NO:  03-978, 03-990, 03-1022, 03-1023, 03-1049, 
03-1069, 03-1070, 03-1079, 03-1082, 03-1083, 03-1084









Re:  Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyers Discipline v. John WorldPeace, 269th District Court  
Harris County, Texas







                                                                        Filed by: John WorldPeace, Relator  

                                                                        John WorldPeace
2620 Fountainview,
Suite 106   
Houston , Texas 77057
Tel. 713-784-7618
Fax. 713-784-9063
TBA# 21872800  

                                                                        Attorney Pro Se  


The following is a complete list of all the parties and the names and addresses of all counsel in the underlying lawsuit.  

Relator (Respondent)

John WorldPeace

John WorldPeace

2620 Fountainview, Suite 106  

Houston , Texas 77057

Tel. 713-784-7618

Fax. 713-784-9063

Attorney Pro Se                     


Respondent: Honorable James R. Fry

Presiding Judge in the Underlying Disciplinary Petition

(Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John WorldPeace, 269th District Court, Harris County, Texas )

15th Judicial District Court

200 S. Crockett St .

Sherman , Texas 75090

Tel:   903-813-4303 

Fax:  903-813-4304


Real Parties in Interest and Parties to the Case.  (Petitioner)

            Commission for Lawyer Discipline

Dawn Miller

J. G Molleston

State Bar of Texas

1111 Fannin, Suite 1370

Houston , Texas   77002

Tel:  713-759-6931

Fax: 713-752-2158

Attorneys for the Commission for Lawyer Discipline






The Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure are in the process of being amended.  The lawsuit that the Commission for Lawyer Discipline filed against me shows the unconstitutionality of many of the rules and the arbitrary application of those rules to the detriment of the Respondent attorney.  In reality, the rules are full of injustices that serve neither the public nor the Respondent attorneys. 

If the TRDP was enforced to the letter and every single violation of the TDRPC had the potential of death penalty sanctions, then no person in this state would be able to afford legal fees.  In order to compensate for the Draconian dictates of the TRDP, attorney fees would have to double if not triple and the overall objective of the rules to protect the public from the wrongful acts of attorneys would translate into the end of legal services for everyone but the rich.

The following is my perspective on the TRDP as they presently exist and as they have been applied to me.  These comments are supported in many cases by challenges in the form of my Applications for Writs of Mandamus that are presently before this court.  These applications show some of the major flaws in the rules.  In some cases, I have not filed an application because I believe that ten applications against one presiding judge on any one case are more than enough to show there is something wrong with the grievance process.  However, I am prepared to file those additional applications if necessary.

I have set up a website ( for the purpose of creating a dialogue about the injustices of the disciplinary process in Texas.  On this site, you should be able to find a broader perspective and more details about the application of the TRDP to real fact scenarios.

The TRDP is seriously flawed and cannot be fixed.  The core problem is the attempted integration of the TRDP with the larger body of law both common and statutory in this state.  You cannot try a TDRPC violation in a vacuum, 1) because Rule 3.08 B ties the TRDP to the TRCP, 2) the law of legal malpractice parallels the TDRPC and 3) suits for attorney fees trigger grievances and so Rule 97a TRCP must be integrated with the TRDP.

The reality is that only about forty-five disciplinary cases have been appealed in the last eleven years during which time the current TRDP has been in effect.  The reason that there have been few appeals is because most attorneys simply can’t afford to put their license on the line to challenge the Commission for Lawyer Discipline.  Consequently they succumb to its injustice. 

I, on the other hand have no fear of the people who work in the grievance system.  Consequently, I have taken it upon myself to challenge every single aspect of the system.  I have laid the foundation and preserved error on as many of the injustices of the system as I could in the disciplinary petition filed against me.  For the first time, the court has a live case to hold up to the TRDP to see how the TRDP works in fact. 

These matters would have reached this court earlier this year had it not been for the procrastination of Judge Fry, the presiding judge in the underlying disciplinary petition against me, who signed a Judgment of Disbarment against me on April 23, 2003, then set it aside on June 23, 2003, then two months later on August 27, 2003, signed a second Judgment for Disbarment.  Judge Fry did not hear my Motions for New Trial, JNOV, Motion to Vacate, Modify or Clarify the Judgment for Disbarment or my Motion for Reheaing on the Commisison’s Amended Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment until Friday, November 7, 2003 .  All of which were denied.

There was about 150 pages of facts and arguments (exclusive of exhibits) contained in my collective motions and to which the Commission did not submit a single written word in response.

On Monday November 20, 2003 , three days after the hearings, I filed two Applications for Writs of Mandamus against Judge Fry in addition to the one that I had filed on October 24, 2003 .  Over the last three weeks I filed seven more applications for a total of ten.  (Cause Numbers 03-990, 03-1022, 03-1023, 03-1049, 03-1069, 03-1070, 03-1079, 03-1082, 03-1083, 03-1084) 

Many of the issues in this shorthand rendition were going to be adjudicated in the underlying lawsuit by way of my cause of action for Declaratory Judgment.  However, as it stands now, Judge Fry through his attempted use of a “mother hubbard” clause in his August 27, 2003 , Judgment for Disbarment has attempted to arbitrarily dismiss my cause of action for a declaratory judgment as well as my constitutional counterclaims and has therefore avoided any discussion on several of the issues below.


NOTE:  The cited rules are attached.  Exhibit “H” is a summary of the grievances.


1.06 Definitions: 

1.06 Q (4) This Rule is apparently being eliminated in the proposed rules that are to become effective January 1, 2004, but this rule is no different than Rule 8.01 (b)  and Rule 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC which both have to do with furnishing information to the State Bar in a grievance matter.   Rules 8.01(b) and 8.04(a)(8) are nothing more than back doors into Rule 1.06 Q (4).  So without a specific exclusion under Rule 1.06 Q (1) with regards to Rule 8.01 (b) and Rule 8.04 (a) (8), Rule 1.06 (Q) (4) lives on.

There are questions regarding these rules in my Application for Writ of Mandamus (Cause No 03-1079).  No attorney should be sanctioned for invoking his or her rights against self incrimination during the grievance investigatory process. 

The initial letter to an attorney following the filing of a grievance states that the information may be turned over to law enforcement.  In addition, every grievance hearing begins with a warning to the Respondent attorney regarding self incrimination.

Comment 2 to Rule 8.01 (b) TDRPC indicates that an attorney is not required to assert his self incrimination rights verbally or in writing.  The right against self incrimination can be asserted by a refusal to respond. 

“This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.  A person relying on such a provision in response to a specific or more general demand for information, however, SHOULD do so openly and not use the right of non-disclosure, as an unasserted justification for failure to comply with this Rule.”


            The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and neither the TDRPC nor the TRDP can infringe on its guarantees.  This is what Rule 1.06(Q)(4) TRDP and 8.01(b) and 8.04(a)(8) TDRPC are all about.  There are no overriding state interests that can void a person’s constitutional rights against self incrimination. 


1.06 R.  Reasonable Attorney Fees

The question here is whether or not attorney fees can be awarded for services performed by the State Bar attorneys in prosecuting a disciplinary petition.  There is no case law on this point.  I challenged it in the underlying trial but I have not made it the subject of an Application for Writ of Mandamus for now.

In the underlying trial, Mr. Molleston, attorney for the Commission, testified that no attorneys were hired by the Commission to prosecute the case against me and that no outside attorneys were contracted by the Commission to prosecute the case against me and no attorneys did pro bono work on the disciplinary petition against me.

Therefore, no attorney fees should have been awarded as sanctions in the prosecuting of the underlying disciplinary petition against me.

Further, Mr. Molleston testified that he makes $27 per hour working for the State Bar.  Judge Fry awarded attorney fees based on $150 per hour.  This would allow the State Bar to make a profit on fees awarded as sanctions.  There is something wrong with giving the Commission for Lawyer Discipline this profit incentive to pursue attorneys.


Rule 2.07  Duties of the Committees.

“Committees shall act through panels, as assigned by the Committee chairs, to conduct investigatory hearings or evidentiary hearings…all Committee panels MUST  be randomly selected by the chair.”


At trial in the disciplinary petition against me, there were according to Mr. Mapes, the senior investigator in Houston, two committees specifically assigned to him.  Each committee has three panels for a total of six panels.  Yet of the twelve grievances that have been processed by the State Bar against me (six were tried), eight were assigned to the Alan Levine panel and two to the Jim Adler panel.  (Exhibit “A”)

The wording used in Rule 2.07 is “MUST be randomly assigned”.  There is no way that eight out of twelve grievances can be randomly assigned to ONE of six panels.  There was an outright manipulation of the assignment of the panels based on the fact that Mr. Levine’s panel could be counted on to bring back a negative “just cause” finding against me.  Mr. Levine stated in one grievance hearing that the Complainant “could walk out the door and down the street and find any number of legitimate attorneys.”  This is an undeniable statement of personal bias against me.  (This statement is on the grievance video and was part of the evidence at trial.)

The odds that ten out of twelve grievances could be randomly assigned to two out of six panels is astronomical.  I objected to Mr. Adler being on one of my grievance hearings and Mr. Mapes assigned a subsequent grievance to the Adler panel anyway; again to achieve a negative “just cause” finding with a suspension or disbarment recommendation.

This is undeniable.  Panel selection was the subject of a Bill of Exception I created at trial due to Judge Fry allegedly severing my Constitutional counterclaims at pre-trial. 

(As an aside, in his Second Judgment for Disbarment, Judge Fry said that he had ruled for Rule 174 (b) separate trials as opposed to Rule 41 separate lawsuits.  This is nonsense and contrary to the pre-trial record.  If that were the case and there was to be a second trial on the constitutional issues, there would be no point in my creating a Bill of Exception in the TDRPC violations trial that had been severed by Judge Fry.  I would have just brought this issue up in the second trial in the lawsuit. (see Cause No. 03-1049)

The unfortunate thing, and this is critical, is that the case law has indicated that a Respondent attorney has no rights of due process in the grievance investigation process and therefore all these MUST dictates and time deadlines and virtually everything in the TRDP are unenforceable and therefore meaningless.   (See Minnick v. State Bar of Texas; 790 S.W. 2d 87, 90 (Tex. App. – Austin 1990, writ denied) and Flume v. State Bar of Texas; 974 S.W. 2d 55 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1998))

Think about it.  There is not one single sanction available to a Respondent attorney for a single violation of the TRDP by the Commission.  There are no enforcement provisions applicable to the Commission and therefore the whole body of law is a vicious joke on the lawyers in Texas.

If the Commission or its agents or employees violate the TRDP dictates, then there are no repercussions of any kind.  It makes the whole TRDP a farce and along with the Rule 15.11 TRDP “immunity provision” it allows the disciplinary process to take on a Draconian Inquisition atmosphere. 

What you end up with is a witch hunt that can be prosecuted at will by malicious and bad intentioned people based upon the most insignificant gripes of a disgruntled client or a client who does not want to pay his attorney fees or an opposing attorney in a live lawsuit who wants to use the TRDP to gain an advantage in the lawsuit contrary to No. 15 in the TDRPC Preamble/Scope. 

“Furthermore, the purpose of these rules can be abused when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons.”


(Five of the twelve grievances against me have to do with opposing parties and attorneys in live lawsuits.  This is nonsense.)  (Exhibit “H”)

Dawn Miller filed suit on me for the State Bar in 1993 after the statute of limitations had run.  The suit was poured out with prejudice.  (Exhibit “C”)  A year ago she added five additional grievances to the underlying disciplinary petition against me contrary to the “MUST file” with the Clerk of the Supreme Court dictates of Rule 3.01 TRDP.  Dawn Miller, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, believes that she is above the law.  This is undeniable.

If MUST does not mean MUST in regards to Rule 3.01 TRDP then what is the point of using MUST in the statute?  It might as well read may or should or even shall or whatever you feel like.


Rule 2.09 Clarification of Inquires and Complaints.

“The Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall examine each such written statement and determine whether it constitutes an inquiry or a complaint.”


The problem is that Mr. Mapes, the investigator in eleven of the twelve grievances filed against me, testified at trial that he is not an attorney and that he had no understanding of the Preamble and Scope of the TDRPC.  No. 11 under Preamble: Scope states; “The rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role”

Mr. Mapes, as a non-attorney, has no qualifications to determine whether a written statement constitutes a complaint or an inquiry.  Rule 2.09 should mandate that an attorney must make these determinations.

A non-attorney assigned as the gate keeper in disciplinary matters is really ridiculous.

When you follow this gate keeping function up with the ability of the Commission to manipulate the committees and panels that hear the complaints (as they undeniably did in my case; against the MUST dictates of Rule 2.07) (Exhibit “A”), you have a situation like mine where Mr. Mapes takes a frivolous grievance and classifies it as a complaint and then manipulates the panel assignment to achieve a negative “just cause” finding against me. 

            This is NOT a hypothetical case.  This is what undeniably happened to me; over and over again.


Rule 2.13  Disposition Upon a Finding of Just Cause.

“Should an investigatory panel find Just Cause, it may, with the consent of Respondent, impose any Sanction available under these rules except disbarment.”


Here is another problem that happened to me.  In the Collins matter, the Committee offered me a sanction of a public reprimand.  My choice was to take the public reprimand in the State Bar Journal or be sued and receive a public reprimand in the public records of the Harris County District Clerk anyway. 

Now consider that a non attorney, Mr. Mapes, has determined that a written statement is a complaint and then maliciously forwarded it to a committee that is biased against me and then an offer is made to me for a public reprimand which I either accept or face the public reprimand of a disciplinary petition anyway.  No one can deny the unconstitutionality in this kind of arbitrary system. 


Rule 2.15  Confidentiality

The number one problem here is that Complainant Collins and her attorney McNab Miller violated the confidentiality rule.  In Collins pro se original answer and in Miller’s amended answer for Collins, they referenced the grievance against me and even lied about what was going on in the grievance process.  (Exhibit “B”)  I filed a grievance against Miller but it was rejected.  (Exhibit “D”) 

The reality is that there is no remedy for an attorney against a Complainant for violation of this Rule, or any Rule for that matter.

The real question for the Supreme Court is whether a violation of the confidentiality rule overrides the common law regarding “slander”; which says that a slander cause of action cannot be maintained for anything that is stated in relation to a lawsuit.  So was it OK for Miller and Collins to violate Rule 2.15 because they did it within my lawsuit against Collins for my fees? 

Collins and her attorney violated Rule 2.15.  This is just another area where it is almost impossible to reconcile the TRDP which includes the TDRPC’s and the common and statutory law.

It makes the prohibitions in Rule 2.15 inapplicable to the Complainant and potentially deadly to the Respondent attorney.


Rule 3.01 Disciplinary Petition

“The Disciplinary Petition MUST be filed with, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas


Per my Application for Writ of Mandamus (Cause No. 03-0990) the Commission added on five additional complainants to the underlying disciplinary petition filed against me without filing them with the Clerk of the Supreme Court per Rule 3.01 TRDP.  Consequently, Judge Fry had no jurisdiction to hear these additional grievances because he was not assigned to hear them by the Supreme Court per Rule 3.02 TRDP.

“The Supreme Court shall promptly appoint an active district court judge who does not reside in the Administrative Judicial Region in which the Respondent resides to preside over in the case.”


Dawn Miller, believing she was above the law, in 1993 filed suit on me after the statute of limitations had run.  The suit was poured out with prejudice.  (Exhibit “C”)  Maintaining her pattern and practice of violating the law, Dawn Miller added five complainants to the underlying lawsuit as opposed to filing them with the Clerk of the Supreme Court.  There is no denying this.  There is no excuse.  There is only Dawn Miller’s arrogance.

Further, when this matter came up in pre-trial, Judge Fry asked Mr. Molleston to respond to my Plea to the Jurisdiction regarding Rule 3.01 TRDP.  Mr. Molleston stated to the court that in the six years he had been at the State Bar he had violated Rule 3.01 on several occasions by adding Complainants to existing disciplinary petitions. 

I filed a Motion to Compel Mr. Molleston to produce those cases (there are none in the case law with this fact pattern) and Judge Fry refused to hear my motion.  There can be no doubt that Judge Fry knows that no such cases exist and that Mr. Molleston will be subject to being fired and disbarred if Judge Fry compels him to produce cases which he does not have.  It would show he lied to the court.  I filed a grievance against Mr. Molleston on this issue.  Guess what?  It was denied.  (Exhibit “E”)

The word MUST leaves no room for discretion.  MUST means MUST unless of course you are Dawn Miller, General Counsel for the State Bar and Chief Disciplinary Counsel.  Then MUST means whatever you want it to mean.

Further Rule 3.01 does not authorize more than one complainant to be filed with one petition.  Under the proposed Rules, multiple Complainants are allowed.

The problem is that in my trial, three or four people were struck from the jury panel when asked if they thought that six complainants meant that I had in fact done something wrong and they answered in the positive without having heard a scintilla of evidence.

No one can question the prejudice against an attorney when multiple Complainants are tried together.  By trying the Complainants together, three or four grievances based on a minor infraction of the TDRPC (not calling a client enough) are put together in one case.  Any one grievance would not be able to fly by itself.  Yet together they give an appearance of wrong doing simply based on the number of complainants in the lawsuit.

I allege that Dawn Miller was afraid that the original disciplinary petition against me, which only included Collins and was barred by res judicata and would be dismissed by Judge Fry.  The disciplinary petition was bolstered with five additional grievances filed eighty days after the original disciplinary petition was filed in order to prevent the Collins case from being poured out on Summary Judgment.


Rule 3.08 Additional Rules of Procedure in the Trial of Disciplinary Actions

“B. Except as varied by these rules, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply.”

Rule 3.08(b) is where there are a lot of problems with the TRDP.  This is where everything becomes cloudy and bright lines do not exist.  Two examples follow.

1)  Is Rule 97a TRCP varied by Rule 15.04 and 15.05 TRDP.  (Cause No. 03-1049, 03-1069, 03-1070) The real problem here is whether or not a suit for fees by the Respondent attorney can be severed under Rule 41 TRCP or even separated under Rule 174 (b) TRCP from the TDRPC violations.  Especially when there is an award of restitution all based on the same underlying action.  It makes no sense at all for fee disputes and their associated TDRPC violations to be tried separately.

2)  Rule 3.09 Judgment.  The problem in my case is that Judge Fry set a disbarment date prior to the date when his plenary power expires.  This resulted in my defacto disbarment.  Judge Fry admitted this.  (Exhibit “F”)  This issue regarding actual disbarment date is not addressed in the TRDP. (Cause No. 03-1022)


Rule 3.10 Hearings on Sanctions

The problem here is that it is nonsense that every violation of the TDRPC could have “death penalty” disbarment consequences.  It is wrong that there is no range of punishment to limit the presiding judge’s range of sanctions.  This is especially true when some of these judges who are appointed by the Supreme Court have no familiarity with Disciplinary Petitions.  There is no way that failing to call a client can be as serious as taking the client’s trust funds.

In the underlying lawsuit, I won the lawsuit that Collins had filed against Alvin Arbuckle (Exhibit “I”) and that I was hired to prosecute (Exhibit “J”).  Yet I was disbarred in part for not keeping her informed.  This is nonsense.

This issue becomes even more important considering the fact that a Judgment for Disbarment cannot be superseded or stayed per Rule 3.14 TRDP.


Rule 3.12  Restitution  

The only client property that restitution concerns is trust funds as delineated by Rule 1.14 (a, b, c) TDRPC.  Rule 3.12 does not specifically state this.  However, in my case, Judge Fry ordered restitution to three complainants when there was no submission to the jury regarding Rule 1.14 TDRPC. (Cause No. 03-1069, 03-1070)

The first thing that is told to a Complainant in a grievance hearing is that the Commission is not empowered to get their money back.  So this means that only Rule 1.14 TDRPC trust funds are subject to restitution under Rule 3.12.

In my case, Judge Fry awarded Restitution without a Rule 1.14 jury finding that I had taken trust monies with regards to three Complainants.

A secondary issue here relates to the fact that I had sued Collins in Cause No. 2000-31108, WorldPeace v. Collins, 281st District Court, Harris County, Texas and a final judgment had been entered in that case a month prior to trial in the underlying disciplinary case.  Collins had not counter sued for restitution in the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit and therefore was barred by Rule 97a (res judicata) from suing for it in the underlying disciplinary petition.  (Cause No. 03-1084)  Yet Judge Fry awarded Collins restitution.  (Exhibit “G”)


Rule 3.14 No Supersedeas

“A district court judgment of disbarment or an order revoking probation of a suspension from the practice of law cannot be superseded or stayed.”


As far as I know there are no other examples in the civil law which enforce a judgment and allow no bail, stay or supersedeas bond to maintain the status quo during appeal.

The problem with Rule 3.14 is that it does not allow for an expedited appeal.  The questions of law can be the subject of an Application for Writ of Mandamus but that is limited. 

A lawyer could be stopped from practicing law for years while he waits to be heard in the appeals court and if the disbarment is reversed, there is no remedy for the attorney.  Considering the manipulation of the grievance process as stated above, this is the ultimate injustice.

The problem in my case is that Judge Fry intentionally refused to clarify or modify his Judgment for Disbarment expecting that he would accomplish a defacto disbarment lasting at least a couple of years by simply refusing to clarify or modify his wrongful Judgment for Disbarment. (Judge Fry granted the Commission’s Motion for No Evidence Summary Judgment when the Commission did not plead all WorldPeace causes of action and did not specifically list all the elements of the causes of action.  The lawsuit has not been fully adjudicated.  Yet I cannot practice law.) (Cause No. 03-1023)


Rule 4.06  Duties and Authority of the Commisison

“The Commission has the following duties and responsibilities. (A) To exercise, in lawyer disciplinary and disablility proceedings only, all rights characteristically resposed in a client by the common law of this State.”


The question is, in my lawsuit, should I have counterclaimed against the Commission for my fees owed to me by Complainants Lang, Apodaca and Collins or should I have filed a Third Party claim against the Complainant.  Judge Fry in one of the hearings stated that Rule 97a TRCP did not apply because the Complainants are not Parties.  However, without Rule 4.06 A, the Commission has no privity to sue me for what I allegedly did against the Complainants.  So the Complainants really are Parties.

This also gets into the issue of a Rule 41 TRCP severance and sometimes a Rule 174 (b) separate trial issue where it is an abuse of discretion to sever a Rule 97a compulsory counterclaim.  But Rule 97a speaks of Parties and not Complainants. 

I find it interesting that Judge Fry strictly interprets the word Party in Rule 97a TRCP but ignores the word MUST in Rule 3.01 TRDP.


Rule 15.01  Subpoena Power

An attorney can assert his rights against self incrimination under this Rule.   The client has a right to his or her file.   If an attorney does not return a file then the Commission must prove up a Rule 1.15 TDRPC violation.  But there can be no violation of Rule 15.01 because an attorney exercises his rights against self incrimination and refuses to respond to the Commission.


Rule 1.15 (d) and Rules 1.03 (a & b) TDRPC.

All of these rules reference the word “reasonably” or “reasonable” and that ties back to the Terminology of the TDRPC. 

“Reasonable and Reasonably when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.”


In the law of legal malpractice, an expert is required to prove up a “reasonably prudent attorney”  The terminology is the same in the TDRPC as in the legal malpractice law and therefore an expert should be required by the Commission to prove up the same standard of care with regards to the TDRPC.  (Cause No. 03-1069, 03-1070)


The abuse that has been foisted on me in the grievance process is not the exception but the rule.  I am the only attorney to date who laid the proper foundations and preserved error on all these abuses by Dawn Miller and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline;  from Mr. Mapes the non attorney determining that I had violated the TDRPC that he admitted at trial that he did not understand, to the manipulation of the panels that investigated the grievances against me, to Dawn Miller, who as per usual believed that she was above the law and added additional grievances to the underlying disciplinary petition that were not authorized by Rule 3.01 TRDP, to Judge Fry who refused to sever the lawsuit per my motion, refused to clarify his disjunctive orders, and attempted to dismiss a large part of my counterclaims with a “mother hubbard” clause.  This is all business as usual in the grievance process. 

The grievance process as it now exists is arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.

A lawyer in this state cannot be held to two very distinct bodies of law; the “suit within a suit” and “but for” legal malpractice elements and the TDRPC elements.  The first makes it impossible for a client to win a case against an attorney and the second allows malicious harassment of an attorney by the Complainant through the Commission based on the most frivolous of grievances.  Many of which are filed simply to get out of paying attorneys fees.

Every attorney in this state knows that to sue for one’s fees will bring on a grievance.

The grievance process needs to be abolished.  Not a single rule of the TRDP that applies to the pre 2.14 TRDP election of a trial de novo can be enforced by a Respondent attorney.

There is a presently a question before this court as to whether the most critical part of the post Rule 2.14 election can be enforced.  (Cause No. 03-0990)

Rule 3.01 TRDP “The Disciplinary Petition MUST be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas .”

Respectfully submitted,


John WorldPeace
2620 Fountainview,
Suite 106
Houston , Texas 77057
Tel. 713-784-7618
Fax. 713-784-9063
TBA No. 21872800


            I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was forwarded to opposing counsel and Judge Fry on December 1, 2003 by fax and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas on December 1, 2003 by EXPRESS MAIL.  

John WorldPeace


A.                    Chart of Panel assignment of the grievances against WorldPeace  

B.                    ORIGINAL ANSWER

                                    JOHN WORLDPEACE V. JOHNELL COLLINS  

C.                    ORDER OF DISMISSAL

                                    STATE BAR OF TEXAS V. JOHN WORLDPEACE  

D.                    WorldPeace’s GRIEVANCE AGAINST MILLER  

E.                     WorldPeace ’s GRIEVANCE AGAINST MOLLESTON,

                        Attorney for the State Bar  

F.                     Molleston’s Letter to Judge Fry regarding Judge Fry’s refusal to enforce the

                        Judgment for Disbarment  

G.                    JUDGMENT FOR DISBARMENT  

H.                    Summary of Grievance’s from WorldPeace’s Webpage  


                        NON-SUIT OF ALL OTHER DEFENDANTS

                                     COLLINS V. ARBUCKLE  

J.                     WorldPeace’s RETAINER FEE AGREEMENT with Collins


NO:  03-978, 03-990, 03-1022, 03-1023, 03-1049, 
03-1069, 03-1070, 03-1079, 03-1082, 03-1083, 03-1084








 Re:  Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyers Discipline v. John WorldPeace, 269th District Court 
Harris County , Texas






BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared the affiant, John WorldPeace, who being by me first duly sworn, on his oath stated:

My name is John WorldPeace, I am over 21 years of age, of sound mind, capable of making this affidavit and fully competent to testify to the matters stated herein, have personal knowledge of each of the matters stated herein, and the facts contained in this affidavit are true.           


 Further affiant sayeth not.”

                                                                        John WorldPeace

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this _______ day of _________________, 2003.  

                                                                        NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE 

                                                                     STATE OF TEXAS

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