WorldPeace - "WorldPeace verses The State Bar of Texas" - World Peace

NO. 2002-42081

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER                  §          IN THE DISTRICT COURT
DISCIPLINE                                                 §
                                                                        §
V.                                                                    §          HARRIS COUNTY , TEXAS
                                                                        §
JOHN WORLDPEACE                                §          269TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

WORLDPEACE’S DEMAND FOR JUDGE FRY TO SET ASIDE HIS INTERLOCUTORY AUGUST 27, 2003 , JUDGMENT FOR DISBARMENT

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT

COMES NOW, WorldPeace, Respondent in the above styled and numbered cause, and files this WORLDPEACE’S DEMAND FOR JUDGE FRY TO SET ASIDE HIS INTERLOCUTORY AUGUST 27, 2003 , JUDGMENT FOR DISBARMENT and would show the Court the following:

SUMMARY

Judge Fry has intentionally, knowingly and maliciously caused a defacto disbarment of WorldPeace by signing and entering his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment against WorldPeace effective October 15, 2003 . Judge Fry knows that the Judgment for Disbarment is interlocutory because it is not a final order, per Rule 301 TRCP and is therefore not enforceable. Judge Fry knows his Judgment for Disbarment will be reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court because all the issues in the underlying disciplinary petition have not been adjudicated and the Judgment for Disbarment does not conform to the requirements of a final judgment per Lehman v. Har-Con Corp, 39 SW3d 191, (Tex. 2001).

Judge Fry has been informed that the Judgment for Disbarment has created confusion among the judges of Harris County, Texas, the majority of whom have decided not to allow WorldPeace to practice in their courts because the August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment appears on its face to be valid and therefore will require an order from Judge Fry setting aside or modifying the Judgment for Disbarment or an order from the Appellate Court or the Supreme Court vacating the order.

Further, per Judge Hellums, the State Bar is calling the local courts telling the judges of Harris County that WorldPeace is disbarred knowing the Judgment for Disbarment is interlocutory. This is a bad faith and corrupt action by the State Bar that is supported by Judge Fry’s refusal to set aside the August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment.

AUTHORITIES

“In Lehmann, we held that a judgment is final for purposes of appeal in circumstances like those of this case “If and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment. Id at 192. We apply this rule to the present case.

As we held in Lehmann, “Mother Hubbard” language like that contained in the July 9 summary judgment does not indicate finality.

Guajardo v. Conwell; 46 S.W. 3d 862, 863-4 ( Tex. 2001)

“We no longer believe that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in a judgment issued without a full trial can be taken to indicate finality. We therefore hold that in cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.”

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.; 39 S.W. 3d 191, 192-3 ( Tex. 2001)

The inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause does not indicate that a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corporation, 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex.2001). When there has not been a conventional trial on the merits, an order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corporation, supra. The trial court stated in its October 28 order that it was addressing the parties' motions for partial summary judgment. The order states that the Gibsons take nothing on their claim against Sabre for oil and gas lease termination; however, the order does not reference the Gibsons' other claims against Sabre. We find that the October 28 order does not clearly and unequivocally state that it disposes of all claims and parties.

Sabre v. Gibson; 72 S.W. 3d 812, ( Tex. App. – Eastland 2002)

An order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties. Lehman v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 ( Tex. 2001). An order that does not dispose of all issues and parties is interlocutory and not appealable absent a severance. Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 ( Tex. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Lehman v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 ( Tex. 2001). Simply labeling the order "Final Judgment" is not enough; there must be some clear indication the trial court intended to completely dispose of the entire case. Lehman, 39 S.W.3d at 205. Furthermore, the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause is no longer determinative of finality. Id. at 203-04. An appellate court may review the record to determine whether an order disposes of all claims and parties. Id. at 205-06.

Espeche v. Ritzell, 65 S.W. 3d 226, 232 ( Tex. App. – Hous. [14^th Dist] 2001)

In these two consolidated cases we revisit the persistent problem of determining when a judgment rendered without a conventional trial on the merits is final for purposes of appeal. We consider only cases in which one final and appealable judgment can be rendered and not cases, like some probate and receivership proceedings, in which multiple judgments final for purposes of appeal can be rendered on certain discrete issues.¹ And we consider a judgment's finality only for purposes of appeal and not for other purposes, such as issue and claim preclusion.² In Mafrige v. Ross,³ we held that a summary judgment is final if it contains language purporting to dispose of all claims and parties. We gave as one example of such language what we have called a "Mother Hubbard" clause⁴ -- a recitation that all relief not expressly granted is denied.⁵ Since then, the routine inclusion of this general statement in otherwise plainly interlocutory orders and its ambiguity in many contexts have rendered it inapt for determining finality when there has not been a conventional trial. We no longer believe that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in a judgment issued without a full trial can be taken to indicate finality. We therefore hold that in cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties. In the two cases before us, the court of appeals concluded that judgments that do not meet this test were final and dismissed the appeals as having been untimely perfected.⁶ We reverse and remand for consideration of the merits of the appeals.

When a court grants more relief than requested, the judgment is reversible but the error does not deprive this court of jurisdiction. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 ( Tex. 2001)

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.; 39 S.W. 3d 191, 193 ( Tex. 2001)

“[A]n order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 ( Tex. 2001); see also Youngblood & Assoc., P.L.L.C. v. Duhon, 57 S.W.3d 63, 65 ( Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). An order that does not dispose of all issues and parties is interlocutory and is not appealable absent a severance. Id. (citing Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.3d 590, 591 ( Tex. 1993),overruled on other grounds, Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 204). An appellate court may review the record to determine whether an order disposes of all claims and parties. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205B06 (“The record may help illumine whether an order is made final by its own language, so that an order that all parties appear to have treated as final may be final despite some vagueness in the order itself . . .”).

Vansteen v. Twin City Fire Insurance & Hartford Fire Insurance; 93 S.W. 3d 516, 519 ( Tex. App. – Hous. [14^th Dist] 2002)

A judgment is final if it either actually disposes of all claims and parties before the court or states with “unmistakable clarity” that it is a final judgment. Guajardo v. Conwell, 46 S.W.3d 862, 864 ( Tex. 2001); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 ( Tex. 2001). As a rule, a severance of an interlocutory judgment into a severed action makes it final if all claims in the severed action have been disposed of, unless the order of severance indicates further proceedings are to be had in the severed action. Tanner v. Karnavas, 86 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, pet. filed); see also Diversified Fin. Sys., Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 795, 795 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). The appellate timetable runs from the signing date of whatever order makes the severed judgment final and appealable. Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 ( Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Tanner, 86 S.W.3d at 743.

Thompson v. Beyer; 91 S.W. 3d 902, ( Tex. App. – Dallas 2002)

See Lehmann v. Har-con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 ( Tex. 2001) ("The intent to finally dispose of the case must be unequivocally expressed in the words of the order itself.").

In re: Tenet Healthcare; 84 S.W. 3d 760, ( Tex. App. – Hous. [1^st Dist] 2002)

As a general rule, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). A judgment that finally disposes of all remaining parties and claims, based on the record in the case, is final regardless of its language. Id. at 200. But the language of an order or judgment may make it final, even though it should have been interlocutory, if that language expressly disposes of all claims and all parties. Id. The intent to finally dispose of the case must be unequivocally expressed in the words of the order itself. Id. If the intent to dispose of the case is clear from the order, the order is final and appealable, even though the record does not provide an adequate basis for rendition of judgment. Id. A judgment that grants more relief than a party is entitled to is erroneous and subject to reversal, but it is not, for that reason alone, interlocutory.Id.

Perry v. Stanley, Gilbert, and Pleasant; 83 S.W. 3d 819, 823 ( Tex. App. – Texarkana 2002)

The mere inclusion of the word "final" in the order does not make it final. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 ( Tex. 2001). "Rather, there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case." Id. The above-quoted language in the severance order meets this requirement. Plaintiffs do not complain on appeal of the trial court's failure to award attorney's fees. mere inclusion of the word "final" in the order does not make it final. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 ( Tex. 2001). "Rather, there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case." Id. The above-quoted language in the severance order meets this requirement. Plaintiffs do not complain on appeal of the trial court's failure to award attorney's fees.

Arredondo v. City of Dallas ; 79 S.W. 3d 657, ( Tex. App. – Dallas 2002)

If the summary judgment grants more relief than a party is entitled to, it should be reversed and remanded. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 ( Tex. 2001).

Haas v. George; 71 S.W. 3d 904, ( Tex. App. – Texarkana 2002)

Under Texas procedure, appeals are allowed only from final orders or judgments. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 ( Tex. 2001); Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 ( Tex. 1992); North East Indep . Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 ( Tex. 1966); Cameron County v. Alvarado, 900 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The issue we must first address is whether an order granting summary judgment can be a final and appealable order when one of the appellant's causes of action was not addressed by the appellees in the motion for summary judgment.

A judgment is final if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record. Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 272;see Clark v. Pimienta, No. 99-1131, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 36, *1 (April 26, 2001). The law does not require that a final judgment be in any particular form; therefore, whether a decree is a final judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. A "Mother Hubbard" clause alone does not indicate that a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal. Guajardo v. Conwell, No. 00-1234, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 34, *4 ( April 26, 2001 ); Clark, 2001 Tex. LEXIS at *1; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 204. An order that adjudicates only the plaintiff's claims against the defendant does not adjudicate a third-party claim. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3dat 205. An order that disposes of claims by only one of multiple plaintiffs does not adjudicate claims by the other plaintiffs. Bobbitt v. Stran, No. 00-0774, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 30, *1 ( April 26, 2001 ); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. An order does not dispose of all claims and all parties merely because it is entitled "final." Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. Rather, there must be some other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case. Id. To determine whether an order actually disposes of all pending claims and parties, the appellate court may look to the record in the case. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205-06.

Liu v. Yang; 69 S.W. 3d 225, 228 ( Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2001)

An appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 ( Tex. 2001); N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 ( Tex. 1966). A judgment is final if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record. Guajardo, 46 S.W.3d 862, 863-64 ( Tex. 2001)(citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195);Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 ( Tex. 1992). In cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court regardless of its language, or it stated with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192. The law does not require that a final judgment be in any particular form; therefore, whether a decree is a final judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case. Id. at 195.

A court of appeals must not affirm or reverse a judgment or dismiss an appeal for formal defects or irregularities in appellate procedure without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend the defects or irregularities. Tex. R. App. P. 44.3. An appellate court is also prohibited from affirming or reversing a judgment or dismissing an appeal if the trial court's erroneous action or inaction prevents the proper presentation of a case to the court of appeals and the trial court can correct its action or failure to act. Tex. R. App. P. 44.4(a). The courts of appeals are authorized by rule 44.4 to require the trial court to enter a clarifying order to allow proper presentation of an appeal. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark , 38 S.W.3d 92, 97 ( Tex. 2000). "If the appellate court is uncertain about the intent of the [summary judgment] order, it can abate the appeal to permit clarification by the trial court." Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206.

Lopez v. Sulak; 76 S.W. 3d 597, ( Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 2002)

ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN ADJUDICATED

1) The following issues have not been adjudicated in the underlying disciplinary lawsuit.

a) WorldPeace in his Seventh Amended Answer and Counterclaims and Third Party Claims pled a Constitutional cause of action for violations of his rights against self incrimination. This issue was not tried with the TDRPC violations to the jury and was not pled in the Commission’s Amended Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment nor was it the subject of a directed verdict nor was it referenced in the August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment per Lehmann (39 S.W. 3d 191, Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. (Tex. 2001)).

b) WorldPeace in his Seventh Amended Answer Counterclaims and Third Party Claims pled a cause of action for Injunctive relief.

“To be entitled to a permanent injunction, Jordan had to plead and prove: (1) a wrongful act; (2) imminent harm; (3) irreparable injury; and (4) no adequate remedy at law.”

Jordan v. Landry’s Seafood Restaurant, Inc., 89 S.W. 3d 737, 742 ( Tex. App. – Hous. [1^st Dist.] 2002)

“A successful applicant for injunctive relief must demonstrate the following four grounds for relief: 1) the existence of a wrongful act; 2) the existence of imminent harm; 3) the existence of irreparable injury; and 4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Frey v. DeCordova Bend Estates Owners Ass’n, 632 S.W. 2d 877, 881 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 1982), aff’d, 647 S.W. 2d 246 ( Tex. 1983)”

Priest v. Texas Animal Healt Comm’n, 780 S.W. 2d 874, 875 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1989)

The cause of action for injunctive relief was not pled in the Commission’s Amended Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment and was not adjudicated in the trial on the TDRPC violations to the jury nor was it the subject of a directed verdict nor was it referenced in the August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment per Lehmann.

c) WorldPeace’s cause of action regarding his constitutional counterclaim regarding due process for having multiple complainants in one lawsuit. This issue was not tried with the TDRPC violations to the jury and was not pled in the Commission’s Amended Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment nor was it the subject of a directed verdict nor was it referenced in the August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment per Lehmann.

d) WorldPeace’s counterclaim for equal protection was not adjudicated because the Commission did not plead the elements of which WorldPeace had no evidence in its Second Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment and the court did not try that issue to the jury nor was it the subject of a directed verdict nor was it referenced in the August 27, 2003 Judgment for Disbarment per Lehmann.

e) WorldPeace’s counterclaim for due process was not adjudicated because the Commission did not plead the elements of which WorldPeace had no evidence in its Second Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment and the court did not try that issue to the jury nor was it the subject of a directed verdict nor was it referenced in the August 27, 2003 Judgment for Disbarment per Lehmann.

f) WorldPeace’s counterclaim for unconstitutional range of punishment was not adjudicated because the Commission did not plead the elements of which WorldPeace had no evidence in its Second Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment and the court did not try that issue to the jury nor was it the subject of a directed verdict nor was it referenced in the August 27, 2003 Judgment for Disbarment per Lehmann.

g) WorldPeace’s counterclaim for violation of his Texas Equal Rights Amendment protection was not adjudicated per Lehmann.

h) WorldPeace’s counterclaim for religious discrimination and political discrimination (free speech) were not adjudicated because the Commission did not plead the elements of which WorldPeace had no evidence in its Second Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment and the court did not try that issue to the jury nor was it the subject of a directed verdict nor was it referenced in the August 27, 2003 Judgment for Disbarment per Lehmann.

FACTS REGARDING SPECIFIC ACTS OF HARRIS COUNTY JUDGES

On November 17, 2003, Judge Block of County Civil Court at Law Number Two signed two orders removing John WorldPeace from two lawsuits (Cause Number 799,213; Don McGill Toyota v. Adriana Ospina and Luis Ospina, County Civil Court at Law Number Two, Harris County, Texas and Cause Number 790,109; Chevy Chase Bank, FSB v. Eddie Christeen Meredith, County Civil Court at Law Number Two, Harris County, Texas based on the August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment. (Exhibit “A & B”)

On November 17, 2003, Judge Hellums of the 247^th District Court refused to allow WorldPeace to represent WorldPeace’s client in Cause Number 2003-15888; In the Matter of the Marriage of Jay Kelley and Laura Perez and in the Interest of Brittany Kelley and Victoria Kelley, Children, 247^th District Court, Harris County, Texas, saying that she had received a call from the State Bar not to allow WorldPeace to practice law in her court. No order was signed.

On November 14, 2003 , Judge Gamble, of the 270^th District Court refused to allow WorldPeace to represent WorldPeace’s client in Cause Number 2003-32898, Contour Fittings Corporation v. Michael Zawacki, 270^th District Court, Harris County , Texas . No order was signed.

On November 17, 2003, Judge York of the 246^th District Court continued Cause Number 2003-22965; In the Interest of Ashlynn Page Simpson and Destiny Michelle Simpson Children, 246^th District Court, Harris County, Texas, to January 20, 2004, in order to allow time for resolution of the Judgment for Disbarment. No order was signed.

WorldPeace would show the court that Judge Crowe of County Civil Court at Law Number Four, Harris County, Texas illegally disqualified WorldPeace on Cause Number 775,560; General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Margarita Boado, County Civil Court at Law Number Four, Harris County , Texas after WorldPeace filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Crowe regarding the Judgment for Disbarment. (Exhibit “C”)

WorldPeace would show the court that Judge Newy of the 308^th District Court refused to allow WorldPeace to practice in Cause Number 2002-03670; In the Matter of the Marriage of Merribeth J. Deaton and John Edwin Deaton and in the Interest of Melody J. Deaton and Jeremey E. Deaton, Children, 308^th District Court, Harris County, Texas due to the Judgment for Disbarment. No order was signed.

CONCLUSION

Judge Fry’s August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment is interlocutory because all of the underlying issues in this lawsuit have not been adjudicated. The Judgment for Disbarment appears on its face to be valid. The Judgment for Disbarment has had the effect of a defacto disbarment of WorldPeace. It is more than an abuse of discretion for Judge Fry to refuse to modify or vacate his August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment knowing that it is causing undeniable confusion in the trial courts in which WorldPeace practices for WorldPeace, WorldPeace’s clients, opposing attorneys and the judges of the various Harris County courts.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, WorldPeace prays Judge Fry to be set aside his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment and for such other and further relief at law or in equity as this court deems proper.

Respectfully submitted,

                                                                        __________________________________
                                                                        John WorldPeace
                                                                        TBA No. 21872800
                                                                        2620 Fountainview, Suite 106
                                                                        Houston , Texas    77057
                                                                        Tel: 713-784-7618
                                                                        Fax: 713-784-9063