6

The underlying case is a disciplinary petition filed by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline against Realtor WorldPeace (Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John WorldPeace, 269^th District Court).

The Respondent is Judge James R. Fry, in his capacity as presiding judge, appointed by the Supreme Court to preside over the underlying disciplinary petition.

WorldPeace prays the court to order Judge Fry’s to modify his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment to read that WorldPeace is disbarred effective on the day after the trial court loses it plenary power. Judge Fry set the disbarment date as October 15, 2003 . The soonest Judge Fry will lose his plenary power is December 7, 2003 . (WorldPeace’s Motion for New Trial and Motion to Modify were denied on November 7, 2003 .) However, that being said, WorldPeace alleges that the August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment is not a final order per Rule 301 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure because it does not dispose of all issues and all parties and is therefore interlocutory and not enforceable at all.

As a result, and in the mean time, there is confusion in the courts where WorldPeace practices as to whether WorldPeace is disbarred or not due to the October 15, 2003 , disbarment date in the Judgment for Disbarment.

REALTOR’S APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS was not first filed in the appeals court because jurisdiction over disciplinary petitions and the judges appointed to hear them is with the Supreme Court per Rule 3.01 and Rule 3.02 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure.

1) The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus against a district judge under Section 22.002(a) of the Government Code and Article V. Section 3 of The Texas Constitution.

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THIS COURT:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 23, 2003 , the trial court signed it Judgment for Disbarment effective July 1, 2003 .

On May 23, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Respondent’s Amended Motion for New Trial and Amended Judgment NOV.

On May 23, 2003 , WorldPeace filed WorldPeace’s Motion to Modify Judgment of Disbarment.

On June 23, 2003 , the court vacated it April 23, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment.

On August 27, 2003 , the trial court signed a second Judgment for Disbarment effective October 15, 2003 . (Record “1”)

On September 26, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Respondent WorldPeace’s Third Amended Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV Regarding the Court’s August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment.

On September 26, 2003 , WorldPeace filed WorldPeace’s Second Amended Motion to Vacate or Modify Judgment of Disbarment of August 27, 2003 .

On November 5, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Respondent’s Short Hand Rendition Regarding Respondent’s Motion for New Trial, Respondent’s Motion to Modify, and Petitioner’s Summary Judgment. (Record “31”)

On November 7, 2003 , the trial court denied WorldPeace’s Motion to Modify. (Record “68”)

On December 7, 2003, the trial court will lose its plenary power per Rule 329b(e) Texas Rules of Civil Procedure if it is determined that the August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment is in fact a final judgment per Rule 301 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which WorldPeace denies.

REQUIREMENTS FOR MANDAMUS

1) There is no remedy on appeal because per Rule 3.14 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Appendix) a Judgment for Disbarment cannot be superseded or stayed.

2) Judge Fry’s actions in the underlying disciplinary petition as presiding judge are a clear abuse of discretion.

3) The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct affect over 67,000 attorneys in Texas and so WorldPeace’s Application for Writ of Mandamus regarding the underlying disciplinary petition is important to the jurisprudence of the state.

ISSUE ONE

AUTHORITIES

“In Lehmann, we held that a judgment is final for purposes of appeal in circumstances like those of this case “If and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment. Id at 192. We apply this rule to the present case.
            As we held in Lehmann, “Mother Hubbard” language like that contained in the July 9 summary judgment does not indicate finality. There is no other language in that judgment that indicates finality, nor is there any in the October 15 order states that the July 9 summary judgment was final, but that statement could not itself make the July 9 order final. Nor did either order actually dispose of all claims and parties. Paris’s and Guajardo’s claims against each other are not mentioned. The defendants argue that those claims are not before the court because they were all filed after the deadline set by the scheduling order, but the mere fact that they were late-filed does not mean that they were not properly before the court. The court struck other late-filed claims by Guajardo but did not strike Paris ’s claim, even though Guajardo requested it. The defendants argue that Paris waived his claim by requesting that the summary judgment grant the defendants specific performance only, but Paris ’s response clearly requests that he be allowed to pursue his claim against Guajardo. Finally, the defendants argue that Paris ’s motion to dismiss the appeal shows that he considered the summary judgment to be final. That is true, of course, at the time the motion was filed, but the motion does nothing to show how the summary judgment actually disposed of Paris ’s claim.
            Guajardo has attached to her petition another order purported to be signed by the trial court on October 15, 1999 , which dismisses the case for want of prosecution for “[f]ailure to comply with court order.” Guajardo states that this order was given to her by the court at the October 15 hearing, but it is not in the clerk’s record, and therefore we do not consider it.
            Neither the July 9 summary judgment nor the October 15 order was final and appealable. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the appeal was not timely perfected, but it did not err in dismissing the appeal. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, we grant the petition for review and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.”
            Guajardo v. Conwell; 46 S.W. 3d 862, 863-4 ( Tex. 2001)

“We no longer believe that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in a judgment issued without a full trial can be taken to indicate finality. We therefore hold that in cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.”
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.; 39 S.W. 3d 191, 192-3 ( Tex. 2001)

“A judgment is final if it either actually disposes of all claims and parties before the court or states with “unmistakable clarity” that it is a final judgment. Guajardo v. Conwell, 46 S.W. 3d 862, 864 ( Tex. 2001): Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W. 3d 191, 192 ( Tex. 2001).”
Thompson v. Beyer; 91 S.W. 3d 902, 904 ( Tex. App. – Dallas 2002)

“[A]n order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W. 3d 191, 205 ( Tex. 2001); see also Youngblood & Assoc., P.L.L.C. v. Duhon, 57 S.W. 3d 63, 65 ( Tex. App. – Hous [14^th Dist] 2001, no pet.). An order that does not dispose of all issues and parties is interlocutory and is not appealable absent a severance. Id. (citing Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W. 3d 590, 591 ( Tex. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Lehmann, 39 S.W. 3d at 204). An appellate court may review the record to determine whether an order disposes of all claims and parties. Lehmann, 39 S.W. 3d at 205B06 (“The record may help illumine whether an order is made final by its own language, so that an order that all parties appear to have treated as final may be final despite some vagueness in the order itself…”).”
Vansteen Marine Supply, Inc. v. Twin City Fire Insurance, Co.; 93 S.W. 3d 516, 518 ( Tex. App. – Hous [14^th Dist] 2002)

“While it is true that there can be only one final appealable judgment in any lawsuit, Tex. R. Civ. P. 301, as long as the trial court has plenary power over a judgment, it is not technically final. Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W. 2d 83, 84 ( Tex. 1993). The trial court has the power to correct, modify, vacate, or reform a judgment during the thirty days that it retains plenary jurisdiction over a case. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b; Faulkner v. Culver, 851 S.W. 2d 187, 188 ( Tex. 1993).”
Woosley v. Smith, 925 S.W. 2d 84, 87 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1996)

ABUSE OF DISCRETION

“A trial court abuses its discretion by (1) acting arbitrarily and unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules or principles, or (2) misapplying the law to the established facts of the case. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W. 2d 238, 241-42 ( Tex. 1985)”
Appleton v. Appleton , 76 S.W. 3d 78, 86 ( Tex. App. – Hous. [14^th Dist] 2002)

“A trial court “abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W. 2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985, orig. proceeding).”
Crouch v. Gleason, 875 S.W. 2d 738, 739 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1994)

“On the other hand, review of a trial court’s determination of the legal principles controlling its ruling is much less deferential. A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.   Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ…
            Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W. 2d 833, 839-40 (1992) (citations omitted).”
            Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Abascal, 831 S.W. 2d 559, 563 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1992)

“A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or, stated differently, when it acts without any reference to guiding rules or principles. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W. 2d 233, 226 ( Tex. 1991); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W. 2d 238, 241-42 ( Tex. 1985)’
In re: Meador, 968 S.W. 2d 346, 353 ( Tex. 1997)

“A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.”
In re: News America Publishing, Inc., 974 S.W. 2d 97, 106 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1998)

“Aside from the “clear abuse of discretion” threshold set forth in Walker , supra, the supreme court has also stated that mandamus will lie to correct a “gross” abuse of discretion by the trial court. State v. Sewell, 487 S.W. 2d 713, 718 ( Tex. 1972). “The relator must establish, under the facts of the case, that the facts and law permit the trial court to make but one decision.” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W. 2d 916, 917 ( Tex. 1985). Put differently: “[A] clear abuse of discretion, when utilized as the basis for an original mandamus proceeding, refers to the unique situation wherein the lower court, exercising a ‘discretionary’ authority, has but one viable course to follow and one legitimate way to decide the question presented, but instead issues a contrary ruling.” Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Kirk, 702 S.W. 2d 321, 323 (Tex. App. – Eastland 1986, orig. proceeding).”
Monroe v. Blackmon, 946 S.W. 2d 533, 536 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1997)

“Following its holding in Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W. 2d 833 ( Tex. 1992), the Court noted that “[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion…” 842 S.W. 2d at 271.”
Trinity Capital Corporation v. Briones, 847 S.W. 324, 326 ( Tex. App. – El Paso 1993)

ARGUMENT

Judge Fry has deliberately created confusion in his August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment by setting a disbarment date of October 15, 2003, knowing that he could not enforce the Judgment for Disbarment until he lost his plenary power at some unknown time in the future, assuming the August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment is a Rule 301 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure final judgment.

The effect of the Judgment for Disbarment has been to create chaos with WorldPeace, his clients and the courts where WorldPeace is prosecuting his clients lawsuits.

It is an abuse of discretion for Judge Fry to deliberately cause such chaos.

WorldPeace moved for Judge Fry to modify and clarify his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment with regards to the October 15, 2003 , date because Judge Fry would have plenary power for at least another 30 days. (Assuming that the Judgment for Disbarment is a final Rule 301 TRCP final judgment.)

WorldPeace alleges the August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment is not a final judgment because it does not dispose of all the issues and parties and does not comply with the Supreme Court ruling in Lehman and Guajardo regarding final judgments.

WorldPeace alleges it is an abuse of discretion for Judge Fry to deliberately cause chaos and confusion with WorldPeace, his clients and the courts in which WorldPeace practices by ordering a disbarment date that Judge Fry knows is not enforceable.

At the November 7, 2003 , hearing Judge Fry stated, to wit: “Number two. Let me finish. Number two. The state has filed a Motion for Contempt which they are requesting me to sign today. I have, Frankly, I have looked at all the case law that I can find and I think that that appears to be premature. I agree with Mr. WorldPeace and I don’t think that this Judgment is even enforceable until such time as the trial courts plenary power elapses. Now as soon as it does, because the only thing that the, that the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure talk about is a supersedeas. They cannot supercede it until, they cannot be superceded until the disbarment. But supersedeas doesn’t come into play until after the Court’s plenary power is gone. So I don’t think its even enforceable.” (Record “71 plus 97-100”)

It is an abuse of discretion for Judge Fry to try to force a defacto disbarment of WorldPeace and thereby create chaos in the judicial system.

WorldPeace would show the court that Judge Block continued Cause No. 790,109; Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Eddie Christeen Meredith, CCCL No. 2 due to a Motion by opposing counsel with regards to WorldPeace’s disbarment. (Record “28”)

WorldPeace would show the court that Judge Crowe of County Civil Court at Law Number Four, Harris County illegally disbarred WorldPeace after WorldPeace filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Crowe regarding the Judgment for Disbarment. (Record “22”)

WorldPeace would show the court that Judge Newy refused to allow WorldPeace to practice in the 308^th Court in Cause No. 2002-03670; Merribeth Deaton and John Deaton divorce due to the Judgment for Disbarment.

WorldPeace would show the court there is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remove Counsel and Motion to Strike Oral Hearing in the Cause No. 799213; Don McGill Toyota v. Adarina Ospina, set for November 13, 2003 , at 9:00 a.m. due to the August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment. (Record “59”)

WorldPeace would show the court that Judge York in Cause No. 2003-22965; Chad Simpson v. Stacy Simpson, 246^th District Court ruled that WorldPeace could continue to practice in his court until Judge Fry lost his plenary power. Opposing counsel had filed a motion to stop WorldPeace from appearing in that court.

SUMMARY

WorldPeace alleges that the Judgment for Disbarment is not a final judgment.

WorldPeace believes that this court will grant one or more of his mandamus in this matter and Judge Fry will be mandated to modify his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment and that will push the court’s plenary power further into the future.

WorldPeace alleges it is wrong for Judge Fry to deliberately create chaos in the judicial system in his attempt to de facto disbar WorldPeace.

WorldPeace would show the court that Judge Fry waited two months after he set aside his April 23, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment on June 23, 2003, before he signed a second Judgment for Disbarment on August 27, 2003. Judge Fry between June 23, 2003 , and August 27, 2003 refused to set hearings on WorldPeace’s Motion to Sever and Motion to Compel Mr. Molleston to produce relevant Rule 3.01 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure documents. Time is obviously not of the essence in this matter.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Relator moves this court to mandamus Judge Fry to modify his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment to read that the Judgment for Disbarment is effective the day after the trial court looses its plenary power and for such other and further relief at law or in equity as this court may deem proper.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________
John WorldPeace
2620 Fountain View, Suite 106
Houston , Texas 77057
Tel. 713-784-7618
Fax. 713-784-9063
TBA No. 21872800

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was forwarded to opposing counsel and Judge Fry on November 10, 2003 , by fax and to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas on November 10, 2003 , via HAND DELIVERY.

John WorldPeace

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Opposing Counsel opposes the RELATOR’S APPLICATION.

____________________________________
John WorldPeace

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this _______ day of _________________, 2003.

____________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE
STATE OF TEXAS

Simpson v. Simpson; Cause No. 2003-22965; 246 Judicial District; Harris County , Texas

F. November 5, 2003 RESPONDENT’S SHORT HAND RENDITION REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTIO FOR NEW TRIAL, RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO MODIFY, AND PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

H. November 7, 2003 ORDER ON WORLDPEACE’S SECOND AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE OR MODIFY JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT OF AUGUST 27, 2003

How can we manifest peace on earth if we do not include everyone (all races, all nations, all religions, both sexes) in our vision of Peace?