STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus against a district judge under Section 22.002(a) of the Government Code and Article V. Section 3 of The Texas Constitution.  

ISSUES PRESENTED

ISSUE ONE  

            If the Respondent has no due process rights in the grievance investigatory process but has a constitutional right against self incrimination, is it an abuse of discretion for a presiding judge in a trial de novo in a disciplinary petition to sanction an attorney for asserting his rights against self incrimination in the grievance investigatory process which preceded his Rule 2.14 TRDP election for a trial de novo?  

ISSUE TWO  

            Is it an abuse of discretion for Judge Fry to disbar Relator WorldPeace for asserting his constitutional rights against self incrimination?  

ISSUE THREE  

            Is it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sanction a Respondent in a disciplinary petition because he did not orally or in writing assert his right against self incrimination in the grievance investgatory process?  

ISSUE FOUR  

Does Comment Two of Rule 8.01 TDRPC regarding a Respondent’s rights against self incrimination and which does not require an oral or verbal assertion of those rights in a grievance investigatory process also apply to Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC?           

ISSUE FIVE           

            Is it an abuse of discretion to sever Relator’s compulsory constitutional counterclaims regarding his rights against self-incrimination from the underlying TDRPC violations which may require self incrimination per Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC?

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THIS COURT:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 26, 2001 , the State Bar sent WorldPeace a demand for a response to a complaint filed by Helene Fraser-Nash per Rule 2.09 TRDP.  (Record “1”)  The demand included a paragraph informing WorldPeace that his response may be turned over to law enforcement.  (Record “2”)  WorldPeace did not respond.

At the beginning of the grievance investigatory hearing which WorldPeace did not attend but which WorldPeace viewed the video which was produced in discovery in the underlying trial, the moderator began by stating that the attorney could assert his constitutional rights against self incrimination.

WorldPeace did not provide his copy of the client file subpoenaed by the grievance committee (Record “5”) because he had car trouble in Corsicana and could not attend the grievance hearing.  Mr. Mapes, at the State Bar, was called by WorldPeace’s daughter but Mr. Mapes said the hearing would proceed anyway. 

WorldPeace would show the Court that Mr. Mapes had no trouble resetting a grievance hearing requested by Ms. Helene Fraser-Nash.  (Record “288”)

On October 19, 2001 , the State Bar sent WorldPeace a demand for a response to a complaint filed by Penny Reily (Apodaca) per Rule 2.09 TRDP.  (Record “6”) The demand included a paragraph informing WorldPeace that his response may be turned over to law enforcement.  (Record “7”) WorldPeace did not respond.

At the beginning of the grievance investigatory hearing which WorldPeace did not attend but which WorldPeace viewed the video which was produced in discovery in the underlying trial, the moderator began by stating that the attorney could assert his constitutional rights against self incrimination.

WorldPeace did not provide his copy of the client file subpoenaed by the grievance committee (Record “10”) because he had car trouble in Corsicana and could not attend.  Mr. Mapes was called by WorldPeace’s daughter but Mr. Mapes said the hearing would proceed.

On January 7, 2002 , the State Bar sent WorldPeace a demand for a response to a complaint filed by Darlene Williams per Rule 2.09 TRDP.  (Record “11”)  The demand included a paragraph informing WorldPeace that his response may be turned over to law enforcement.  (Record “12”)

WorldPeace did not respond within thirty days as demanded but did respond in the grievance hearing.

At the beginning of the investigatory hearings the moderator began by stating that WorldPeace could assert his constitutional rights against self incrimination.

WorldPeace did not assert his rights against self incrimination.

In each of the above three demand letters from the State Bar to WorldPeace, there was the following statement as is required by Rule 2.09 TRDP, to wit:

“The notice shall notify the Respondent that the Chief Disciplinary counsel may provide appropriate information, including the Respondent’s response, to law enforcement agencies as permitted by Rule 6.08.”  

Rule 6.08 TRDP states in relevant part, to wit:

“The Chief Disciplinary Counsel may provide appropriate information to law enforcement agencies…”  

The Rule 2.09 TRCP law enforcement references and the self incrimination statements at the beginning of the grievance hearings are in fact a modified “Miranda” warning used in criminal cases.  Forwarding information to law enforcement is an indication and notice of a potential criminal investigation to an attorney.

“Rule 8.01 Bar Admission, Reinstatement, and Disciplinary Matters:  An applicant for admission to the bar, a petitioner for reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with the bar admission application, a petition for reinstatement, or a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admission, reinstatement, or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.05”  

Rule 8.01 TDRPC Comment 2 states, to wit:

“This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.  A person relying on such a provision in response to a specific question or more general demand for information, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as an unasserted justification for failure to comply with this Rule.”  

On April 14, 2003 , the underlying disciplinary petition went to trial on the TDRPC issues only as the other issues had been severed in pretrial.  (Record “34-36”)  Trial was held on Petitioner’s Second Amended Petition.  (Record “13”) 

On April 23, 2003 , Judge Fry entered a Judgment for Disbarment.

On June 23, 2003 , Judge Fry set aside the April 23, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment.

On August 27, 2003 , Judge Fry entered a second Judgment for Disbarment.  (Record “116”)

On August 27, 2003 , Judge Fry entered an Order of Severance. (Record “123”)

On August 27, 2003 , Judge Fry entered an Order Granting Petitioner’s Second Motion for No-evidence Summary Judgment. (Record “287”)

On September 26, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Respondent WorldPeace’s Third Amended Motion for New Trial and Motion for JNOV Regarding the Court’s August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment. (Record “165”)

On September 26, 2003 , WorldPeace filed WorldPeace Second Amended Motion to Vacate or Modify Judgment of Disbarment of August 27, 2003 . (Record “124”)

On October 31, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Respondent’s Amended Motion for Rehearing on Petitioners Second Motion for No-evidence Summary Judgment. (Record “228”)

On November 7, 2003 , the court signed Order on Respondent’s Motion for Rehearing on Petitioner’s Motion for Second Motion for No-evidence Summary Judgment. (Record “286”)

On November 7, 2003 , the court signed Order on WorldPeace’s Motion for JNOV. (Record “285”)

On November 7, 2003 , the court signed Order on WorldPeace’s Third Amended Motion for New Trial. (Record “283”)

On November 7, 2003 , the court signed Order on Second Amended Motion to Vacate or Modify Judgment of Disbarment of August 27, 2003 . (Record “284”)

REQUIREMENTS FOR MANDAMUS

1)  There is no remedy on appeal because per Rule 3.14 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Appendix) a Judgment for Disbarment cannot be superseded or stayed.  

2)  Judge Fry’s actions in the underlying disciplinary petition as presiding judge are a clear abuse of discretion. 

3)  The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct affect over 67,000 attorneys in Texas and so WorldPeace’s Application for Writ of Mandamus regarding the underlying disciplinary petition is important to the jurisprudence of the state. 

Further, this Application for Writ of Mandamus involves the construction or validity of two statutes; Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC and involves a constitutional issue of how an attorney’s rights against self incrimination integrates with these two Rules of the TRDP.

AUTHORITIES:  ABUSE OF DISCRETION

“A trial court “abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.”  Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W. 2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985, orig. proceeding).”

            Crouch v. Gleason, 875 S.W. 2d 738, 739 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1994)  

“On the other hand, review of a trial court’s determination of the legal principles controlling its ruling is much less deferential.  A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.   Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ…

            Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W. 2d 833, 839-40 (1992) (citations omitted).”

            Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Abascal, 831 S.W. 2d 559, 563 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1992)  

            “Aside from the “clear abuse of discretion” threshold set forth in Walker , supra, the supreme court has also stated that mandamus will lie to correct a “gross” abuse of discretion by the trial court.  State v. Sewell, 487 S.W. 2d 713, 718 ( Tex. 1972).  “The relator must establish, under the facts of the case, that the facts and law permit the trial court to make but one decision.”  Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W. 2d 916, 917 ( Tex. 1985).  Put differently: “[A] clear abuse of discretion, when utilized as the basis for an original mandamus proceeding, refers to the unique situation wherein the lower court, exercising a ‘discretionary’ authority, has but one viable course to follow and one legitimate way to decide the question presented, but instead issues a contrary ruling.”  Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Kirk, 702 S.W. 2d 321, 323 (Tex. App. – Eastland 1986, orig. proceeding).”

            Monroe v. Blackmon, 946 S.W. 2d 533, 536 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1997)  

AUTHORITIES – REGARDING SELF INCRIMINATION

            The Fifth Amendment can be asserted in both civil and criminal trials “wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.  Generally, the exercise of the privilege should not be penalized.  Spevack v. Klein, 385 US 511 (1967)

            Texas Department of Public Safety Officers Association v. Denton ,

897 SW2d 757, 760 ( Tex. 1995)

            We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled, that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the First Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it.

            Spevack v. Klein, 385 US 511(1967)

“Rule 8.01 Bar Admission, Reinstatement, and Disciplinary Matters:  An applicant for admission to the bar, a petitioner for reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with the bar admission application, a petition for reinstatement, or a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admission, reinstatement, or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.05”

Rule 8.01 TDRPC Comment 2 states, to wit:

“This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.  A person relying on such a provision in response to a specific question or more general demand for information, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as an unasserted justification for failure to comply with this Rule.”

Rule 8.01 TDRPC comment 2  

            This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.  A Person relying on such a provision in response to a specific question or more general demand for information, however, should do so openly and not use the right of non-disclosure as an unasserted justification for failure to comply with this Rule.

Rule 8.04 (a)(8)  TDRPC

             A lawyer shall not fail to timely furnish to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel’s office or a district grievance committee a response or other information as required by the TRDP, unless he or she in good faith timely asserts a privilege or other legal ground for failure to do so.

Rule 1.06 (Q)(4) TRDP

            “Professional Misconduct” includes failure of a Respondent to furnish information subpoened by a Committee, unless he or she, in good faith, asserts a privilege or other legal grounds for the failure to do so.

Rule 15.01 TRDP

             Chief Disciplinary Counsel or Respondent may compel the attendance of witnesses, including the Respondent, and the production of books, documents, papers, banking records, and other things subpoena.  

Rule 15.02 TRDP

             If any witness, including the Respondent, fails or refuses to appear or to produce the things named in the subpoena, or refuses to be sworn or to affirm or to testify, the witness may be compelled to appear and produce tangible evidence and to testify at a hearing before a district judge of the county in which the subpoena was served.  

            Actions taken by the grievance committee are not accorded finality; therefore, due process does not attach.  (Minnick below) The decision of the grievance committee regarding the complaint against Flume had no finality absent Flume’s consent.  Because Flume did not accept the decision of the committee, the State Bar filed suit and a trial de novo was held in the district court according Flume due process.

            Flume v. State Bar of Texas , 974 SW2d 55, 59 (Tex. App. -San Antonio, 1998)  

            A grievance committee’s investigations have been compared to an inquisition by a grand jury.  Nonetheless, as long as an indictment is valid on its face and the grand jury is legally constituted, a due process complaint will not be sustained.

            Minnick v. State Bar, 790 SW2d 87, 90 (Tex. App. - Austin, 1990)  

“We no longer believe that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in a judgment issued without a full trial can be taken to indicate finality.  We therefore hold that in cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.”

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.; 39 S.W. 3d 191, 192-3 ( Tex. 2001)  

ARGUMENT  

ISSUE ONE  

            If the Respondent has no due process rights in the grievance investigatory process but has a constitutional right against self incrimination, is it an abuse of discretion for a presiding judge in a trial de novo in a disciplinary petition to sanction an attorney for asserting his rights against self incrimination in the grievance investigatory process which preceded his Rule 2.14 TRDP election for a trial de novo?  

ISSUE TWO  

            Is it an abuse of discretion for Judge Fry to disbar Relator WorldPeace for asserting his constitutional rights against self incrimination?  

            WorldPeace would show the court that per Spevack above Judge Fry could not disbar WorldPeace for refusing to incriminate himself by refusing to respond to the grievance committee’s demands for a response to a complainants’ allegations under Rule 2.09 TRDP or for WorldPeace's refusal to submit to the grievance committees’ subpoena for WorldPeace’s copy of his client file under Rule 15.01 TRDP.

In the Williams grievance, WorldPeace did not respond to the initial demand letter for information within thirty days but did respond at the grievance hearing.

In the Nash and Apodaca grievance WorldPeace did not respond to the initial demand for information at all.  In addition, WorldPeace did not respond to the subpoena for WorldPeace to attend the February 19, 2002 , grievance hearing and bring his copy of the client file as opposed to the clients’ copy of the file.  (Which he did not have.)

WorldPeace was running for governor of Texas on February 19, 2002 , the date of the hearing, and although he intended to be present at the hearing WorldPeace had car trouble in Corsicana and could not be there.  WorldPeace called into the State Bar but Mr. Mapes said they were going to have the hearing anyway.

WorldPeace would show the court that Mr. Mapes had reset the hearing for the convenience of Fraser-Nash (Record “288”) but refused to reset it for WorldPeace. 

Even if WorldPeace had attended the hearing, he had no intention of giving the committee his copy of the client file.  The committee did not request the clients’ file but requested WorldPeace’s copy of the client’s file.

Further, Mr. Apodaca testified at trial that he had picked up his file from WorldPeace.  (Record “291”) This was several months prior to the grievance hearing.

WorldPeace would show the court in regards to the subpoena power of Rule 15.01 TRDP, the Commission had the choice of having a district judge order WorldPeace to comply with the subpoena under Rule 15.02 TRDP.  The grievance committee did not use this vehicle.  

Is the Grievance Investigatory Process like a Grand Jury Investigation as per Minnick and Flume

regarding worldpeace’s rights of due procesS?  

            WorldPeace would show the court that per Minnick above a grievance investigation is compared to a grand jury investigation and WorldPeace therefore had no due process rights in the grievance investigation because he elected a Rule 2.14 TRDP trial de novo in the district court and the grievance investigatory process therefore had no finality.

WorldPeace would show the court that this is not true:  a grievance investigation is not like a grand jury investigation.

In a grand jury investigation, there is no carry over to the criminal trial of any self-incrimination issues that came up in the grand jury investigation.  On the other hand, in a grievance process, there is a carry over from the grievance investigation to the trial de novo of an attorney who asserted his constitutional rights against self-incrimination in the grievance process prior to his election for a Rule 2.14 TRDP trial de novo.

If a criminal refuses to cooperate with the grand jury in the investigation of his alleged acts of murder, he is only tried on the issue of the murder.  He is not tried on the issue of his refusal to cooperate with the grand jury by asserting his constitutional right against self incrimination.  This is a critical difference in the grand jury process and the attorney grievance investigatory process.

If an attorney refuses to cooperate in the grievance investigation process, there is no clean break to the trial de novo per Minnick because the attorney can be disbarred for asserting his rights against self incrimination in the investigatory process per Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC which on their face violate an attorney’s right against self incrimination. 

This link between the grievance investigation process and the trial de novo controverts the legal theory announced in Flume and Minnick above; that there is no due process rights in the grievance investigation process because the investigation process does not end in a final adjudication of the matter. 

If the attorneys’ assertion of his rights against self incrimination carries over from the grievance investigation to the trial de novo, there is no break in the process and there is really no trial de novo.  The grievance investigation leads to a Judgment for Disbarment because the attorneys’ action in the grievance investigation process are potential violations of the TDRPC.

To have a Minnick bright line barrier between the grievance investigation and the trial de novo, the State Bar must not be allowed to prosecute the attorney for violation of Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TRDP for his non responsiveness in the grievance investigation. 

ISSUE THREE  

            Is it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to sanction a Respondent in a disciplinary petition because he did not orally or in writing assert his right against self incrimination in the grievance investgatory process?  

Is an attorney required to orally or in writing assert his right against self incrimination

It is a violation of an attorneys constitutional right against self incrimination to disbar an attorney for asserting his right against self incrimination.

An attorney should not be required to state that he is asserting his rights against self incriminate.  See Comment two of Rule 8.01 TDRPC above which uses the words “should not”. 

In a “Miranda” warning, a person is not required to assert his rights.  All he is required to do is to acknowledge that he understands his rights. 

The warnings by the State Bar that the information obtained from the attorney can be turned over to law enforcement in the initial Rule 2.09 TRDP request for a response from the attorney and the same warning at the beginning of the each grievance hearing are the equivalent to “Miranda” warnings.  An attorney should have the right to simply refuse to respond in any way. 

In the Miranda warning, it says that “anything you say can be used against you.”  This would seems to include an affirmative plea of one’s rights against self incrimination.

            WorldPeace would show the court that if he has no due process rights in the grievance process, then he would be foolish to respond to the demands for information from the grievance committee especially since his license is subject to being revoked in the process.  It made more sense for WorldPeace to refuse to respond to the grievance committee; especially since WorldPeace knew that he would demand a trial de novo at the end of the process based on his prior negative experiences with the State Bar in general and with Dawn Miller, Chief Disciplinary Counsel in particular.

            WorldPeace would show the court that the State Bar cannot be allowed to deny WorldPeace due process rights in the grievance investigation process and then disbar WorldPeace for refusing to waive his rights against self incrimination orally or in writing in that process.    

ISSUE FOUR  

Does Comment Two of Rule 8.01 TDRPC regarding a Respondent’s rights against self incrimination and which does not require an oral or verbal assertion of those rights in a grievance investigatory process also apply to Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC?           

CAN AN ATTORNEY BE DISBARRED FOR ASSERTING HIS RIGHTS AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION  

There is no despositive Texas law on how the Fifth Amendment applies to the grievance process.  There is no law that says it does not apply.  Spevach above says it does.

            Therefore, not only did Judge Fry abuse his discretion by sanctioning WorldPeace when he exercised his right against self incrimination during the grievance process, per Spevack, he also abused his discretion by sanctioning WorldPeace for refusing to participate in a process in which WorldPeace had no due process rights per Minnick.

            Also, comment 2 to Rule 8.01 TDRPC indicates that WorldPeace was not required to openly assert his rights against self incrimination and there is no difference between Rule 8.01 TDRPC and the Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC and Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP. 

WorldPeace prays the court to vacate the Rule 8.01(a)(8) TDRPC and Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP violations from Judge Fry’s August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment.  

ISSUE FIVE           

            Is it an abuse of discretion to sever Relator’s compulsory constitutional counterclaims regarding his rights against self-incrimination from the underlying TDRPC violations which may require self incrimination per Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC?  

SEVERANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

In pretrial, Judge Fry, severed WorldPeace’s constitutional counterclaims.  (Record “123”)  However, nowhere in Judge Fry’s August 27, 2003 , Order of Severance or in his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment (Record “16”) did he specifically mention WorldPeace Constitutional Counterclaim regarding his right against self incrimination.  (Record “54-55”)

The Commission also did not plead WorldPeace cause of action regarding self incrimination in its Motion for No-evidence Summary Judgment.  (Record “292”) Judge Fry granted the Summary Judgment. (Record “287”)

WorldPeace constitutional right against self incrimination counterclaim was never tried but Judge Fry has attempted to dismiss the counterclaims with a “mother hubbard” clause in his Judgment for Disbarment (Record “122”) contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Lehmann.

There is no way to know what Judge Fry actually intended regarding WorldPeace’s cause of action regarding self incrimination because he has refused to clarify his orders of August 27, 2003 .  (Record “284”)

WorldPeace would assert that it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Fry not to try WorldPeace’s counterclaim regarding self incrimination with the Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC violations.  WorldPeace’s counterclaims and the TDRPC violations should not be severed per Rule 41 TRCP or separated per Rule 174(b) TRCP.

            The reality is that WorldPeace had a constitutional counterclaim regarding his rights against self incrimination and it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Fry to refuse to adjudicated it or to adjudicate it separately per Rule 41 TRCP or Rule 174(b) TRCP.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, WorldPeace moves this court to order Judge Fry to modify his August 27, 2003, Judgment for Disbarment to vacate WorldPeace’s violation of Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC and for such other and further relief at law or in equity as this court may deem proper.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________
John WorldPeace
2620 Fountain View, Suite 106
Houston , Texas 77057
Tel. 713-784-7618
Fax. 713-784-9063
TBA No. 21872800  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  

            I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was forwarded to opposing counsel and Judge Fry on November 21, 2003 , by fax and to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas on November 21, 2003 , via EXPRESS MAIL.  

                                                                                                                                                            
John WorldPeace  

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE  

            Opposing Counsel opposes the RELATOR’S APPLICATION FOR MANDAMUS.
 

____________________________________
                                                                        John WorldPeace

APPENDIX  

EXHIBIT       DESCRIPTION  

A.  August 27, 2003              Judgment for Disbarment  

B.  November 7, 2003          Order on Respondent’s Motion for Rehearing on Petitioner’s Motion for Second Motion for No-evidence Summary Judgment  

C.  November 7, 2003          Order on WorldPeace’s Motion for JNOV  

D.  November 7, 2003         Order on WorldPeace’s Third Amended Motion for New Trial  

E.  November 7, 2003          Order on WorldPeace’s Second Amended Motion to Vacate or Modify Judgment of Disbarment of August 27, 2003  

Rule 8.01 and Comment  Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule 8.04(a)(8)  Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule 1.06(Q)(4)  Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

Rule 2.09  Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

Rule 2.14   Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

Rule 3.14  Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

Rule 4.06(a)  Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

Rule 6.08  Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

Rule 15.01  Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

Rule 15.02  Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

Rule 41  Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 174(b)  Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

Further affiant sayeth not.”  

__________________________________
                                                                        John WorldPeace  

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this _______ day of _________________, 2003.  

____________________________________
                                                                        NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE 
                                                                        STATE OF TEXAS

RECORD  

      August 28, 2001               See Record “T” below

A.  September 26, 2001         Letter from State Bar Regarding Helene Marie Fraser-Nash
                                                And December 18, 2001 , subpoena  

B.  October 19, 2001             Letter from State Bar Regarding Penny Jo Reilly
                                                And January 15, 2002 , subpoena  

     December 10, 2001          See Record “S” below (Mapes Letter to WorldPeace)

C.  January 7, 2002                Letter from State Bar Regarding Darlene Armstead Williams
D.  January 16, 2003 SECOND AMENDED DISCIPLINARY PETITION
E.  April 14, 2003                  Transcript of the April 14, 2002 proceedings

F.  April 22, 2003                   JURY CHARGE (Rule 8.01 TDRPC and Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP Issues)  

     July 1, 2003                       See Record “U” below  

G.  July 21, 2003                    DEFENDANT’S SEVENTH AMENDED ORIGINAL ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMS  

H.  July 21, 2003                    RESPONDENT’S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S SECOND MOTION FOR NO EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT  

I.   August 27, 2003                 JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT  

J.  August 27, 2003                ORDER OF SEVERANCE
     August 27, 2003                See Record “R” below

K.  September 26, 2003        WORLDPEACE’S SECOND AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE OR MODIFY JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT OF AUGUST 27, 2003                                                

L.  September 26, 2003        RESPONDENT WORLDPEACE’S THIRD AMENDED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION FOR JNOV REGARDING THE COURT’S AUGUST 27, 2003, JUDGMENT FOR DISBARMENT  

M.  October 31, 2003            RESPONDENT’S AMENDED MOTION FOR REHEARING ON PETITIONER’S SECOND MOTION FOR NO EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT  

N.  November 7, 2003           ORDER ON WORLDPEACE’S THIRD AMENDED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL  

O.  November 7, 2003           ORDER ON WORLDPEACE’S SECOND AMENDED MOTION TO VACATE OR MODIFY JUDGMENT OF DISBARMENT OF          AUGUST 27, 2003  

P.  November 7, 2003            ORDER ON WORLDPEACE’S MOTION FOR JNOV

Q.  November 7, 2003           ORDER ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON PETITIONER’S SECOND MOTION FOR NO EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT  

R.  August 27, 2003               ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT  

S.  December 10, 2001          Mapes’ Letter concerning continuing the first Fraser-Nash Grievance Hearing  

T.  August 28, 2001                Form signed by Apodaca that he picked up his file 

U.  July 1, 2003                      COMMISSION’S SECOND MOTION FOR NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT  

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