WorldPeace - "WorldPeace verses The State Bar of Texas" - World Peace

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL...................................................................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................iii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................…………….........................iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............................................................….........................vi

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION........................................................…....................viii

ISSUES PRESENTED................................................................................………...........ix

REQUIREMENTS FOR MANDAMUS………………………………………………….1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ……………………………………………………………….2

ISSUE ONE.........................................................................................................................5

Is the Final Judgment in the underlying lawsuit a Final Judgment?

ISSUE TWO………………………………………………………………………………5

Is it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to adjudicate all the issues in the underlying lawsuit?

ISSUE THREE…………………………………………………………………………….5
Is it an abuse of discretion for the First Court of Appeals to dismiss WorldPeace’s Appeal (that was filed out of an abundance of caution) for Want of Prosecution as opposed to Want of Jurisdiction due to the fact that the alleged Final Judgment in the underlying lawsuit is not in fact a final judgment per Rule 301 TRCP and the First Court of Appeals therefore did not have jurisdiction?

AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………………...5

ARGUMENT……………………………………………………………………….……10

PRAYER............................................................................................................................13

APPENDIX……………………………………………………………………….……...15

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WORLDPEACE…………………………………………….…16

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

A. CASES

Anthony Arredondo, et. al. v. The City of Dallas , Texas ................................................7,11

79 S.W. 3d 657 ( Tex. App. – Dallas 2002)

Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp..................................................................................................8

447 S.W. 2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ. App. – Dallas 1969)

Crouch v. Gleason...............................................................................................................5

875 S.W. 2d 738, 739 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1994)

Fulton v. Finch.....................................................................................................................7

346 S.W. 2d 823, 827 ( Tex. 1961)

Guajardo v. Conwell............................................................................................................6

46 S.W. 3d 862, 863-4 ( Tex. 2001)

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Abascal………………………………….....5

831 S.W. 2d 559, 563 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1992)

Ho v. University of Texas ................................................................................................6,10

984 SW2d 672, 680 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998)

In re: Tasby.....................................................................................................................5,11

40 SW 2d 190, 191 (Tex.App.-Texarkana, 2001)

In Re: Wiese……………………………………………………………………………….8

1 S.W. 3d 246, 250 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1999)

Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Martinez .......................................7,11

18 S.W. 3d 844, 847 ( Tex. App. – El Paso 2000)

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.............................................................................................6,11

39 S.W. 3d 191, 192-3 ( Tex. 2001)

Maureen Espeche v. William Ritzell....................................................................................6

65 SW3d 226 (Tex.App.-Houston [14^th Dist.] 2001)

Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board.................................................7

852 S.W. 2d 440, 443-4 ( Tex. 1993)

Thompson v. Beyer...............................................................................................................7

91 SW3d 902 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002)

Vance v. Davidson...............................................................................................................8

903 S.W. 2d 863, 867 (Tex. App. – Houston (14^th Dist.) 1995)

Willingham v. Hagerty.........................................................................................................7

553 SW2 137, 140 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1977)

STATUTES

Rule 39(a)(2)(ii) Texas Rules of Civil Procedure………………………………………...9
Rule 97a Texas Rules of Civil Procedure………………………………………………...9
Rule 301 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure…………………….…………….…………….6
Rule 3.14 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure……………………….…………….....1
Rule 4.06(a) Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure……………………………………..9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

The underlying case is a civil petition filed by John WorldPeace (Relator) against Johnell Collins (Cause No. 2000-31108; John WorldPeace v. Johnell Collins, 281^st District Court, Harris County, Texas) to collect his attorney fees per his Retainer Agreement with Collins. However, the underlying case is inextricably and significantly interconnected with (Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John WorldPeace, 269^th District Court, Harris County, Texas) a disciplinary petition filed by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline against WorldPeace. Both cases adjudicate the same WorldPeace and Collins transaction. The Collins lawsuit was assigned to the First Court of Appeals (Cause No. 01-03-00555-CV; John WorldPeace v. Johnell Collins) and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline lawsuit was assigned to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals (Cause No. 14-03-01339-CV; John WorldPeace v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline).

THE RESPONDENT

The Respondents are Judge David Brenal, in his capacity as presiding judge of the 281^st District Court, and Justice Taft, Justice Nuchia and Justice Keyes presiding justices of the First Court of Appeals, Harris County, Texas.

RELIEF SOUGHT BY RELATOR

Relator WorldPeace prays the court to mandamus Judge Brenal to try the unadjudicated issues in the underlying lawsuit and to mandamus Justice Taft, Justice Nuchia and Justice Keyes to vacate their Memorandum Opinion dismissing WorldPeace’s Appeal for Want of Prosecution and to enter an Order of Dismissal for Want of Jurisdiction.

REGARDING FILING IN THE SUPREME COURT

RELATOR’S APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS was not first filed in the appeals court because it is significantly and inextricably interconnected with the following Applications for Writs of Mandamus that have been submitted to this court regarding Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John WorldPeace, 269^th District Court, Harris County, Texas. Seven of these Application’s for Writs of Mandamus are presently pending before this court.

Cause Numbers 03-978, 03-990, 03-1022, 03-1023, 03-1049, 03-1069, 03-1070, 03-1079, 03-1082, 03-1083, 03-1084, 03-1117, 03-1139.

The problem is that a determination must be made as to whether the Final Judgment in the underlying lawsuit in the 281^st District Court is a Rule 301 TRCP Final Judgment.

If it is, then the Commission for Lawyer Discipline was barred by res judicata from pursuing the same underlying WorldPeace and Collins transaction in the disciplinary petition against WorldPeace in the 269^th District Court.

If the Final Judgment in the 281^st District Court is not a Final Judgment, then Judge Fry in the 269^th District Court should have adjudicated the WorldPeace v. Collins counterclaim in the 269^th District Court which he refused to do.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Prohibition/Mandamus against a district judge under Section 22.002(a) of the Government Code and Article V. Section 3 of The Texas Constitution.

Is it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to adjudicate all the issues in the underlying lawsuit?

Is it an abuse of discretion for the First Court of Appeals to dismiss WorldPeace’s Appeal (that was filed out of an abundance of caution) for Want of Prosecution as opposed to Want of Jurisdiction due to the fact that the alleged Final Judgment in the underlying lawsuit is not in fact a final judgment per Rule 301 TRCP and the First Court of Appeals therefore did not have jurisdiction?

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THIS COURT:

COMES NOW, WorldPeace and files this RELATOR’S APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS REGARDING FINAL JUDGMENT and would show the court the following:

REQUIREMENTS FOR MANDAMUS

1) There is no remedy on appeal because per Rule 3.14 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (Appendix) a Judgment for Disbarment cannot be superseded or stayed. WorldPeace would show the court that his Judgment for Disbarment in the 269^th District Court and the underlying WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit in the 281^st District Court are inextricably interconnected and that WorldPeace has filed Applications for Writs of Mandamus regarding the connection of the two lawsuits in this court. WorldPeace was disbarred in part for his actions regarding the Collins matter which had been tried to conclusion before the disciplinary petition trial began in the 269^th District Court. 2) Judge Bland and Judge Brenal (of the 281^st District Court) and Justice Taft, Justice Nuchia and Justice Keyes’ (of the First Court of Appeals) actions in the underlying WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit and appeal are a clear abuse of discretion. 3) The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct affect over 67,000 attorneys in Texas and so WorldPeace’s Application for Writ of Mandamus regarding the underlying lawsuit is important to the jurisprudence of the state. 4) This Application for Writ of Mandamus concerns Judge Brenal’s refusal to perform his ministerial duties. 5) The Memorandum Opinion of the First Court of Appeals is a void order because there is no final order in the underlying lawsuit and the First Court of Appeals therefore has no jurisdiction.

This matter was not first filed in the First of Fourteenth Court of Appeals because there are multiple Applications for Writs of Mandamus presently pending in this court and this Application for Writ of Mandamus is inextricably connected to those Applications for Writs of Mandamus.

The problem with the underlying WorldPeace and Collins transaction is that it was tried under two cause numbers in two courts and was by the rules appealed to the First and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

WorldPeace incorporates into this Application for Writ of Mandamus the following Applications for Writs of Mandamus: Cause Numbers 03-978, 03-990, 03-1022, 03-1023, 03-1049, 03-1069, 03-1070, 03-1079, 03-1082, 03-1083, 03-1084, 03-1117, 03-1139.

On October 27, 2000 , Collins filed a First Amended Answer and Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment in the underlying lawsuit. (Record “85”)

On September 15, 2002 , the Commission for Lawyer Discipline filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction in the underlying lawsuit. (Record “91”)

On March 10, 2003 , Judge Bland signed and entered an Amended Take Nothing Judgment and Award of Rule 13 Sanctions in the WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit. (Record “98”)

Out of an abundance of caution, on May 28, 2003 , WorldPeace filed a Notice of Appeal. (Record “1”)

On June 30, 2003 , the Post Judgment Clerk sent a letter to WorldPeace regarding inability to locate a portion of the court’s file. (Record “2”)

On July 24, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Appellant’s Motion to Abate in the First Court of Appeals. (Record “3”)

On July 31, 2003 , the Post Judgment Clerk sent a second letter to WorldPeace regarding inability to locate a potion of the court’s file. (Record “8”)

On October 9, 2003 , the First Court of Appeals signed and entered an Order regarding filing of clerk’s record and reporter’s record. (Record “10”)

On October 29, 2003 , WorldPeace examined the trial court’s file and compared its contents with that of his own case file to find the pleadings missing in the trial court’s file. (Record “13”)

On October 31, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Appellant’s Motion for Continuance in the First Court of Appeals. (Record “18”)

On November 21, 2003 , the First Court of Appeals Denied WorldPeace’s Motion for Continuance. (Record “23”)

On November 26, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing for Continuance. (Record “24”)

On December 3, 2003 , WorldPeace filed WorldPeace’s Motion to Vacate, Clarify, Modify the Court’s Final Judgment of March 10, 2003 , in the 281^st District Court. (Record “27”)

On December 3, 2003 , WorldPeace filed WorldPeace’s Motion to Abate in the 281^st District Court. (Record “30”)

On December 3, 2003 , WorldPeace filed WorldPeace’s Motion to Set a Hearing on WorldPeace’s Motion to Vacate, Clarify or Modify the Court’s Final Judgment of March 10, 2003 , and WorldPeace’s Motion to Abate in the 281^st District Court. (Record “32”)

On December 4, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Appellant’s Supplement to Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing for Continuance. (Record “33”)

On December 18, 2003 , the First Court of Appeals signed and entered a Memorandum Opinion dismissing WorldPeace’s appeal for Want of Prosecution. (Record “42”)

On January 20, 2003 , WorldPeace filed Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing on the Court’s Opinion in this Appeal and Alternatively Motion to Continue and Alternatively Motion to Transfer. (Record “46”)

On March 4, 2004 , the First Court of Appeals signed and entered an order Denying Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing and Alternatively Motion to Continue and Alternatively Motion to Transfer. (Record “76”)

On March 4, 2004 , the First Court of Appeals signed and entered an order Granting Appellant’s Motion to Extend Time to File Motion for Rehearing. (Record “77”)

On March 5, 2004 , WorldPeace sent a letter to Charles Bacarisse regarding Missing Pleadings Regarding Cause No. 2000-31108; John WorldPeace v. Johnell Collins (Record “78”) and Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John WorldPeace and filed Appellant WorldPeace’s Notice of Filing Regarding Letter to District Clerk of Harris County Regarding Missing Records. (Record “82”)

ISSUE ONE

Is the Final Judgment in the underlying lawsuit a Final Judgment?

ISSUE TWO

Is it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to adjudicate all the issues in the underlying lawsuit?

ISSUE THREE

AUTHORITIES: ABUSE OF DISCRETION

“A trial court “abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W. 2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985, orig. proceeding).”

Crouch v. Gleason, 875 S.W. 2d 738, 739 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 1994)

“On the other hand, review of a trial court’s determination of the legal principles controlling its ruling is much less deferential. A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ…

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W. 2d 833, 839-40 (1992) (citations omitted).”

Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Abascal, 831 S.W. 2d 559, 563 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1992)

“A trial court may not arbitrarily halt proceedings in a pending case, and mandamus will lie to compel a trial court to hear and rule on motions pending before it.”

In re: Tasby; 40 SW2d 190, 191 (Tex.App.-Texarkana, 2001)

AUTHORITIES: FINAL JUDGMENT

“We no longer believe that a Mother Hubbard clause in an order or in a judgment issued without a full trial can be taken to indicate finality. We therefore hold that in cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.”

Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.; 39 S.W. 3d 191, 192-3 ( Tex. 2001)

“In Lehmann, we held that a judgment is final for purposes of appeal in circumstances like those of this case “If and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment. Id at 192. We apply this rule to the present case.

As we held in Lehmann, “Mother Hubbard” language like that contained in the July 9 summary judgment does not indicate finality.”

Guajardo v. Conwell; 46 S.W. 3d 862, 863-4 ( Tex. 2001)

“Rule 301 TRCP provides that there shall be only one final judgment rendered in any cause except where it is specifically provided by law. A judgment is final when it disposes of all controverted issues concerning all parties to the suit. Thus, any order rendered during a lawsuit which does not dispose of all issues regarding all parties is, of necessity, interlocutory.”

Ho v. University of Texas , 984 SW2d 672, 680 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998)

“An order or judgment is not final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it is a finally disposes of all claims and all parties. An order that does not dispose of all issues and parties is interlocutory and not appealable absent a severance. Simply labeling the order “Final Judgment” is not enough; there must be some clear indication the trial court intended to completely dispose of the entire case. Furthermore, the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause is no longer determinative of finality. An appellate court may review the record to determine whether an order disposes of all claims and parties.

A summary judgment may not be granted on a ground not presented in a motion for summary judgment. Further, a summary judgment cannot be affirmed on grounds not expressly set out in the motion or response. Because Ritzell’s amended motion for summary judgment addressing Johathan’s Espeche’s claim was not properly before the trial court, summary judgment could not be granted on that claim. Thus, the final summary judgment does not dispose of all claims.

Because the order appealed from is not a final, appealable judgment.. we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”

Maureen Espeche v. William Ritzell, 65 SW3d 226 (Tex.App.-Houston [14^th Dist.] 2001)

“A judgment is final if it either actually disposes of all claims and parties before the court or states with “unmistakeable clarity” that it is a final judgment.”

Thompson v. Beyer, 91 SW3d 902 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002)

“In that event and so long as the claimant elects not to take his credit, the nonappealable interlocutory order can never become final, a prerequisite for the enforcement of a judgment.”

Willingham v. Hagerty, 553 SW2 137, 140 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1977)

“The mere inclusion of the word “final” in the order does not make it final.”

Anthony Arredondo, et. al. v. The City of Dallas , Texas ; 79 S.W. 3d 657 ( Tex. App. – Dallas 2002)

AUTHORITIES: VOID JUDGMENTS

“A judgment which discloses its invalidity upon its face anywhere at any time in a nullity and may be disregarded anywhere at any time. While it is wholly unnecessary to appeal from a void judgment, it is nevertheless settled that an appeal may be taken and the appellate court in such proceeding may declare the judgment void. There is some similarity in this respect between a void order and an interlocutory order from which there is no statutory right of appeal.”

Fulton v. Finch; 346 S.W. 2d 823, 827 ( Tex. 1961)

“Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. The standing requirement stems from two limitations on subject matter jurisdiction: the separation of powers doctrine and, in Texas , the open courts provision. Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed and cannot be waived.”

Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control Board; 852 S.W. 2d 440, 443-4 ( Tex. 1993)

“When the trial court acts outside its jurisdiction, the proper action by the reviewing court is set aside the improper judgment and dismiss the appeal. This appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal from a void judgment. A judgment is void only when it is clear that the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no jurisdiction to render judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. When appeal is taken from a void judgment, the appellate court must declare the judgment void. Because the appellate court may not address the merits, it must set aside the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the appeal.”

Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania v. Martinez ; 18 S.W. 3d 844, 847 ( Tex. App. – El Paso 2000)

“A judgment which discloses its invalidity upon its face anywhere at any time is a nullity and may be disregarded anywhere at any time.”

Boyd v. Gillman Film Corp.; 447 S.W. 2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ. App. – Dallas 1969)

“It is one thing to say that a void order may be appealed from but it is another thing to say that it must be appealed from for it would be anomalous to say that an order is void upon its face must be appealed from before it can be treated as a nullity and disregarded. An order which must be appealed from before it is ignored can hardly be characterized as “void” and binding on no one.”

Vance v. Davidson; 903 S.W. 2d 863, 867 (Tex. App. – Houston (14^th Dist.) 1995)

“Voidable orders are readily appealable and must be attacked directly, but void orders may be circumvented by collateral attack or remedied by mandamus. A judgment is void if it is apparent that the court rendering the judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to render the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. All errors other than jurisdiction deficiencies render the judgment merely voidable, and such errors must be corrected on direct attack.”

In Re: Wiese; 1 S.W. 3d 246, 250 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1999)

BACKGROUND

WorldPeace would show the court that the underlying lawsuit and its appeal are impossible to justly separate from WorldPeace’s appeal of Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. WorldPeace (Cause No. 2002-42081; Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John WorldPeace, 269^th District Court, Harris County, Texas) as well as separate it from the Applications for Writs of Mandamus that WorldPeace has filed in this Court that are directly related to the underlying lawsuit the subject of this Application for Writ of Mandamus.

The problem is centered on the right of WorldPeace to file a Rule 97a TRCP compulsory counterclaim in a disciplinary lawsuit or Rule 39(a)(2)(ii) TRCP counterclaim (consolidating the Commission for Lawyer Discipline’s disciplinary petition with the existing civil lawsuit) based on the same transaction.

Rule 39 TRCP Joinder of Persons needed for Just Adjudication (a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so siturated that the desposition of the action in his absence may (ii)leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he is not so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party.

Rule 97a TRCP Compulsory Counterclaims A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim within the jurisdiction of the court, not the subject of a pending action, which at the time of filing the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; provided, however, that a judgment base upon a settlement or compromise of a claim of one party to the transaction or occurrence prior to a disposition on the merits shall not operate as a bar to the continuation or assertion of the claims of any other party to the transaction or occurrence unless the latter has consented in writing that said judgment shall operate as a bar.

WorldPeace has been severely abused in the underlying lawsuit and its appeal by virtue of the fact that WorldPeace is incurring all the nightmares that Rule 39 (a)(2)(ii) TRCP seeks to avoid. WorldPeace has pursued his claims against Collins as a Plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit against Collins and defended himself from the vicarious standing of the Commission for Lawyer Discipline per Rule 4.06(a) TRDP on behalf of Collins regarding the exact same underlying transaction.

The First Court of Appeals refused to acknowledge the fact that the underlying transaction was being pursued by WorldPeace in the Supreme Court as well as in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. The First Court of Appeals was determined to force WorldPeace to appeal the underlying WorldPeace v. Collins lawsuit as if WorldPeace’s pleadings in the Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not exist.

Further, WorldPeace alleges that the First Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to even consider the underlying lawsuit because there was no final judgment.

This Application for Writ of Mandamus centers on the fact that there is no final judgment in the underlying lawsuit and that the presiding judge of the 281^st District Court, Judge Bernal refuses to go forward with the underlying lawsuit or to abate the lawsuit.

Between the 281^st District Court’s refusal to go forward with the underlying lawsuit and the First Court of Appeals refusal to continue the appeal, over which it has no jurisdiction (WorldPeace filed a Notice of Appeal out of an abundance of caution) in addition to the related matters pending in the Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, all of WorldPeace’s pleadings regarding his disbarment are being dealt with in a disjunctive, incoherent and unjust manner by multiple courts.

ARGUMENT

The underlying Final Judgment is not a final judgment because it does not adjudicate all the issues and all the parties. See Ho above. A declaratory judgment cause of action that was filed by Collins (Record “86”) has not been adjudicated and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline who appeared in the lawsuit and filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction (Record “91”) was never dismissed by Judge Bland in the March 10, 2003 , Final Judgment. (Record “98”) The Commission for Lawyer Discipline listed all the motions it responded to in the 281^st District Court in its Plea to the Jurisdiction. (Record “91”)

WorldPeace filed a Motion to Vacate, Clarify, Modify the Court’s Final Judgment of March 10, 2003, (Record “27”) and a Motion to Abate (Record “30”) and a Motion to set hearings on both (Record “32”) in the 281^st District Court. Judge Bland refused to set a hearing and when she was appointed to the First Court of Appeals, Judge Brenal who replaced her as presiding judge in the 281^st District Court also refused to set a hearing on WorldPeace’s Motions.

Per Tasby above it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to not perform its ministerial duty to adjudicate lawsuits.

Per Lehman, and its progeny, Judge Bland’s March 10, 2003 , Final Judgment is not a final judgment because it did not in fact dispose of all the issues and all the parties. The March 10, 2003 , order did not include “Final” in its caption. (Record “98”) Judge Bland did indicate in the last sentence of the Order that it was a Final Judgment. (Record “103”) Per Arredondo above, just because an order uses the word “final” does not make it final.

The First Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to hear the underlying appeal and all of its orders including its dismissal for want of prosecution of WorldPeace’s appeal are void and not enforceable because there was no final order in the underlying lawsuit and therefore the First Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to hear WorldPeace’s appeal (See Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania above) that was filed out of an abundance of caution.

WorldPeace would also ask the court to take judicial notice of the fact that in both the underlying case and in Commission for Lawyer Discipline v. John WorldPeace there are significant pleadings missing. WorldPeace wonders what the odds are that two of WorldPeace’s files regarding his disbarment in two district courts would both be missing pleadings critical to WorldPeace’s appeal.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, WorldPeace prays this court to mandamus Judge Brenal to hold hearings on WorldPeace motions and to adjudicate the balance of the underlying lawsuit or to abate the lawsuit and mandamus the First Court of Appeals to vacate its Memorandum Opinion dismissing WorldPeace’s Appeal for Want of Prosecution and to enter an order dismissing WorldPeace’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and for such other and further relief at law or in equity as this court may deem proper.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________________
John WorldPeace
2620 Fountainview, Suite 106
Houston , Texas 77057
Tel. 713-784-7618
Fax. 713-784-9063
TBA No. 21872800

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing pleading was forwarded to opposing counsel on March 10, 2004, by fax and the Commission for Lawyer Discipline on March 10, 2004, by fax and Judge Brenal on March 10, 2004, by CERTIFIED MAIL and Justice Taft, Justice Nuchia and Justice Keyes by CERTIFIED MAIL on March 10, 2004, and to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas on March 10, 2004, via EXPRESS MAIL.

John WorldPeace

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

Opposing Counsel opposes the RELATOR’S APPLICATION FOR MANDAMUS.

____________________________________
John WorldPeace

APPENDIX

EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION

A. March 10, 2003 Amended Take Nothing Judgment and Award of Rule 13 Sanctions

B. February 12, 2004 Memorandum Opinion

C. RULES

Rule 39(a)(2)(ii) Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 97a Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 301 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 3.14 Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure
Rule 4.06(a) Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure

NO. ________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF TEXAS

______________________________

IN RE:

JOHN WORLDPEACE

______________________________

Re: Cause No. 2000-31108; John WorldPeace v. Johnell Colins,
281^st District Court
Harris County , Texas

______________________________________________________________________

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WORLDPEACE, ATTORNEY AT LAW

______________________________________________________________________

STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF HARRIS

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared the affiant, John WorldPeace, who being by me first duly sworn, on his oath stated:

My name is John WorldPeace, I am over 21 years of age, of sound mind, capable of making this affidavit and fully competent to testify to the matters stated herein, have personal knowledge of each of the matters stated herein, and the facts contained in this affidavit are true.

The exhibits in the Appendix and Record attached to RELATOR’S Application for Writ of Mandamus are true and correct copies of the originals.”

Further affiant sayeth not.”

__________________________________
John WorldPeace

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this _______ day of _________________, 2004.

____________________________________
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS

How can we manifest peace on earth if we do not include everyone (all races, all nations, all religions, both sexes) in our vision of Peace?